THE RELIGIOUS QUEST FOR UNIFYING VALUE: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE MEANING OF RELIGION IN THE THOUGHT OF ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD

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ABBREVIATIONS OF THE MAJOR WORKS OF ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD

AI	Adventures of Ideas
ESP	Essays in Science and Philosophy
FR	The Function of Reason
MT	Modes of Thought
PR	Process and Reality
RM	Religion in the Making
SMW	Science and the Modern World
Sym.	Symbolism
UA	Treatise on Universal Algebra
Dial.	Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead, as Recorded by Lucien Price.

INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF RELIGION IN AN UNFINISHED WORLD

I. The Shape of the Problem

The secular climate of the contemporary world poses some important challenges for man's religious identity and self-understanding. It faces him with the question of whether it is possible to be a person who is thoroughly involved in the secular project of building the earth and yet deeply involved with God, whether it is possible to appreciate and live with the social dimensions of religion and yet exercise responsible freedom in the solitariness of religious commitment, whether it is possible to respect particular instances of religious insight and yet at the same time to see them in continuity with a comprehensive general understanding of the world.

These are but a few of the questions that reveal the crisis facing religion today. One cannot deal adequately with various specific challenges that confront religion, however, unless one first examines the more fundamental questions of the meaning and function of religion. Since the present study will be taken up with the perspective of one man, Alfred North Whitehead, on the meaning and function of religion, it is well to call attention to some central problematic

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areas out of which the question of the character of religion emerges. These areas include the problems of what is the importance of religion, what is the relationship of individuality and community in religion, and how we are to understand the roles of generality and particularity in religion.

It is often noted that many conventional expressions of religion have lost their force for men and women today.[1] Religious beliefs, practices, and worship have all undergone scrutiny and criticism. The calling into question of these aspects of religion, however, is symptomatic of a deeper questioning and concern. That deeper concern revolves around the problem of whether religion is really important and, if it is important, how its importance is to be understood.

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[1] For a few of the various perspectives on this problem, see Robert Bellah, Beyond Belief (New York: Harper and Row, 1970); Robert Wuthnow and Charles Y. Glock, "Shifting Focus of Faith: A Survey Report, God in the Gut," Psychology Today, November 1974, 131-136; Thomas Luckmann, The Invisible Religion (New York: Macmillan, 1966). The recognition of this loss of force in religion found expression a generation ago in the plea of Dietrich Bonhoeffer for a "religionless Christianity" and in his criticism of religious consciousness seen in terms of a response to a "God of the gaps" who is summoned when human perceptions fail or when human resources are at an end. See Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, trans. Reginald Fuller (New York: Macmillan, 1962), 162-166.

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One may trace the apparent loss of vitality and meaning in religion to many sources: the collapse of social structures, the philosophical implications of scientific discoveries and technology, the insights gained through the study of human psychological development, to mention but a few. Whatever else these and other factors bring to light concerning religion, they all accent a new sense of human autonomy which has implications for the way that we understand the importance of religion.

The sense of human autonomy that characterizes contemporary consciousness takes a large measure of its significance for religion from the fact that human beings have a new awareness that they are shapers of history and not merely recipients of history. With this awareness of themselves as creative agents comes a corresponding diminution of the kind of religious attitude characterized by a sense of finitude, appreciativeness, and openness to the given. One is therefore led to ask whether the feeling of dependence on a larger, more comprehensive reality than one's self no longer carries religious meaning or whether the religious meaning is to be found in another attitude or on another level.

On the one hand, the sense of autonomy that pervades contemporary consciousness introduces the suspicion that religious impulses and religious meanings may be products of human construction that have been outgrown. "Man come of age" often wonders if he has transcended religion, if religious concerns are so peripheral an element in human existence as to suggest another realm set apart from the challenging concerns of everyday living. If this is so, then religion takes one away from matters of importance, and it is not worthwhile to attempt to redeem its meaning and vitality.

On the other hand, a religious character in experience itself seems to be a given, for religion persists and continues to express itself in new forms.[2] Thus, it cannot be taken for granted that autonomy, as an unexamined assumption, is the last word. Though the sense of finitude has diminished in some areas of human existence, especially as a result of advances made possible by technology, a deeper, more pervasive sense of finitude may be discovered. If the importance of religion, with whatever finitude it carries, is to become evident today, then its meaning must be discovered in man's existence in and relation to an unfinished world.

At the same time, a renewed religious understanding should reach out to discover the source of fragmentariness at the heart of human existence and the means by which the fragmentariness is overcome. The shift of meaning that seems to be occurring for religion involves an uncertainty as regards the central values by which the diverse values of life are coordinated. Any attempt to understand the importance of religion must come to terms with the value at the center of life and with the finitude by virtue of which human beings are not the sole creators of unified value or the sole agents through whom the fragmentariness is overcome and unified value is promoted. The ground of ultimate significance that establishes unity lies beyond mere human invention. Still further, even when such unity of value and purpose is perceived, the sense of finitude does not disappear. One is still subject to the inadequacy of his own personal power and motivation to live wholeheartedly in accord with the purpose perceived.

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[2] Andrew Greeley and Gregory Baum, eds. The Persistence of Religion (Concilium 81) (New York: Herder and Herder, 1973).

A renewed understanding of the importance of religion, then, requires a framework for analysis which will both recognize human beings as creative agents in their own history and which will also give due attention to the religious elements which are revealed in the recognition and transcendence of finitude and fragmentariness. In order to discover the significance religion has in a world that is understood as unfinished and in the process of becoming, it is necessary to explore these elements in relation to the central values that lie at the heart of the process. This will be one of the basic tasks of this study.

In addition to the problem of determining the meaning and importance of religion, another challenge confronts contemporary

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religious understanding. Once religious meaning establishes a unity and an aim in life, the question arises as to what are the roles of individuality and community in the discovery and fulfillment of religious values. This question, which concerns the public and private sides of religion, has long engaged the attention of religious thinkers, but it has come into particular prominence in the last two centuries.

The historical background of the contemporary period reveals a growing emphasis on subjectivity and individuality and a corresponding devaluation of the communitarian elements that are often bound up with the external forms of religion. Since these forms in the shape of beliefs, rituals, and religious practices are what is most immediately identified with religion, they can become detached from the fundamental religious relationship with the result that the communitarian, public side of religion seems superficial, external, and inclined to promote narrowness and conservatism.

Some religious thinkers suggest that the external and public forms of religion have come to dominate our understanding of what is religious and what is not religious to the detriment of genuine religious values.[3] Among them is Wilfred Cantwell Smith who states that a growing concentration on the public side of religion has resulted in the reification of religion and its identification as a noun or a thing.[4] This reification of religion not only distorts its meaning, but it also promotes the tendency to make static a relationship that is dynamic. Smith observes that the most vital and important expressions of religious spirit have been formed by a particular kind of relationship rather than by concern with religion as a thing, for when religion is reified there is a distancing from involvement in the relationship out of which religious meaning emerges.

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[3] Wuthnow and Glock, loc. cit.; Luckmann, op. cit.; Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion (New York: Mentor Books, 1964), 19-49, 109-138.

On the one hand, while outward aspects of religion present us with objectifications whereby we can recognize, study and evaluate the religious stance of individuals and the meaning they share with others, it would be hard to deny that this religious stance has little meaning apart from its rootedness in the individual's subjective response. Religion at best is an affair of the heart and the spirit of man where his deepest meaning and the shape of his character are formed.

On the other hand, the creation and understanding of religious meaning and value cannot be detached from the concreteness of historical process. The religious values that the individual perceives and embodies subjectively depend to a considerable degree on the community out of which he is formed. We are faced, therefore, with the dilemma of attempting to acknowledge, on the one hand, the influence and value of the social dimensions of religion, whether communicated through traditional religious expressions or through religious influences more diffusely present in the world, and, on the other hand, of recognizing the necessity of a personal response which cannot be replaced by external forms and which cannot be forced by social pressures. Our understanding of man as a person who is historically shaped and yet free, bodily receptive and yet spiritually yearning, compels us to find a way to deal with both the public and the private aspects of religion.

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[4] Smith, op. cit., proposes as a solution to this problem the abandonment of the term "religion" as a substantive and suggests replacing it with the two-pronged expression "tradition" and "faith."

If the meaning of religion is to be found in a mode of relating, as has been suggested, we must seek a clarification of the basis on which one may discuss a religious character in the relational process and the roles individuality and community have in it.

Finally, the contemporary dilemma of religious meaning leads to another, more comprehensive problem. It is the question of how religious meaning manifests itself in particular instances and how these instances are related to one's general understanding of the world and the way one lives in it. As they are usually described, moments of religious experience or intuition are charged vividly with a sense of meaning and importance that is both self-justifying and widely applicable. Though they are particular occurrences, these experiences open up a view of something larger than the immediate occasion. A full understanding of religion requires a spelling out of this sense of importance by means of a broader conceptual framework that uncovers the connections between particularity and generality.

There is another reason why the particularity and generality of religious insight requires explication through a coherent framework. The sense of individuality and freedom that characterizes the present stage of human development presupposes rationality as an essential quality of the structure of existence. In order to assure the continuing quality of religious response, rationality not only permits but also calls for criticism and evaluation of one's religious position and choices. It has been these critical functions operative in man's development through history that have made possible the transformation of religion with the transformation of knowledge. From this we realize that the religious insights gained in particular moments will not continue to reveal their full consequences unless the assumptions inherent in them continue to find renewed expression in one's generalized understanding of the world. In this way, one is able to interpret, evaluate, and reform one's religious response as he or she develops.

Gordon Allport makes this point admirably clear in his classic study, The Individual and His Religion.[5] Allport distinguishes several characteristics of mature religion, among which are two that are specifically related to the issue we have been considering. The first is that mature religion involves a differentiation of sentiment and the second, that mature religion demands a comprehensive philosophy of life. To say that religion involves a differentiation of sentiment means that one possesses a certain critical ability to evaluate what he encounters in religious insight and expressions. Such a religious attitude allows the development of religion in breadth of outlook as well as in depth of conviction. It also recognizes the necessity for intellectual differentiation in religion by admitting the impact of relevant experience on religious sentiment.

When the individual is sensitive to the intake of relevant experience, he does not allow the present state of religion and its particular expressions to have the final word. Instead, he continually brings the generality he finds in religion into relationship with the forms of generality he finds in the various aspects of life. As we have seen, this requires some measure of detachment and the differentiation of sentiment.

The second characteristic which has relevance for the issue

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[5] Gordon Allport, The Individual and His Religion (New York: Macmillan, 1960), 52-74.

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we are considering here is the need for a comprehensive philosophy of life. The second characteristic, which is a counterpart of differentiation, is expressed in varying degrees of explicitness. However explicitly this philosophy of life may or may not be expressed, individuals live by certain ideas or assumptions that relate to their perception of order. A comprehensive philosophy of life, flowing from general principles, recognizes and elucidates this order, thus providing a basis for unity in life and preventing the fragmentation that dissipates energy and reduces efficacy.

A comprehensive philosophy of life, then, builds on the extended application of general notions, either perceived in or derived from particular experiences. While a comprehensive philosophy of life testifies to the coherence and growth possibilities of religion, it can lead to the desire for further understanding such as a clarification of the meaning of religion itself and of the relationship between the experiences that ground religion and one's more basic experiences in life as a whole. To become self-critical about the philosophy of life itself, then, one needs to search for adequate conceptual resources.

A fuller examination of the problems which have surfaced in the various areas we have considered, calls for a framework of interpretation. In order to arrive at a deeper understanding of the meaning and importance of religion in a dynamic, unfinished world, we need a conceptual framework which takes this processive and relational character with full seriousness. Alfred North Whitehead's metaphysical system suggests such a framework. Therefore, the purpose of this study will be to examine the character and function of religion in Whitehead's thought and, consequently, to evaluate the adequacy of his approach for the elucidation of the meaning of religion and religious experience. It is well, then, to give some preliminary attention to the relevance of his thought for the problem of religion that has been sketched and to set forth the procedure that will be followed in examining his approach to religion.

II. Whitehead and Religion

The several problematic areas of religion that have been explored are areas to which Whitehead's thought lends itself in a special way; thus it will be helpful to point out some of his concerns and emphases along these lines as a way of indicating the key elements in his religious thought that will have to be examined in this study.

While Whitehead did not explicitly take on the task of arguing for the importance of religion, his writings are charged with the acceptance of religious importance and with his own perspective on what the importance of religion is. It is necessary to examine some of his assumptions and valuations in this matter in order to clarify his understanding of the meaning and function of religion. Since his comprehensive outlook is one that is shaped by the presuppositions of a twentieth century scientific world view, his approach to religion will reflect that view and should therefore offer a major modern address to the question of whether religion still has relevance.

In order to deal adequately with Whitehead's view of religion, it must be examined against the background of his philosophical outlook, for his approach to more specific questions can only be understood in light of his analysis of the basic categories that characterize all aspects of experience. Moreover, it is in this philosophical framework that we find the clearest expression of the valuational elements which give substance to all forms of meaning, religious or otherwise. In studying this background, it will become apparent that Whitehead's analysis of the structure of reality lends itself not only to the question of religious importance that has been raised but also to the matter of individuality and community, for his analysis of the structure of experience revolves around the relationship between individuality and community.

For one thing, it will be essential to examine and clarify Whitehead's discussions of individuality and community in religion and their connection with his discussions of individuality and community in the philosophical scheme. The philosophical scheme is concerned with the process of unification, with the subject's overcoming of the disjunctiveness of the many. Whitehead's religious outlook gives evidence of being concerned with the same basic problem of the one and the many along with the question of what is the distinctive religious perspective on this problem.

In investigating the categoreal scheme and the central notions which control its contours, relations and process stand out as the dominant elements constitutive of the character of all things. These elements give form and direction to Whitehead's casting of the central philosophical question in terms of how the many others of the world enter into the constitution of any individual. In light of this,

his view of religion also needs to be examined to see how these elements contribute to its shape and how they illuminate the relationship between individuality and community in religion.

There are a number of specific aspects of individuality and community that need to be explored from within this relational perspective of Whitehead's: the individual's religious role, the community's religious role, the tension between the two, the individual and social contexts of religious meaning, to mention a few. In light of his considerable interest in the topic of individuality and community, therefore, we should expect his approach to elucidate these areas as well as to present resources for dealing with other aspects of the question of individuality and community which will become more apparent as the study proceeds.

Finally, Whitehead's framework offers a means for dealing with the question of particularity and generality. The topic of generality was significant for Whitehead in several ways. First, he saw the method of descriptive generalization as the most appropriate way of getting at the essential character in the structure of reality, and therefore it presents an important means for clarifying the values which lie at the center of religion and life. Second, he had an expressed interest in the relationship between philosophical generality and religious particularity, and it is in connection with this interest that he sought to establish the interdependence of religion and philosophy and to establish the experiential basis for a rational understanding which has a universal scope. Third, he viewed the development of religion through history in terms of its demonstrating a movement toward greater generality, a movement whose intellectual implications are considerable.

The relationship between particularity and generality is manifested in other ways besides in the interaction between philosophy and religion. It is also manifested in a significant way in the religious intuitions. Because of the central role of intuitions in Whitehead's approach to religion, and because he has not analyzed their meaning or structure himself, it will be necessary to give special attention to religious intuitions in order to see how, as particular instances, they express generality.

In view of Whitehead's concern with generality in these several ways, therefore, we would expect that the pervasive generality reflected in his philosophical scheme will bring some important insights and elucidation to bear on the way that generality functions in religion. In this regard, however, Whitehead himself has not elaborated a complete philosophy of religion, and, therefore, the central task of this study will be to bring out the full dimensions of his religious thought, not as a philosophy of religion, but by establishing its essential concepts and their implications in light of his philosophical view. Although the incompleteness of Whitehead's philosophy of religion has been duly noted,[6] this should not prevent an exploration of the religious conceptions that are present explicitly in Whitehead's thought as well as consequences of the religious elements that are present less explicitly in his philosophical attitude.

No comprehensive study of Whitehead's understanding of religion itself, or of the influences that gave rise to it, has been offered so far. Nor does this study claim to present a comprehensive picture of what would be his philosophy of religion. Whitehead devoted scant attention to man as the locus of the religious response, not to mention to prayer or worship, sin or salvation. Even Whitehead's conception of God leaves some haunting questions which indicate he has not fully resolved all the problems which gave rise to his formulation. But this incompleteness should not stand in the way of our discovering the full religious dimensions which are present in Whitehead's thought.[7]

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[6] John B. Cobb, Jr., A Christian Natural Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1965), 216; Victor Lowe, Understanding Whitehead (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), 112-113; Kenneth Thompson, Whitehead's Philosophy of Religion (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), 8.

[7] Thompson, op. cit., observes that the incompleteness of Whitehead's philosophy of religion makes it an unlikely topic for systematic examination and therefore, though his study is entitled "Whitehead's Philosophy of Religion" it focuses on Whitehead's conception of God. I am in agreement with Thompson's observation that Whitehead's philosophy of religion is not fully developed, but I do not believe this precludes a study of some systematic aspects of his understanding of religion.

It should also be mentioned that when we survey Whitehead's treatment of some of the religious issues which have been singled out, we find a number of disparate strands somewhat in tension with each other. At the same time that Whitehead affirms the radically social character of the world, he insists upon the inescapability of solitariness in religion. At the same time that Whitehead claims descriptive generalization is the best mode of analyzing and dealing with the world in which we live, he affirms the validity of particular religious insights and the need for metaphysics to take account of them. At the same time that he strongly supports the value of rationality and its role in religion, he asserts that one must constantly return to experience as the ground out of which conceptuality arises. These tensions must eventually find some resolution, and our exploration will attempt to discover what the resolution finally comes to for Whitehead.

As the preceding considerations make evident, the principal focus of this study of Whitehead's thought will not be Whitehead's conception of God. It is imperative that this conception enter into our investigation in some detail, but the topic with which the essay is more immediately concerned is the nature of religion itself in terms of the human response to God. Obviously, religion is shaped by the way that one conceives God, but religion includes more than this. Religion involves a wider, more complex description of the synthesizing pattern of one's attitudes toward God, self, and the world. Our concern, therefore, will be to bring out various facets of this relationship as they are illuminated by Whitehead's perspective.

Aside from the particular attention Whitehead gave to religion in Religion in the Making, his thought on religion is found woven in with various other themes in Science and the Modern World, Process and Reality, Adventures of Ideas, and Modes of Thought. The organic character of Whitehead's religious views, makes the clarification of his thought especially relevant, and, again, it demands that the explication of his religious thought take place in the context of the large dimensions of his philosophical thought.

As this study proceeds with the project of analyzing Whitehead's understanding of the meaning and function of religion, it will be guided by a thesis that acknowledges the intrinsic relationship of Whitehead's religious and philosophical thought. The guiding thesis of this investigation is that Whitehead's view of religion is of a piece with the content and character of his categoreal scheme in that his view of religion expresses a particular instance of the problem of the one and the many which dominates the whole of his philosophical thought. Moreover, the thesis includes a deeper level of meaning in that it points toward the view that the unifying drive of the universe, the divine Eros, not only promotes individual integration through the incorporation of contrasts but that the Eros is directed toward the transformation of incompatibilities into contrasts so as to maximize the value and richness of the process.

With this central thesis, the first chapter of the study will present the basic elements of Whitehead's categoreal scheme, focusing on the aspects of the scheme which will have the most direct relation to the explication of religion. After this philosophical exposition, it will be possible to consider Whitehead's views on the character and function of religion. The second chapter will consider the picture of religion that emerges in Whitehead's most comprehensive treatment of the topic in Religion in the Making, while the third chapter will examine some of the other works in which religion plays an important role. The fourth chapter will take up the role of intuitions in Whitehead's thought as a further elaboration of the thesis of this study. Finally, the fifth chapter will present a final synthesis and an assessment of the adequacy of Whitehead's view of religion for the elucidation of religion and religious experience.

CHAPTER I

WHITEHEAD'S VISION OF REALITY

I. Some Preliminary Considerations

A. Importance and Expression in Whitehead's Philosophical Approach

Whitehead expresses the aim of philosophy in several ways, all of which hinge upon bold far-reaching vision and generality of thought.[1] The endeavor to frame a system of thought in terms of which "every element of our experience can be interpreted" requires effective rational tools to be sure. But it also requires a quality of spirit that is open enough to permit such a construction, as well as an appreciation of the more primitive, uncontrollable elements of experience which furnish the philosopher's dominant intuitions.

We cannot understand Whitehead's philosophic scheme or his method in isolation from his broad vision and deep intuitions. Therefore, before we examine his philosophic scheme or his method of descriptive generalization, it is important to note two intuitive notions that illustrate the tonal quality of Whitehead's approach and illuminate the spirit he brought to the philosophic task. These are the notions of importance and expression.

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[1] PR, 4ff; SMW, 87; RM, 82; AI, 140ff; MT, 171ff.

Importance is so basic a term that it is difficult to get hold of it. Broadly speaking, it is a sense of the irreducible. Importance is not a sense of significance that arises from intellectual considerations. Rather, it is a more visceral sense that itself gives rise to ideas, to reasoning, to imagination, and even to the principles of classification of a given age. Yet the sense of importance is so basic in shaping thought that its elements are usually considered "too obvious" to discuss.[2]

The ultimate notions of an era are often obscured by questions which are more particular than the age's basic assumptions and therefore more likely to stimulate debate. The questions of primary generality, the underlying first principles, are almost too acceptable, too general, to be introduced into debate or even to lend themselves to expression. They are the assumptions by which men are surviving and usually surviving fairly well. As Whitehead puts the difficulty,

> In each period there is a general form of the forms of thought; and, like the air we breathe, such a form is so translucent, and so pervading, and so seemingly

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[2] MT, 1-19; AI, 12.

> necessary, that only by extreme effort can we become aware of it.[3]

But even with the extreme effort it takes to become aware of the generality of the thought forms of an era, there remains a certain givenness, a mystical quality of sorts, a depth as yet unspoken, which philosophy attempts to sound, "not by explaining it away, but by the introduction of novel verbal characterizations, rationally coordinated."[4] From these depths come the massive and unmanageable underlying ideas whose essential connection shapes importance. The generality which is the basis for importance is also the basis for religious value.

Whitehead contrasts the massive and unmanageable character of importance with the specific and controllable character of the matter-of-fact. Importance has to do with the primary mode of our conscious experience of quality and, as such, is infused with a tone of generality.[5] It is not concerned with the particulars of a given statement whereby it can be declared right or wrong, true or false, but with a kind of pre-logical awareness which contributes to a global sense of rightness or wrongness.[6]

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[3] AI, loc. cit.

[4] MT, 174.

[5] Ibid., 4ff.

The matter-of-fact, on the other hand, is concerned with detail and particulars. It has to do with a derivative mode of conscious experience, with elements that are singled out as this and that. Whenever we concentrate, we attend to the matter-of-fact, though we do so by reason of a sense of importance. The contemporary scientific mentality, for example, with its emphasis on data and verification, directs attention almost exclusively to the mere fact because it possesses certain assumptions regarding the final and irreducible character of an empirical fact.

Whitehead observes that the notion of a simple fact in isolation is a primary myth we posit because of the inability of our thought to grasp totality.[7] Importance refers to totality and the interconnectedness of things, in the same way that religious value points to a source of unity in the universe. The matter-of-fact, when taken as a mere fact forgetful of its relations, is an abstraction from the connectedness of things. Despite a certain antithesis of importance and the matter-of-fact, however, there is a mutual dependence without which we could not conceive generality or particularity.

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[6] The feeling of generality and a global sense of the presence of something significant have reference to Whitehead's insightful view of causal efficacy or non-sensory perception which I will have occasion to treat later. It will also be shown to have an important connection with religious intuitions.

[7] MT, 9.

This mutual dependence becomes evident when we consider a perspective such as a historical-cultural setting. The Victorian Age involved a certain set of people with their characteristics, habits, tendencies, and modes of thought. Behind the particularities of that era which are available for us to deal with selectively, there is a pervasive character dependent upon the relatedness of various elements which gives the configuration of the whole its over-all significance. Neither the multiplicity of the particular facts nor some amorphous view of the whole accounts satisfactorily for the character of that perspective.

Importance is a relational concept expressing totality, generality, and interconnectedness, all of which are aspects of oneness. In the same tone of oneness, importance also expresses the infinite. Importance derives from the immanence of the infinite in the finite.[8] Because of the relatedness of all things, each of the many finite entities in the world bears within it the infinite relationships of the world in which it exists; thus we are able to "see a World in a grain of sand." Although the practical consequences of the relationships may be negligible because there are gradations of relevance, nevertheless, all of reality has a structure which permits integrations to emerge out of the relationships and which permits us to comprehend some measure of unity in truth.

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[8] MT, 20.

Whitehead's attitude toward expression reveals another intuitive notion which characterizes his philosophic approach. Expression is a term which presupposes importance.[9] Whatever is brought to expression, be it through language or other means, is a particular finite moment shaped by the relationships of the infinite world of importance which it embodies and out of which it arises. Whitehead does not reserve the term expression for human or other animal expressions alone. Expression is a general term for all the data diffused in the environment.[10]

Whitehead understands expression as a secondary process, involving the discrimination of detail. Discrimination is an activity of the finite occasion through which it selects a particular expression of the world in order to telescope importance for itself. Expression, therefore, represents importance's loss of infinitude and consequently the diminution of its true character as importance.

To put it another way, importance is monistic. It represents the world as one with all the massiveness and complex relationality that oneness entails. Importance covers the unity that is or can be. Expression is pluralistic. It represents the world as many with all the individuality and detail the many have to contribute to unity.[11]

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[9] Ibid.

[10] I take up the technical aspects of this point on page 46 and following. Cf., PR, 443-445.

Given this distinction between importance and expression, it is evident that language, the most outstanding example of human expression, possesses limitations in its ability to deal with the concrete whole, for its strength lies in its capacity to exercise selectivity, to discriminate, and to abstract particulars.

> The essence of language is that it utilizes those elements in experience most easily abstracted for conscious entertainment, and most easily reproduced in experience.[12]

The more explicit and unambiguous language attempts to make its expression, the farther it strays from the concrete whole.[13]

This is not meant to imply that language is unnecessary or that it is not responsible for the most complex uprisings of civilization, but simply to indicate that language, like any other form of expression, cannot fully convey what it attempts to express. Whitehead concludes Modes of Thought, in which he discusses importance and expression at length, with an epilogue that sums up his vision of philosophy.[14] Philosophy aims to uncover the ultimate notions that constitute importance, yet it is ever bound by the inadequacy of language to accomplish this task completely. Aware of this, philosophy should reflect the spirit of poetry, for in the case of both poetry and philosophy greatest significance attaches to the form behind the direct meaning of the words. Both philosophy and poetry recognize the limits as well as the power of language.

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[11] This point will be treated more fully in connection with Whitehead's categoreal scheme. It is central to his handling of the problem of the one and the many.

[12] MT, 34.

[13] Whitehead calls excessive trust in the adequacy of language to express all the fundamental ideas men have entertained "The Fallacy of the Perfect Dictionary." MT, 173.

B. Speculative Philosophy's Basic Method: Descriptive Generalization

As we might expect, Whitehead's concern with importance and ultimate notions shapes the method he adopts for philosophical analysis. And as we shall see in subsequent chapters it also shapes his religious outlook. His desire to provide as comprehensive an account of reality as is possible, while remaining always faithful to concrete experience, required that he start with a broad base for interpretation. Descriptive generalization is the tool which affords the wide application needed for the task.

During his career as a mathematician, before his philosophy took on definite shape, Whitehead demonstrated a concern to find ideas broad enough to include special ideas such as the concepts of arithmetic, geometry, and mathematics.[15] This concern remained with him all his life, growing in strength and clarity in his philosophy. There he devoted himself to the development of a metaphysical framework that could do justice to every kind of experience.

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[14] MT, 171ff. Cf., PR, viii.

Whitehead did not believe that philosophy should be a bloodless reflection upon abstract principles, having little relation or application to what man experiences, any more than he believed religion should be a code of behavior or a collection of rituals. At the outset of Process and Reality, he describes speculative philosophy as "the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted."[16] Further, the system itself is to be evaluated on the basis of its ability to deal adequately with experience. Whitehead sees this as intrinsic to the method of generalization which he compares to the flight of an airplane which starts from the ground of particular observation, makes a flight in the thin air of imaginative generalization, and lands again for renewed observation rendered acute by rational interpretation.[17]

Speculative philosophy aims at establishing a coherent and systematic means of interpreting experience by abstracting elements from experience which will have generality of application. More specifically, philosophy constructs a system of general ideas by generalizing from factors discerned in particular topics of human interest such as physics, psychology, aesthetics, etc.[18] The selection of the topic or area which is to serve as the locus of origination for the general philosophic scheme is of considerable importance, though the only insistent point Whitehead makes with regard to it is that there should be some application beyond the restricted locus.[19] Beyond this there is an almost secret sensitivity, a religious intuition if you will, by which one grasps the important elements providing the basis for generalization.

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[15] UA, v-vi.

[16] PR, 4.

[17] PR, 7.

The field of origination should be fundamental enough that it can lend the generalizations it yields to application in more specialized areas. If, for example, a generalization derived from physics could not be extended to other fields of experience, it would remain simply an alternative expression of notions applicable to physics alone. It could serve no broad philosophic purpose. If, however, the generalization can be extended to apply to fields of experience beyond physics, it will enlighten and inform observations in those areas and provide an interpretation for occurrences in that area whereby a person can say, "Yes, that is the way the importance of this event strikes me." In addition, the general principles themselves become clearer when they are considered in their various exemplifications. Without imaginative generalization these principles are obscured in the persistence of concrete instances of particularity.

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[18] Ibid.

[19] PR, 8. Whitehead's own starting point for generalization is physics, and it seems that the physical sciences may lend themselves better to broad generalization because they perhaps involve a lower level of innate interpretation and accommodate themselves more easily to interpret the emergence of complex forms from simpler entities.

For Whitehead, narrowness in the selection of evidence is the greatest danger facing philosophy.[20] Narrowness distorts the evidence and prevents an adequate confrontation of our experience with the tools of interpretation. The refusal to succumb to narrowness implies not only a willingness to entertain evidence broadly but also the refusal to be bound blindly to any one system of generalized thought as final. Whitehead was well aware of the limits of generalization and the lack of finality in any system of thought from his experience of the breakdown of existing principles of physics. He reflected that the best generalizations of men are subject to qualifications of which they are ignorant. The limitations of knowledge and the impossibility of arriving at a final or exhaustive account of truth

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[20] PR, 512. This observation opens the section entitled "The Ideal Opposites." It is an indication of Whitehead's own sensitivity to complementarity and paradox as well as a lead in to his treatment of the ultimate integration of all opposites in God.

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should lead one to a humble search for an adequate general basis for the elucidation of experience.[21]

It is apparent from what precedes that there must be means of testing our generalizations, empirically and rationally. Whitehead gives two criteria for testing his system empirically. These criteria are applicability and adequacy. Applicability refers to the requirement that the generalizations must be brought to bear on some items of experience. Adequacy means that no items of experience are to be excluded from such interpretation.[22]

Whitehead also presents two criteria to test the rational side of his philosophy. These are the requirements of coherence and logical perfection. Logical perfection does not concern Whitehead so much as does coherence. Logical contradictions, though plentiful in philosophies are usually trivial; that is, numerous minor inconsistencies are overshadowed by the larger vision of reality the scheme represents. However, when there is a deficiency of coherence it is of greater moment, for coherence is concerned with importance and fullness of vision. Coherence for Whitehead means that no element of the philosophical framework can be viewed in isolation from the rest. The incoherence of a system is the arbitrary disconnection of its first principles. Whitehead's concern for coherence is quite different from a passion for consistency. Consistency implies a neat view of reality with its elements having an evident compatibility with each other at all times. This is not the kind of view that reflects the spirit of Whitehead who gives due recognition to the range and complexity of experience, which makes it massive, unmanageable, and shifting.

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[21] Dial., 5.

[22] PR, 4.

Whitehead is not insensitive to contemporary objections to speculative philosophy. One objection often raised is that speculative philosophy is overambitious.[23] Another, more central objection is that speculative philosophy is useless. Those thinkers following a strict empiricism in the tradition of Francis Bacon offer this latter objection, with the assertion that detailed matter-of-fact and its description is what should be philosophy's primary concern. General interpretations, they claim, have no bearing on this procedure. Whether true or false, general interpretations are intrinsically barren.

Whitehead answers this objection with the observation that whenever we try to express matters of immediate experience or the matter-of-fact, our search to understand leads beyond that experience to its contemporaries, its past, its future, and even beyond that to its

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[23] Whitehead's own words give the best summary of his response to this objection, "Rationalism is an adventure in the clarification of thought, progressive and never final. But it is an adventure in which even partial success has importance." PR, 14. Cf., SMW, 186-187.

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universal forms of definiteness. In other words, philosophy does not merely initiate interpretations; it finds them, for there is no uninterpreted fact. Speculative philosophy's search for a rational scheme is essentially a search for connections so as to establish more adequate justifications for the interpretations men employ and more adequate means of criticizing them.

Moreover, Whitehead's approach is a denial of the bifurcation of nature and man's existence. His insistence upon the unity of truth and his refusal to separate the realms of science and faith, which runs counter to aspects of the existentialist position, have important intellectual consequences for his view of religion, as shall become evident in successive chapters of this study.

It is obvious that Whitehead's interest and energies gravitate toward constructive thought, rather than toward detached questions. The constructive scheme of his metaphysics is meant to provide a larger framework whereby we can recover the totality obscured by the various selective emphases we adopt in dealing with specialized topics as well as to shed light on the interpretations that are implicit in those topics.

These preliminary considerations of importance, expression, and generalization are fundamental to the understanding of Whitehead's philosophy, and in an even more pointed way they are prerequisites for understanding his religious vision. They represent important interpretational keys for the elucidation of Whitehead's religious approach to the problem of the one and the many.

It will be the aim of the following section to explore the categoreal scheme of Whitehead's speculative philosophy in order to understand the metaphysical background against which he frames his understanding of religion. Needless to say, it is not possible to deal with that scheme exhaustively, nor is it necessary to do so. Our overall objective is to determine the continuity of Whitehead's view of religion with the content and character of his categoreal scheme. Consistent with that purpose, our exploration will be expository rather than critical, although pertinent points of criticism will be introduced where relevant. The aspects of his metaphysics that will be considered more fully are those bearing most on this purpose. The first step will be to examine Whitehead's ultimate notions.

II. Whitehead's Categoreal Scheme

A. The Goal of Process: Integration Through Creativity

The philosophical scheme Whitehead has constructed, which finds it most complete expression in Process and Reality, and has various less systematic expressions in his other works, is a philosophy of organism whose central concern is the problem of the one and the many. Whitehead's process philosophy focuses on the problem of explaining how things come to be the individual entities they are through a search for the forms in the facts.[24]

For Whitehead the individual fact, simple or complex, is the self-creating creature which, out of its actual world of many other creatures, creates itself. The search to comprehend the fundamental building blocks of reality leads to the ultimate notions involved in the meaning of any entity or being. These are creativity, many, and one.[25] Of them, creativity is the ultimate of ultimates or the universal of universals which underlies and is presupposed by all the other categories.[26] Creativity expresses how the many become one.

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[24] PR, 30.

[25] PR, 31.

Concrescence is the name Whitehead give to the process that is the growing together of the many into one. It tells the story of every occurrence of creativity and therefore the story of every thing that is.

> The most general term 'thing'--or equivalently 'entity'--means nothing else than to be one of the 'many' which find their niches in each instance of concrescence. Each instance of concrescence is itself the novel individual 'thing' in question. There are not 'the concrescence' and the 'novel thing': when we analyse the novel thing we find nothing but the concrescence.[27]

Creativity, then, is the principle inherent in every concrescence. Creativity is not a thing in itself. Rather, it is the principle of process or relation whose goal is integration. Everything that is, from God to the most minute bit of existence, demonstrates the process of bringing the many into the oneness of itself.

The novel individual "things" of which Whitehead speaks are units of experience which he calls actual entities or actual

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[26] Another way to put this is to say that for Whitehead, relationship through creativity is the keynote to the sense of importance mentioned above.

[27] PR, 321.

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occasions.[28] Actual entities achieve their individuality by their integrations of the universal forms of definiteness called eternal objects that are immanent in the actual entities that are felt.[29] The determinate definiteness of each entity is an arrangement of these forms or qualities whose mutual relationships condition the kinds of integrations that arise at any given time.[30] Before presenting a fuller discussion of these and other categories, consideration of the ultimate category of creativity is in order.

Creativity is the relational power found in every entity. Creativity is absolutely general and radically irreducible. In this lies its ultimate character. Nothing lies beyond it. "Creativity is the ultimate behind all forms, inexplicable by forms and conditioned by its creatures."[31] Creativity is inexplicable by the forms; that is, it is not itself an eternal object;[32] yet it is conditioned by its crea-

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[28] PR, 27. Whitehead uses the terms actual entity and actual occasion interchangeably. The only exception to this substitution occurs with regard to God. Whitehead always refers to God as an acual entity, not an actual occasion. Cf., PR, 135.

[29] PR, 34.

[30] This does not involve conciousness as we shall see later.

[31] PR, 30.

[32] Under certain circumstances, one might regard creativity as an eternal object, for example, if one is considering creativity as an idea or a certain form of creativity. Despite Johnson's report that Whitehead did not challenge his interpretation of creativity as an eternal object, we must hesitate in accepting that explanation. See

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tures. A further examination of creativity should shed some light on how this conditioning occurs.

In *An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics,* William Christian notes that creativity is not an actual entity or a category of existence. He comments that Whitehead means at least two things by saying that creativity is ultimate. First, there is an underived element in every actual entity that makes it *causa sui*. Second, every actual entity is in some degree novel. Christian concludes that creativity finds its special significance in that it is a characteristic of every actual entity. But, viewed as a *category* of the ultimate, creativity obviously means more for Whitehead. It is true that creativity may be described as a characteristic of every actual entity, but this is not complete as an explanation.[33]

The meaning of creativity must be clarified by reference to its place in Whitehead's metaphysical scheme, that is, with reference to the question it answers. As Whitehead puts the question himself, "How can concrete fact exhibit entities abstract from itself, yet

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A. H. Johnson, *Whitehead's Theory of Reality* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1952), Appendix B, p. 221. Cobb offers an objection to this interpretation with which I am in basic agreement. See John B. Cobb, Jr., *A Christian Natural Theology* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1965), p. 209. In one sense every abstract noun is an eternal object. But functioning within Whitehead's scheme creativity is a separate category, not a category of existence.

[33] William Christian, *An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 13.

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participated in by its own nature?"[34] Creativity is Whitehead's ultimate and irreducible answer which requires the entire categoreal scheme to elaborate it.

Creativity is generic activity or simply 'power.'[35] It is conceptual as well as physical, signifying both novelty and repetition. Each creative entity enhances its uniqueness by allowing a diversified range of entities to participate in its formation. The greater the diversity and complexity, the richer the integration. But whatever the level of complexity, creativity is the moving power.

Whitehead's approach to creativity and how the one is related to the many is the result of what Charles Hartshorne calls Whitehead's novel intuition.[36] There are two significant factors which enter into this insight. One is that the many become one, not simply that the many are one. The other is that the subject of the concrescence is not a substance, but a unit-event.

Whitehead's statement that the many "become one and are

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[34] PR, 30.

[35] PR, 46-47; PR, 88-91.

[36] Charles Hartshorne, "Whitehead's Novel Intuition," Alfred North Whitehead: Essays on His Philosophy, ed. George Kline (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 19.

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increased by one" is a distinctive expression of his pluralism.[37] This pluralism does not just involve a collection of entities which are rearranged indefinitely. Both genuine integration and genuine novelty occur. The integration, which an individual entity achieves by bringing the many of its world into the unity of itself, acquires a public status upon the completion of the integration. That entity then becomes a new element in the actual world. As the data diffused in the world grow, the complexity inherent in integration increases. Richer, more comprehensive relations require integrations according to higher principles of complexity. I would submit that this insight is central to Whitehead's understanding and appreciation of religion, and I will take it up again later.

The other aspect of Whitehead's original approach to the creative integration of the one and the many is that the one, the subject of the concrescence, is not a substance or a thing moving along in space but a unit-event whose very identity is constituted by its activity in relating. The event is not a pre-existing subject that relates the many to itself; rather, the concrescence _is_ the becoming of a unique subject, thoroughly relational. That is to say, while Whitehead speaks of the subject as "deciding" how the many are brought into novel unity, it must be understood that it is the "deciding" that creates the subject as subject. In this way creativity is conditioned by its creatures, for neither creativity nor the creative subject exists before the conditioning.

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[37] PR, 32. "The novel entity is at once the togetherness of the 'many' which it finds, and also it is one among the disjunctive 'many' which it leaves."

Whitehead's system is built on the premise that it is a more adequate interpretation of reality to understand its basic structure in terms of relation and its forms rather than substance and its accidents. For one thing, thinking in terms of events rather than substances we are better able to do justice to the connectedness of nature. This is so not simply on the atomic level of physics or on the molecular level of biology, but very importantly, on the level of concrete human experience. I believe this fundamental relationality is substantiated by our understanding of the ways men have known and also by the ways they have been influenced in various ages by their cultures. It is also consistent with the most responsible ways men live and direct their futures today. To examine the various aspects and implications of this view of the radical character of relatedness, we must turn to some of Whitehead's more particular categories to see how he has spelled out his novel intuition.

B. The Relational Elements of Integration

Since integration is the goal of process we must examine the elements that enter into the achievement of the goal. These elements are what Whitehead calls the categories of existence.[38] All eight categories of existence that he enumerates are not equally relevent to our discussion, so we will focus on those elements of relation that contribute most immediately to our understanding of Whitehead's view of integration.

1. Actual Entities

As creativity is the term for the fundamental principle inherent in everything that is, so actual entity or actual occasion is the term for the final real things themselves which make up the world.[39] There is no going behind them to find anything more real. Therefore the search for a reason is always the search for an actual fact. This is the ontological principle which Whitehead posits as the first step in the description of the universe as a solidarity of actual entities.[40] Or, to put it in rational terms, the ontological principle may be seen as a description of the essence of the universe characterized by the necessity and the ultimacy of relations. "The doctrine of necessity in universality means that there is an essence to the universe which forbids relationships beyond itself, as a violation of its rationality."[41]

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[38] PR, 32-33. The Categories of Existence are actual entities, prehensions, nexūs (plural of nexus), subjective forms, eternal objects, propositions, multiplicities, and contrasts. These, along with the Category of the Ultimate, the Categories of Explanation, and the Categoreal Obligations, form the totality of Whitehead's categoreal scheme.

[39] PR, 27-28.

[40] PR, 64-65; PR, 28.

Actual entities are microcosmic or cell-like units, aggregates of which form macrocosmic societies or nexūs which make up the visible world of trees and people and buildings in which we live. These microcosmic entities are complex and interdependent units of process or drops of experience.[42] They are not to be conceived under the morphology of a substance because their essence is not static. Each actual entity is a process of "feeling" whereby the many data of the world are integrated to become the unity of one actuality.

In this context feeling is not accidental but constitutive. Feeling or prehension is the term used for the generic activity of passing from the objectivity of the data presented to the subjectivity of the actual entity in question.[43] The feeling that constitutes the subjective experience of an actual entity is "essentially a transition

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[41] PR, 6.

[42] PR, 28.

[43] PR, 65.

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effecting a concrescence."[44] By virtue of every subject's essential connection with the world that makes it possible, everything that is has a social character.

The social character of reality is reflected in Whitehead's discussion of feelings as vectors or processes of feeling here what is derived from there. Each actual entity is a feeling of transition from the objectivity of its data to the subjectivity of its own reality. The subjectivity is always and inevitably bound up with the social character of the objective world, felt first as the press of external reality that is already settled.

To say that the feelings within an inherently social world have a vector character is to say that each actual entity is an act of experience arising out of data. Feelings and combinations of feelings give rise to new feelings so that there is no entity that has not been bred by feeling and there is no feeling independent of the relations of the world.

Whitehead's metaphysics is a metaphysics of experience, but experience broadly conceived and not merely limited to conscious subjects. Consciousness is a characteristic of subjective experience only under certain circumstances in the higher forms of integration, but subjective experience maintains at all levels of integration. Whitehead's metaphysics of experience rests upon what he calls the reformed subjectivist principle. That is to say, everything in the world can be explained in terms of subjective activity.

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[44] PR, 337; Cf., PR, 322. "An actual occasion is a concrescence effected by a process of feelings." (italics mine) The feelings are both the transition and the cause.

> The way in which one actual entity is qualified by other actual entities is the 'experience' of the actual world enjoyed by the actual entity, as subject. The subjectivist principle is that the whole universe consists of elements disclosed in the analysis of experiences of subjects.[45]

The principle is a reformed principle in that it does not refer to a pre-existing subject but to one which emerges in the process of taking account of other actual entities. The reformed subjectivist principle is an alternative statement of the principle of relativity. It highlights the social character of reality by calling attention to the potential of every 'being' to enter into the becoming of another entity.[46]

2. Prehensions

Whitehead states that every actual entity may be analyzed in a variety of ways. The analysis of an entity into prehensions is a mode of analysis which exhibits the most concrete elements in the nature of an actual entity.

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[45] PR, 252.

[46] PR, 33 (Category of Explanation iv).

> The first analysis of an actual entity, into its most concrete elements, discloses it to be a concrescence of prehensions which have originated in the process of becoming.[47]

These prehensions indicate the constitution of actual entities, telling how they take account of other actual entities. Whitehead goes on to say that all further analysis is an analysis of prehensions.

The character of prehensions makes it difficult to capture a full vision of the discrete, indivisible unity that is an actual entity, for each is minute and rapidly succeeded by other entities making direct analysis impossible.[48] The analysis of an actual entity may be likened, though somewhat inadequately, to a single frame of a movie film. During the instant that the projector singles out the frame, one can witness complex factors that are forming the given subject at a split second. Then, as soon as the film is released again, frame after frame "perishes" to give rise to new moments of synthesis.

This is the "stuff" of which the universe is formed, not a substance but minute occasions of relating and being related, of influencing and being influenced. If this seems to be an excessively transitory view of reality, one has only to give attention to the findings of modern science which have effectively demythologized our common sense notions about the stability and solidity of things. Not only living entities but even the most sturdy chairs and the most formidable mountains have been shown to be arenas of activity. The complex composition of these macrocosmic realities is at the mercy of their larger environments, while at the same time the macrocosmic realities actively influence their larger environments by the far-reaching effects of their internal activity.

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[47] PR, 35.

[48] PR, 130. "Completion is the perishing of immediacy." See page 50 of this chapter.

The prehensions or transitional feelings that describe the forms of influence are of a vector character, taking what is there and transforming it into what is here. Prehensions consist of three factors:

> 1) The 'subject' which is prehending, namely the actual entity in which that prehension is a concrete element;
>
> 2) The 'datum' which is prehended;
>
> 3) The 'subjective form' which is how that subject prehends that datum.[49]

The first factor, the subject, exemplifies subjective unity by reason of its ability to integrate the many feelings which present themselves. The subject may accomplish this integration by means of positive prehensions (also called feelings) and by means of negative prehensions, namely by relegating to irrelevance certain elements which it deems incompatible with its satisfaction or the completion of its becoming. For example, an actual entity prehending redness may exclude the feeling of blueness if both feelings cannot be incorporated into its final satisfaction at the same time.

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[49] PR, 35; Cf., PR, 337-338. Here Whitehead extends his analysis to five factors, but the extension mainly affects his analysis of the datum. The basic division stays the same.

In an incomplete phase of its concrescence, the many feelings that might be felt represent a potential unity for the subject. The perspectives represented by other entities do not effect anything until they come together in the standpoint of the subject where something is happening. With the completion of the concrescence, the actual entity "becomes" and the potential unity acquires a real unity through the "decision" of the subject regarding which elements are, in fact, included or excluded. Thus the actual entity is what it is by virtue of its prehensions.

In order for one entity to prehend another, the entity which is the object of the prehension must be in the past. It must have achieved satisfaction itself and attained objective immortality so that it can be publicly available for the prehension of another.[50] It follows that contemporaneous entities cannot prehend each other; however, the past may be so recent as to be a fraction of a second away and thus very close to what we speak of experientially as present. By the same token, an actual entity cannot know its own satisfaction in subjective immediacy, for when the satisfaction has closed up the process of becoming, the actual entity has perished to join the world of objective immortality. It relinquishes its subjective immediacy.

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[50] PR, 43; PR, 94.

The problem of satisfaction, perishing, and the role of actual entities in the formation of other actual entities leads us to seek a more precise designation for the subject which includes its contribution to the future. Whitehead provides this designation in his specification of the entity as the subject-superject.[51] Superject adds to the understanding of the subject as active and processive the notion of the entity as concrete and complete. It abstracts in a sense from the active, becoming process of concrescence. The notion of superject distinguishes the outcome or the satisfaction from the process both of which occur in the indivisible actual entity. The actual entity is both process and outcome. The actual entity considered in its totality is subject-superject, the process and its closing up. By the formation of this total experiential unity, a determinate condition is added to the actual world for all future concrescences. This particular definiteness which is contributed once and for all is the actual entity's objective immortality.

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[51] PR, 43; PR, 71.

3. Eternal Objects

As we have seen above, every concrescing subject or actual entity involves other actual entities in its process of becoming; that is, they are the data it takes account of or prehends in its self-creation. It is one of the principal concerns of the philosophy of organism to clarify how the immanence of one actual entity in another actual entity occurs. Eternal objects play a vital role in the transition of one actual entity to presence in another actual entity.

The participation of other actual entities in the self-creation of a concrescing entity requires that the data entities are objectified for the subject. A basic role of eternal objects is that they are those elements or universals which participate in actual entities and their objectifications so that the subject may prehend forms of definiteness.[52] Eternal objects are not perceived independently or in detachment from the physical data of actual entities, but they are the qualities of entities by means of which a definite feeling takes its shape.

Eternal objects considered in themselves are pure potentials for definiteness. From the side of potentiality, Whitehead describes an eternal object as "any entity whose conceptual recognition does not involve a necessary reference to definite actual entities of the actual world."[53] Eternal objects depict what elements of an actual entity might be concretized in another actual entity even when they are not yet available practically speaking. The eternal object, merely taken in itself, is neutral as to the fact of its physical ingression or inherence in any particular entity of the actual world because of its character as a pure potential for the determination of fact. But though there may be unrealized potentials, according to the ontological principle they must be somewhere in an actual entity. Nothing can be potentially floating in space.

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[52] PR, 70; PR, 443-444. Whitehead felt that the doctrine of eternal objects was one point on which he was misunderstood by many. See his letter to Hartshorne in Kline, op. cit., p. 199.

With regard to the multiplicity of eternal objects which either have or have not been actualized in the world, Whitehead holds that eternal objects have their source in God who entertains all eternal objects in his primordial nature. We will not stop here to give consideration to God's role in entertaining and providing novel eternal objects. It is more to our purpose at this point to consider eternal objects as they are selected by actual entities in their self-creation.

An actual entity's process of becoming is a process of acquiring a distinct character by a decision to incorporate or to omit various forms of definiteness. The determinate definiteness of an actuality is its arrangement of the world through the forms of definiteness in the world.[54] The forms have their basis in God's ordering. Individual entities respond to the generality of the order and the initial aim God presents to each occasion with their own qualifications of it so that they reflect a particularization or a further specification of order. In this respect, their particularization reflects their solitariness.

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[53] PR, 70.

But the actual entity does not make its decision with unlimited freedom. Its decision to some extent depends upon decisions made in the past by other actual entities. The past, as well as the basic limitations in God's ordering of forms, limits the forms of definiteness which in its consistency the concrescing entity will inherit and reiterate. Given its inheritance from the past, when the actual entity adds the novelty of its own decision it also contributes to the limitations of the conditions for other actual entities which will supersede it. Such conformation is a necessary consequence of the vector character of feelings. It is particularly relevant, with a high degree of complexity, in the enduring nexus organized as a living person.

The definite character the individual assumes in solitariness is an expression both of its unique particularity and its independence from contemporaneous occasions. The actual entity is limited and temporal. Yet it is concrete, and the concreteness of its actualization represents a form of possibility for future occasions, though Whitehead does not devote attention to its nature as a possibility. The eternal object, on the other hand, is not limited by virtue of its ingression in a particular actual entity. It represents a more rational form of possibility which is not limited by particularity or contemporaneity. The forms that eternal objects represent can be conceptualized and rationalized, while actual entities and the decisions by which they are what they are cannot be rationalized.

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[54] PR, 69.

The ingression of an eternal object in an actual entity can occur in one of three ways:

1) as an element in the definiteness of an actual entity or a society of actual entities that is the datum of the feeling;

2) as an element in the definiteness of the subjective form of some feeling;

3) as an element in the datum of a conceptual or propositional feeling.[55]

The first two modes of ingression are ways in which the eternal object participates fully, not merely potentially, in the definiteness of an actual entity. For example, the actual entity chooses to prehend redness and the eternal object ingresses unrestrictedly in that entity. The third mode represents an ingression into actuality which is restricted; that is, the eternal object can participate but it is not immediately realized. For example, there may be a valuation whereby redness is a real possibility for the actual entity but it is no more than that at that time.

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[55] PR, 445.

There is a further qualification of the modes of ingression of eternal objects. Whitehead draws a distinction between eternal objects of the objective species and of the subjective species. Eternal objects of the objective species are mathematical forms in the strict sense of mathematics, such as triplicity.[56] These can only be prehended publicly; that is, they are only agents in objectification but are never elements in the definiteness of subjective form. Eternal objects of the subjective species are universals of quality--for example, qualities of emotion, of shape, of intensity, or of valuation. Eternal objects of this species can be matters of both public and private fact.[57] Religion in matters of ritual or belief involves eternal objects of the subjective species which are agents in the definiteness of subjective form. As we shall see, it is subjective form that ultimately accounts for the uniqueness in the actual entity's formation. Let us turn now to see how actual entities and eternal objects work in conjunction, with regard to certain kinds of feelings.

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[56] PR, 446. Cf., AI, 251.

[57] Ibid.; Cf., PR, 364, 483. When discussing the public and private character of the subject's feeling of eternal objects objectified in an actual entity, Whitehead comments that there can be no element in the universe capable of pure privacy. The intensity of its own satisfaction may not be completely evident but the effects will have to be objectified somehow. They cannot be lost in private emotion. Cf., RM, 15.

C. The Contours of Feelings

1. Forms of Prehensions

Whitehead distinguishes three kinds of prehensions: physical prehensions or conformal feelings, hybrid physical prehensions, and conceptual prehensions.[58] Physical prehensions are those feelings which have as their data actual entities. In their most fundamental forms, physical feelings are simple conformal feelings or responsive feelings. They physically take over what is handed to them. They are fundamental to understanding how any simple or more complex entity "holds together." These prehensions of another actual entity, of course, still involve eternal objects both in the objective datum and in the concrescing subject. The subjective form in which the object is entertained is the same in both object and subject in the initial stage of physical feelings. We can speak of no difference in form until we speak of the phase of conceptual feelings. The physical feeling or conformal feeling, however, reproduces the subjective form of the actual entity it prehends. This transition actually involves two feelings: the feeling which belongs to the concrescing subject and the feeling which belonged to the datum it is prehending, which is felt as a vector feeling. The objectification of the datum or the objective datum is itself a feeling. Thus what occurs is the feeling of a feeling. An example of a simple physical feeling is the exchange of physical energy.[59]

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[58] PR, 35; PR, 163; PR, 343-344; PR, 375-378.

At the level of describing fundamental forms of prehensions, Whitehead distinguishes another kind of physical feeling, a hybrid physical feeling. Pure physical feelings, we have seen, are prehensions whereby the actual entity feels the physical feeling of another actual entity. In a hybrid physical feeling, the concrescing actual entity feels the conceptual feeling of another entity.

> A hybrid physical feeling originates for its subject a conceptual feeling with the same datum as that of the conceptual feeling of the antecedent subject. But the two conceptual feelings in the two subjects respectively may have different subjective forms.[60]

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[59] PR, 375-376.

[60] PR, 377. Whitehead does not introduce hybrid physical prehensions initially when he presents the categoreal scheme. Their function is accounted for by the category of conceptual reversion whereby novelty or diversity may arise. Hybrid prehensions are introduced in Part II relative to the defining characteristic of a living person. See PR, 164. The idea of a hybrid prehension is developed in Part III at which time the category of conceptual reversion is abandoned. See PR, 382.

Though Whitehead mentions conceptual feelings in both the subject and the datum, this is not a pure conceptual feeling because it has a physical basis in actuality. In non-living societies of actual occasions and to a large extent in sub-human societies of actual occasions, hybrid prehensions play a minimal role. In living persons, hybrid prehensions are of major significance because they introduce relevant alternatives and the possibility of directed control of specific energies.

An instance of a hybrid prehension may occur quite ordinarily. If I prehend the brownness of the leaves on a plant on my window sill, my prehension of the sensum involves a physical taking in of that quality. If my memory presents to me a feeling of that plant when the leaves were green, I am not concerned with the present brown leaves only, but with a conceptual feeling of a possibility for that plant which is not now actualized. This in turn may introduce a search for causes of its brownness and then for nourishment and alternative locations for the plant to restore its greenness and control future growth.

Whitehead distinguishes the two sub-species of hybrid physical feelings, those which feel the conceptual feelings of temporal actual entities such as in the case mentioned above and those which feel the conceptual feelings of God.[61] All entities prehend God who is the source of order and of novelty. The constancy of God's presence, however, militates against hybrid prehensions of God entering into consciousness often in a novel or dramatic way. This, along with the problem of distinguishing between the two types, presents a difficulty in understanding religious experience to which we shall return.

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[61] PR, 377.

Third, there are conceptual feelings. A conceptual feeling is a feeling whose datum is an eternal object. Since eternal objects may be considered without a necessary reference to a definite actual entity, one may speak of pure conceptual prehensions as a purely possible way that one actual entity may be included in another.[62] But much more importantly, conceptual feelings are an aspect of reproduction and conformal feelings which characterize the formation of all actual entities since conceptual reaction accompanies physical inheritance. As such, conceptual feelings account for the completed determination of a feeling by which it expresses its "satisfaction." They provide the structure for speaking of subjective form or the "how" of the feeling and the valuation it carries, which we shall take up in the next section.

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[62] PR, 378-379. When we consider conceptual feelings in themselves, without regard to God's provision of eternal objects, we must note that they are primarily derived from physical feelings. "Unfettered conceptual valuation" is possible only once in the universe, in God's primordial nature.

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Such are the adumbrations of Whitehead's basic distinctions among the kinds of feelings. It is most important to note that every actual entity is characterized by what Whitehead calls a physical and mental pole.[63] The feelings described above have reference to the relative dominance of one or the other of these poles when considering a specific aspect of the subject's formation. The physical pole refers to that aspect of an actual entity wherein it makes no contribution of its own, but simply receives what is given to it from antecedent actual entities. The mental pole is that aspect of an actual entity which responds to what is given; it is the subject's determination of its own ideal, even if that determination is only the reaffirmation of what was given it. Neither side of this dipolarity can function without the other, for an actual entity is essentially dipolar in all its operations. This description of the dipolar character of concrescent experience provides in the physical pole for the objective side of experience, derivative from an external actual world, and provides in the mental pole for the subjective side of experience, derivative from the subject's valuation correlative to its physical feeling.

In this distinction Whitehead intends no dualism such as the dichotomy between mind and matter. On the contrary, his presentation of dipolarity aims at providing an antidote for dualism by highlighting the "outside" and the "inside" within the indivisibility of every event.[64] According to this presentation, the emergence of spirit or mind requires no extraordinary intervention contrary to the existing potentiality within matter. The seeds of more complex conceptual activity are envisioned as present in the most rudimentary forms of existence and the outgrowths of more complex forms in evolution can be seen in continuity with the earlier forms from which they emerged. Before considering these poles in connection with the higher phases of experience, we must turn to the third factor in the analysis of a prehension, subjective form.

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[63] PR, 366.

2. Subjective Form

The subjective form of a prehension signifies how one actual entity takes account of or grasps another actual entity. The subjective forms of the various prehensions which finally result in a complex subjective unity are integrated into one final satisfaction, but they are integral to the feeling and do not enter into the subject's formation apart from the transition itself. Correspondingly, the subjective forms are directly connected with the eternal objects of the subjective species. These universals of quality are forms in the datum which enter into the formation of the subject.

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[64] PR, 423.

If we look at subjective form first in relation to a physical feeling we find that the sensa functioning as a quality of emotion, for example redness, result in a corresponding feeling in the subject by which we can describe it as feeling "redly." The subject-superject which has attained the satisfaction of feeling "redly" aims its feeling at the feeler, the concrescing subject. The feeler then feels "redly."

In terms of the eternal object, the actual entity A has as one of its components the eternal object A_1 through which it is objectified for B, a subsequent actual entity. When B feels A_1 it feels A with that feeling. The eternal object which contributes to the definiteness of A's feeling, in this case A_1 or redness, operates as an eternal object of the subjective species. The eternal object under the specification A_1 contributes to A's definiteness as an objective datum for B and also functions as the form of B's prehension of A. The eternal object functions both publicly and privately. It is a public agent in objectification and a private element of subjective form. But it must first be publicly available before it can be privately assimilated.

This atomic or cell-like model of the physical feeling of the actual entity describes in general terms the building blocks making up the structure of all our physical relationships. The subjective form is first of all and for the most part a re-enactment of the subjective form of the feeling felt.[65] A feeling will persist for successive entities unless there are interventions which inhibit, add to, weaken, or intensify the subject's prehension. In other words, there is a physical tendency towards re-enactment; yet, at the same time, subsequent entities always inherit a slightly different actual world from that of their predecessors because the many have become one and have increased by one, adding to the data of the actual world. Therefore, even at a primitive level the adjustment of emotional intensity will be a requirement of an enduring occasion's participation in the actual world. Thus there will always be slight differences in subjective form even between entities in close proximity.

There are many species of subjective forms: emotions, valuations, purposes, adversions, aversions, consciousness, etc.[66] The most essential and pervasive species is valuation which is implicit in the activity of relation and integration. Subjective form as valuation makes a very fundamental contribution to the satisfaction of any subject. Indeed, the final satisfaction awaits the origination of conceptual feelings whose subjective forms express the subject's valuation.[67] Without the subjective form of the conceptual feeling, there would be no valuation. The conceptual feeling which is derivative from the physical feeling but still rooted in it, yields the subjective form which expresses valuation "up" or valuation "down."

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[65] PR, 362-365; PR, 374; PR, 375. Whitehead's concise study of The Function of Reason applies to the theme of re-enactment and its aim the critique of final causation.

[66] PR, 35.

Valuation "up" or "down" is a necessary aspect of the adjustment of emotional intensity. Such valuation, even before it reaches higher order and more complex feelings, is a fundamental determinant of physical feelings which lie in the future, beyond the actual entities in which the valuations occur. The character which valuations finally give to the entity's satisfaction will be the superjective contribution of that entity to the world of the future.

Starting with the fundamental basis of valuation through the adjustment of emotional intensity, the subjective form is an important element in the distinctiveness of a subject. Two actual entities may prehend the same datum, but they may prehend it quite differently. For example, two speakers may address the same audience and yet the various prehensions and subjective forms the audience provides for one may result in a feeling of stimulation and challenge, while for the other it results in a feeling of fear or insecurity. Or one and the same speaker encountering the same audience at different times may find the complexities of various forms and their interactions shift so as to bring about a new subjective unity of feeling. The new subjective unity may introduce complexities of feelings including ambiguities, confidence, familiarity, love, disdain, and even boredom.

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[67] PR, 367-368; PR, 380.

Thus, subjective form is the shaping of an emotional tone which contributes an important element to the specific definiteness of a subject. Not a single factor but many forms and factors contribute to the subjective forms of prehensions which eventually result in a subject-superject. The subjective forms which influence each other are dense in their complexity. They do not arise independently. The total character of the final feeling with its particular form includes how the feeling came into being, the purpose that urged it forward, the obstacles it encountered, and the indeterminations it removed by its decision.[68] Above all, the overall character is determined by its one subjective aim, the aim at satisfaction. According to the complexity of the entity or the society of entities, there are various phases of concrescence which are included in the subject's aim at integrated satisfaction.

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[68] PR, 354.

3. The Structure of More Complex Modes of Integration

In order to approach the higher level integration that is characteristic of religion, we must give some attention to what is involved in the phases of concrescence. Whitehead speaks of phases of concrescence as a way of dealing with the formative complexity of the actual entity, not as a way of dealing with temporal succession in its formation. Each actual entity occurs all at once.[69] Like a bud or a drop of experience, it either isn't or it is. Yet it is possible to speak of phases of the growing together of the many into one, if we keep in mind that the phases are not temporal or logical, but *sui generis*. These phases may be sorted out in analysis, but they are so commingled that to treat them autonomously in any real sense is to destroy the structure of the entity. The occasion becomes and perishes in one process of completion. It does not change. This is most essential to an understanding of the phases of concrescence.

Whitehead distinguishes three phases of concrescence.[70] The initial phase is the phase of conformal feelings or receptive feelings. This phase reaffirms the physical basis of all experience and is presupposed by all the other phases. The physical feeling of this primary phase expresses the reproductive character of nature as well as the objective immortality of the past. The primary phase of the actual entity under this aspect is to conform to or to re-enact the data of its inherited world.

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[69] PR, 28.

[70] PR, 249; PR, 274; PR, 406f.

But every entity is not only the product of the efficient power of the past; it is also causa sui.[71] It determines its own mode of re-enacting the past which is reflected in the second phase, the conceptual phase. The subject's activity at a given point may be virtually indistinguishable from the activity of the past, but it is still the subject's own mode of assimilating the past. The subject possesses the possibility of re-valuing the data it receives. The phase of conceptual feeling signifies that aspect of the subject's formation by which it makes its own contribution to its identity.

These two phases, the conformal phase and the conceptual phase, are the essential sub-structures of whatever happens within an actual entity or a nexus. The third phase, the phase of comparative feelings, is the heading under which the variety of more complex feelings fall.[72] It is important to our understanding of the integrating character of religious experience to examine the phase of comparative feeling and its reliance on the more fundamental phases just noted.

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[71] PR, 249; PR, 280; PR, 342.

[72] PR, 406ff.

a. Physical Purposes

There are two basic types of comparative feelings: physical purposes and intellectual feelings,[73] as well as a hybrid sort of feelings called propositional feelings. Physical purposes, which are the simpler of the two types, are integrations of the basic physical feeling and its primary conceptual correlate. That is to say, physical purposes are indicative of the appetition within a physical feeling toward an eternal object as an element in its realized definiteness.[74] Physical purposes signify valuation simply in terms of adversion or aversion. The valuation is derived from the conceptual prehension which focuses on a definite eternal object from among the indefinite number of eternal objects within the physical datum.

As an exemplification of the most fundamental form of appetition between two occasions of experience, physical purpose is found at various levels of experiential complexity. It is so basic, however, that it does not reach consciousness unless it is integrated with a higher phase of experience. Its basic character reflects the subject's persistent re-enactment of the value direction of the occasion which is its immediate antecedent. For example, if I am reading a book which I am prehending as interesting, physical purpose as adversion will urge me to continue the reading. Thus the value of the past occasion will be re-enacted.[75] My experience of reading with interest continues. In this way, the valuational aspect of the feeling promotes the persistence of one of its elements into the future toward the continuance of a route of occasions forming an enduring object.

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[73] _Ibid._, Cf. PR, 427-428.

[74] PR, 420f; PR, 280.

When the chain of transmission meets incompatibilities, there is a tendency to omit one of the possible elements of objectification in the future. The physical purpose may then exemplify aversion through attenuation, modification, or elimination of the element in question. Such is the case if a ringing telephone introduces a conflicting element demanding attention while I am reading. While adversions promote stability through repetition, aversions promote change, but they do not give any necessary indication of the quality of the change. The bare fact of aversion in itself promotes the elimination of content and the drift toward triviality.[76]

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[75] Admittedly, this example has elements of a more complex phase of experience, including propositional feelings and whatever degree of consciousness is present in intellectual feelings, but the valuation considered simply in itself demonstrates physical purpose. Valuation in the example is not exhaustively explained by physical purpose, but one can speak of valuation in a primary way from that perspective. Cf., "Intellectual feelings. . . already find at work 'physical purposes' more primitive than themselves." PR, 416.

The introduction of a novel element brings us to a second species of physical purpose cited by Whitehead which accounts for the vibration and rhythm in the physical world. This is a species of physical purpose inclusive of reversions which arise by reason of the lure of contrast which is a condition for intensity of feeling. A reversion is a secondary origination of conceptual feelings, introducing data which are partly identical with and partly diverse from the eternal objects forming the data in the first phase of the mental pole.[77] Reversions result from the introduction of novel elements into the subject's actual world. Physical purposes include not only the recognition of the value entertained in the objective datum; they also include the aim toward intensity of feeling which is enhanced by the increase of complexity through contrast. A nexus demonstrates dynamic appetition by its urge toward maximum realization of eternal objects while at the same time exemplifying a demand for "balance."

By balance Whitehead means that no realized eternal object need eliminate potential contrasts with other realized eternal objects. Such an elimination would lessen the possibility of intensity. This may be illustrated by the example just given of the phone ringing while I am reading something interesting. I may ignore the phone and continue my reading. But if I do that, I will be eliminating a contrast which can lend its own interest and provide a source of balance. On the other hand, if I leave my reading for the phone conversation, I run the risk of losing the value exemplified in the reading by choosing a contrast which may be less intense. Yet, if I introduce into both experiences the important elements of the other, a greater richness results. That is, if I bring to the telephone conversation what I have been reading, or if I return to the reading with the aspects that the phone conversation can contribute, I increase the intensity and enhance the value of both.

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[76] PR, 422-423.

[77] PR, 40.

Included in the aim at intensity are two dispositions regarding the present and the future. There is an aim to maximize the integral intensity derivable from the most favorable balance in the present, and there is also the aim which expresses anticipatory feelings of the transcendent future in relation to present facts.[78] When these feelings rise to greater complexity in higher organisms, there are effective feelings of more remote possibilities. Whitehead says that such feelings are reverted conceptual feelings which have their datum largely correlative to the primary feeling of the same pole, but which at the same time express an aim at a favorable balance including some novelty. The physical purpose that results in the case of reverted conceptual feelings is a more complex physical purpose than one which involves a negligible element of reversion because of the novel factor which introduces a contrast and contributes to the intensity of upward valuation in subjective form.[79]

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[78] PR, 424-425.

Physical purpose thus described is a basic way of accounting for the integration of efficient and final causality. The subject's valuational prehension of the objective side of experience involves a double operation. This double operation points to the integration of final and efficient causality in terms of two aspects of physical purpose. The mental pole embodies the subjective aim or the final cause. This completes the decision derived from the actual world of the immediate past which is the efficient cause. In addition, the physical purpose thus completed determines the relative efficiency of the feelings which will enter into the objectification of the subject-superject for future occasions. In this way, the purpose contributes to the efficient cause for creative advance.

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[79] PR, 382. At this point Whitehead abolishes the category of reversion, acknowledging the ultimate source of novelty in God, but he continues to utilize the conception of reversion for its practical value of elucidation.

> In this function, the mental operations determine their subject in its character of an efficient cause. Thus the mental pole is the link whereby the creativity is endowed with the double character of final causation, and efficient causation.[80]

In the context of physical purposes, the mental pole has no necessary connection with consciousness, but simply indicates the decisions which direct the character of future inheritances.

b. Propositional Feelings

Between the unconscious operation of physical purposes and the conscious purposes introduced by the intellectual feelings lie the propositional feelings which have not yet acquired consciousness by reason of the association of subjective forms with intellectual feelings. These propositional feelings mark an intermediate stage of experience between the physical stage and the stage of conscious intellectual operations. In physical purpose, there is "blank evaluation" which is merely the determination of the comparative creative efficacies of the various component feelings of the actual entities. This does not involve any intellectual determination of the value or the intensity of a given element available for inclusion; nor does it include a definiteness of enjoyment or purpose.[81] Propositional feelings, on the other hand, introduce an "arrest" of emotional pattern around the mere fact of a possibility, making it a lure for feeling; and as a constitutive aspect of this lure, the possibility clothed with emotion includes a gain in directness of relevance to the future.[82] Since the more complex intellectual feelings characterized by consciousness rely on propositional feelings, the role of propositional feelings bears further examination.

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[80] PR, 423.

[81] PR, 427-428.

A proposition is a fusion of an actual entity with an eternal object. It is the mental entertainment of an entity or a nexus as having a definite character. The actual entity is termed the logical subject of the proposition, and the eternal object is termed the predicative pattern. As a mixed and complex sort of entity, a proposition evokes the feeling of the subject's datum as having a definite character. Unlike the datum of a physical feeling which is a particular actual entity or a nexus and the datum of a conceptual feeling which is an eternal object without reference to a determined actual entity, the datum of a propositional feeling is a specific possibility awaiting a logical subject.[83]

Since propositional feelings arise in a late phase of experience, they require certain prerequisites in the fundamental phases of physical and conceptual feelings.[84] The requisites are the following: 1) a physical feeling called an indicative feeling whose objective datum includes the actual entities which make up the logical subject of the proposition; 2) a physical feeling called physical recognition which provides the context for the eternal objects which are among the determinants of definiteness in the datum; 3) a conceptual feeling of the eternal object highlighted in physical recognition; 4) possibly a reverted conceptual feeling. The last two instances involving conceptual feelings refer to the predicative pattern of the nexus in question and thus are termed predicative feelings.

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[82] This mode of feeling provides the initial basis for the possibility of generalization which attains considerable significance in the higher feelings and intuitions.

[83] PR, 391ff.

The conceptual aspect of the propositional feeling does not prescind from a physical basis.[85] The physical rootedness of the propositional feeling lies in its integration of the indicative feeling with the predicative feeling. In line with this, it will be helpful to point out several related aspects of propositions.

A proposition, for Whitehead, does not mean a grammatical construction. Propositions, of course, are often expressed in

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[84] PR, 397.

[85] PR, 398. Whitehead reminds us here of his agreement with Locke and Hume that every conceptual feeling has a physical basis.

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language, but as we have seen, Whitehead's usage of the term is much more general.[86] A proposition is an articulated or unarticulated connection of some actual entity or nexus with an ideal possibility for its realization. As such, it may or may not involve the subjective form of consciousness, for consciousness is a derivative of its function as a lure for feeling.

A proposition is either true or false.[87] It is true if the subject of the proposition actually embodies the relationship the proposition suggests with a particular predicative pattern. If that relationship does not hold, the proposition is false. What is important for Whitehead, however, is not so much whether the proposition is true or false, but whether it is interesting. An interesting proposition is one that functions effectively as a lure for feeling, a proposition that exercises some persuasive power on the concrescing subject.

A proposition may be true but quite trivial. To predicate "artist" of a person may be true, but it may be little more than a bland affirmation. On the other hand, the proposition may be false, but it may have sufficient motivating power to engage a high degree of interest and direct a person's energies toward becoming an artist. In such a case, a person entertains the predicative pattern "artist" by way of an imaginative rather than a perceptive feeling. The imaginative feeling may be contrary to present fact, but it may prove to be such a desirable goal that the person devotes himself wholeheartedly to making it a reality. Even if the goal is not realized, it nonetheless affects the character of the one who pursues it.

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[86] One of the points Whitehead expressly repudiates in the preface to Process and Reality is the trust in language as an adequate expression of propositions. PR, viii; PR, 403-404.

[87] PR, 392.

In addition, there is a relational character to the proposition. We have already noted the influence of the proposition functioning imaginatively as a lure for the concrescing subject. Apropos of the function of a proposition as judgment, its relevance takes shape in light of its association with the perceptive feeling of a definite subject. We cannot speak of bare, detached truth.[88] Nor can we attribute truth or falsity to a proposition in itself. A proposition is always true or false for a subject because it is a datum awaiting a subject to feel it.

Finally, a proposition in its own nature does not fully determine the subjective form of the subject that prehends it. The subjective form is influenced by the history of the subject as an enduring occasion. The assignment of the predicative pattern

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[88] PR, 394-395.

"artist" to a particular individual, whether it expresses a perceptive or an imaginative feeling, will have a subjective form which differs in one whose history promotes an adversion toward the pattern and in one whose history promotes an aversion toward the pattern.

c. Intellectual Feelings

In the higher phases of experience, the phase of comparative feelings, we have so far considered two forms of feeling--physical purposes and propositional feelings. Physical purposes refer to the basic valuation without which integration cannot take place; propositional feelings provide clearer direction for that integration. Now we must turn to the most complex aspect of this phase, intellectual feelings. Intellectual feelings characterize conscious experience. They describe both the most selective forms of integrating the various elements of one's world, and they introduce new complexities of valuation.

Before we consider the precise nature of the two modes of intellectual feelings called conscious perceptions and intuitive judgments, a word is in order regarding the form of consciousness which in varying degrees marks these modes. The overall character of an intellectual feeling is such that it permits the contrast of affirmation-negation. That is to say, the feeling can include the

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subjective form of recognition that the object of the feeling is this and not that. Of course, there are infinite degrees of consciousness, and the recognition will not always have the same force of self-evidence. The affirmation-negation contrast is one in which the affirmation of objectified fact in the physical feeling stands out against the mere potentiality of objectification which the proposition represents. The consciousness, therefore, is an instance of recognition of what is over against what might be, but the consciousness is always derived from more primitive phases.[89]

The first type of intellectual feelings noted are conscious perceptions. Conscious perceptions arise from the integration of an original physical feeling with the propositional feelings Whitehead describes as perceptive feelings.[90] A direct perceptive feeling feels its logical subjects as being potentially invested with a predicate expressing an intrinsic character of a nexus. The nexus is the initial datum of the physical feeling.[91] There is, therefore, one physical feeling with two factors involved--the original physical feeling and the derived perceptive feeling. In the original physical feeling the nexus which is the objective datum is objectified through its own physical bonds. The objective datum is felt with its own proper intensities which are transmitted by means of the subjective form of the physical feeling. For example, the feeling subject perceives the redness of the nexus, chair, through the subjective form of feeling redly. The other factor in the integration of this phase is the perceptive feeling. The datum of this feeling is the proposition which has the actual entities of the nexus as its logical subjects and also has its predicate derived from the nexus. Whitehead is insistent upon the physical basis of this feeling.

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[89] PR, 416.

[90] PR, 411.

[91] PR, 410, 400, 409.

> The whole origination of this perceptive feeling has its sole basis in the physical feeling, which plays the part both of 'indicative feeling' and of 'physical recognition.'[92]

The physical origination of conscious perceptions is likewise the basis for the sources of knowledge which we will take up briefly at the end of this chapter under symbolic reference.[93]

The second type of intellectual feelings that Whitehead distinguishes are intuitive judgments. Intuitive judgments are feelings which arise from the integration of the originative physical feeling of a nexus with the propositional feeling whose logical subjects are the actual entities in the nexus.[94] Up to this point, intuitive judgments and conscious perceptions do not differ. The difference between them does not lie in their basic structure but in the complexity of their processes of origination. Intuitive judgment results from a more complex process.[95] It stems from the integration of the indicative feeling with the imaginative feeling. This means that the physical source functions in two ways. On the one hand, there is the indicative feeling of an entity exemplifying a particular pattern. On the other hand, there is the propositional feeling of an entity as potentially providing a particular pattern. It is possible to feel the two sources somewhat distinctly as a contrast even in their integration in the intuitive judgment. If, in addition to the feeling of contrast between the two sources, a subject feels the identity of exemplification and potentiality, then the intuitive judgment results in a feeling of truth. If contrast is felt in any other way than in the rational distinction between potentiality and exemplification, then in some sense the proposition is judged not to be true.[96]

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[92] PR, 411.

[93] The two modes of causal efficacy and presentational immediacy are included in the complex perceptivity of symbolic reference whose complex meaning builds from this physical basis.

The difference in the process of origination of conscious perceptions and intuitive judgments has a practical consequence that makes a further contribution to their distinction. Conscious perceptions are more closely restricted to fact. Intuitive judgments, because of the involvement of imaginative feelings in their origin, heighten emotional intensity and exercise a creative function. This heightening of the intensity inherent in the valuation of conceptual feelings and physical purposes accents the creative function of intuitive judgments, by the sharp-cut way they limit the abstract valuation to express possibilities relevant to definite logical subjects.[97]

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[94] PR, 413.

[95] Ibid.

[96] PR, 414.

This function provides a practical means for the creative advance by focusing on the opportunities within limitations instead of leaving possibility in an abstract, dream-like realm. It brings us back to the realization that all feeling is rooted in physical feeling of the actual world. For example, while intellectual judgments introduce the criticism of physical purposes, these judgments cannot be understood unless we keep in mind that the physical purpose they find at work are more primitive than themselves. No matter how complex the comparative feeling we have been considering, they always find their source in physical feeling.

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[97] PR, 416.

d. Intensity of Feeling

Having considered the various complex levels of feeling, it is well to consider how they reflect the conditions that promote intensity of satisfaction. As we have noted, satisfaction refers to the completion of the subject's becoming. The quality and character of the final fact that becomes and is contributed as superject to future occasions depends upon what of the actual world the subject includes and how the subject includes it as it aims at intensity of satisfaction. But we must ask what is required for intensity in the higher phases of experience. Is it any different from what characterizes intensity at the more primitive levels of experience?

At the primitive level of experience, feelings are heavily physical, dominated by causal efficacy or the physical influence of the settled past on the present. Causality at this level is primarily efficient causality, although final causality is inherent in every subjective aim toward satisfaction. At the more primitive level of experience, intensity of feeling results from blind appetition toward the reproduction or repetition of pulses of experience.[98] The contrast attendant upon what "might be" is not operative. Only in the phase of comparative feelings which are intellectual feelings do we find the element of contrast along with choice and freedom achieving practical significance in the subjective aim.

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[98] PR, 127-130.

Awareness of the contrast between what is "in fact" and what "might be" presupposes a reflective contact with the actual world beyond the limitations of the concrescing subject's physical reality. By means of this reflective contact the subject may decide more deliberately on the gradation of elements which will ultimately shape the satisfaction of its becoming. The multiplicity and variety of components the subject is able to admit into its satisfaction determines intensity.[99]

Intensity requires a range of elements inclusive of contrasts. When elements could be included as contrasts, but instead are deemed incompatible and excluded, the range is narrowed and the opportunity for greater intensity is reduced. The elements are filtered out through negative prehensions. Even though these negative prehensions do not form part of the objective datum, they still participate in the subjective form of the concrescing subject, but in a restrictive way. It stands to reason, then, that the limitations of the datum the subject prehends as its actual world will affect its character.[100]

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[99] PR, 168. "The character of an actual entity is finally governed by its datum; whatever be the freedom of feeling arising in the concrescence, there can be no transgression of the limitations of capacity inherent in the datum."

In the same vein, the character of a subject is the outcome of the fullness of its participation in the complex ordering of the world. The kind of order we find in a world of self-creating creatures is not a logical order or a static order. It is not an order in which each of the elements has an assigned function independent of creativity and the constant adjustment this implies. Instead, in a processive world where the birth of new elements calls for repeatedly new unifications, we find an aesthetic order. Each self-creating experience must take account of other self-creating experiences with the contrasts they present. A look at some specific qualifications of satisfaction will help to fill out this picture. The qualifications are triviality and vagueness, narrowness and width.[101]

Triviality and vagueness are qualities which have reference to contrasting elements of the datum. Triviality involves the exclusion of elements which would be relevant for the appropriate satisfaction of the subject. Triviality is a diminution of importance resulting from a failure or inability of the subject to coordinate the factors of a datum. Triviality is associated with narrowness or with the wrong kind of width, the extension of what itself is limited. It is a selectivity neglectful of higher categories of integration which would provide a more adequate base for particularity or specialization.

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[100] Ibid. Cf. RM, 15-16 for another perspective on this matter. "Life is an internal fact for its own sake, before it is an external fact relating itself to others. The conduct of external life is conditioned by environment, but it receives its final quality, on which its worth depends, from the internal life which is the self-realization of existence."

[101] PR, 170ff.

Vagueness arises from an excess of identification among the factors of a datum. When a subject prehends a nexus in its entirety, it is possible to level the distinctions between the entities comprising that nexus. These distinctions sink into comparative irrelevance because the nexus is seen as a whole. Though vagueness has its hazards, it is essential for a subject's appreciation of any other nexus or society. Vagueness reflects the width of the actual world which is being entertained, and it accounts for the background against which the narrower elements of relevant differentiation and contrast can arise to enrich the subject.[102]

The interaction between width and narrowness makes an essential contribution to intensity at higher levels of experience. Narrowness results from the selection and grading of relevant eternal objects, and there will always be negative prehensions or exclusions of irrelevant diversities in this selection and grading, particularly when greater freedom and control are exercised.

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[102] PR, 171. Sym. 44ff; AI, 253.

Narrowness is necessary for the intensity which is the aim of satisfaction. Yet, ultimately that intensity depends upon the vagueness of the extensive width of the field which permits the relevant contrasts to rise in the first place. These qualifications of intensity at higher levels of integration will have obvious bearing on our examination of religion and its importance, but for now it remains to look at intensity in connection with subjective aim.

4. Subjective Aim

Subjective aim plays a significant role in the movement toward integration. The subjective aim is the ideal of what the subject could become, an ideal which shapes the very nature of the subject-superject which emerges from the process. Its concrete form grows out of the subject's prehension of the actual world along the lines noted above. As a conceptual aim it takes its shape through an evaluation of the initial data.[103]

The subjective aim which arises at the phase of conceptual feeling, presents the goal of intensity of feeling for the immediate subject and in the relevant future.[104] This goal is governed by the subject's own imposition of aptitude for final synthesis. The harmony of contrasted feelings along with the aim at intensity of realization constitutes what would comprise the full flowering of satisfaction, though the subject may not always in fact attain that fullness. The attainment is made complex by the world of growing data which is always a little ahead of the subject's most recent integration. It is also made complex in its particularity because it is a further specification of the general order which pervades the universe.

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[103] PR, 342.

[104] PR, 41.

In the primary phase of concrescence the subjective aim arises as an initial aim, a general aim toward intensity. The initial aim originates in the subject's hybrid physical feeling of God. Whitehead distinguishes between the initial aim and the subject's assimilation of that aim which is the subjective aim *per se* in order to assure recognition of the freedom of each subject.[105]

This initial stage of the aim is an endowment which the subject inherits from the "inevitable ordering of things, conceptually realized in the nature of God."[106] What any subject can become depends upon what it has to work with in the world and from God. Whitehead is not willing to rest with what has been accomplished concretely in the world already as the full or final explanation of

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[105] PR, 342-343; PR, 375.

[106] PR, 373.

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what comes to be. This would imply a complete determinism and the complete self-consistency of the world.[107] Nor can God be the sole determinant of the world's development for this would make God responsible for evil in the world. Novel things occur and the world advances through the interaction of God's presentation of initial aim and the subject's way of relating to the presentation of that aim in the possibilities in the actual world. Both the initial aim from God and the subjective aim of the creature participate in the general structure of order. It is the task of the subject to bring that generality to particular realization in his solitariness.

The subject's aim is its own assimilation of the initial aim received from God. For any given finite subject, that aim does not represent a boundless wealth of possibility. Once viewed in relation to a concrete instance, valuation requires limitation and an ordering of relevant eternal objects. God is the entity whose conceptual valuation of eternal objects presents the aim at intensity within these limits. If the best possibilities that can be realized at any given time seem less than satisfactory or fulfilling for that occasion, it is not the result of a grim determinism that things must forever be as they are. Rather, any struggle to advance awaits the conditions that makes its realization possible.[108]

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[107] PR, 374.

God's subjective aim expands the same general pattern. God's subjective aim is his inexorable valuation, the aim toward order. His aim seeks the order of patterned intensity, which requires dynamic integrational adjustments. Before considering this valuation and order in greater detail, we must attend to the basic contours of Whitehead's conception of God.[109]

D. God, The Ultimate Integrator

Whitehead's conception of God attempts to knit actual entities and eternal objects into a coherent system. The development of Whitehead's idea of God from Science and the Modern World to Process and Reality can be seen as a response to the growing need to integrate possibility and actuality into a more relational unity. The God of Science and the Modern World, which represents Whitehead's earliest formulation of the role of God in relation to the world, is a principle of concretion or limitation.[110] As such, God is the source of order and novelty, without which one could not account for the standard of value which characterizes the way that possibilities are graded in their relevance to particular occasions. The God of Process and Reality is an actual entity that is not only the source of order and novelty, but that is also affected by relations with other actual entities.[111] The more mature presentation of God as an actual entity expresses the coherent application of Whitehead's method of descriptive generalization to God so that God is not treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles or as a separate principle invoked to prevent the collapse of the system. Instead, Whitehead views the nature of God as not generically different from any other actual entity.[112] God is not an exception to the metaphysical categories but is their chief exemplification.

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[108] PR, 373.

[109] The following works offer fuller presentations and evaluations of Whitehead's conception of God. John B. Cobb, Jr., A Christian Natural Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1965); William Christian, An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959); Stephen Ely, The Religious Availability of Whitehead's God (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1942); Kenneth Thompson, Whitehead's Philosophy of Religion (The Hague: Mouton, 1971).

Analogous to other actual entities, the nature of God is dipolar. Through the integrative activity of physical and mental poles, God is the most complete unity of actuality and possibility. Whitehead describes God's dipolarity as his primordial nature and consequent nature, accounting respectively for God's conceptual and physical prehensions.[113]

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[110] SMW, 173-179.

[111] PR, 519-533; Cf. RM, 86-101, 143-154.

[112] PR, 28, 168.

The primordial nature of God is the pole of divine reality which is eternal and unchanging. It refers to the magnanimity of his "unconditioned conceptual valuation of the entire multiplicity of eternal objects."[114] It is the sun that shines on the just and the unjust. But God's primordial nature also refers to his conceptual realization of "the absolute wealth of potentiality" which accounts for novelty.[115] Thus God's primordial nature, which does not itself involve consciousness unless it is integrated with his physical feeling of an entity, is the basis for speaking of God as the ground of order and novelty.

The primordial aspect of God's character describes his conceptual prehensions. Unlike other entities, God's conceptual feelings are neither derivative nor limited. They are infinite and devoid of all negative prehensions. This side of God's nature is free, complete, primordial, eternal, deficient in actuality, and unconscious. The primordial nature is analogous to a person's character which endures throughout the many situations in which he participates. It is descriptive of a basic orientation fundamental to the individual's identity and the preservation of that identity. In contradistinction to other entities, however, God's character does not emerge primarily from his physical relations. God's character precedes those relations, and his physical feelings are dependent upon the unconditioned and complete valuation of his primordial nature.

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[113] PR, 524.

[114] PR, 46.

[115] PR, 521.

It is evident that the precedence of God's conceptual feelings in his primordial nature represents somewhat of an exception to the metaphysical principles, for in other creatures conceptual feelings are derived from physical feelings. But the conceptual origination of God's feelings is a metaphysical exception Whitehead seems willing to admit. This assures that God is not derivative from or created by the world. The temporal actual entities of the world have their origination in the physical pole which in its own nature is exclusive and bounded by contradiction. The conceptual feelings of temporal actual entities arise derivatively from the mental pole. God has the origination of his feelings in the mental or conceptual pole which in its nature is all-embracing and unbounded by contradiction. The origination of feelings in God and in man stand over against each other, not in contradiction but in mutual requirement. In God's nature permanence is primordial and flux is derivative from the world; in the world's nature flux is primordial and permanence is derivative from God.[116]

By reason of God's conceptual valuation of the entire multiplicity of eternal objects there is a graded relevance of eternal objects for the process of each becoming. Apart from God there would be a complete disjunction of the eternal objects realized in the world. With God as the original ground of eternal objects, both realized and unrealized, there is a relatedness among the eternal objects and a gradation of relevance that shapes the initial aim and its power.

The initial aim that God presents to each concrescing subject is not to be understood in its most fundamental sense as an appetition for the mere preservation or the mere novelty of that entity. Rather, the fundamental appetition which constitutes God's valuation and purpose is the appetition for intensity of feeling. God's feeling for each entity as it emerges is the tender desire for the fullness of the entity's feeling.[117] The satisfaction of the entity does not depend mainly upon whether the occasion is new or old as regards its derivation from its ancestry. The quality of its satisfaction depends upon the intensity of the subject's feeling correlative to God's valuation. The appetition for intensity is an expression of God's final

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[116] PR, 529.

[117] PR, 161.

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causality.

The desire for preservation of value does not enter into consideration in the primordial nature of God. Preservation is a physical issue connected with the valuational achievements of temporal actual entities. In God's primordial nature all possibilities are eternally valued. Nor is the desire for novel particulars the primary matter for consideration in the primordial nature, for among its foundational data there are no preconstituted particulars. The only desire that is to be attributed to God's primordial character is the thrust toward intensity which is the source of creative advance, and which is a reflection of final causality and the upward movement within the world. Creative advance is an expression of the dynamic thrust rising from conceptual enjoyment that aims to live not only well, but to live better.[118]

In comparison with what he says about God's primordial nature, Whitehead says relatively little about God's consequent nature. For the most part, his references to this aspect of God's nature are restricted to the last ten pages of Process and Reality. Nevertheless, it represents an important attempt to fill out the presentation of God's nature relative to the categories of Whitehead's mature philosophical system.

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[118] Ibid.; Cf. FR, 8.

The ontological principle requires that reasons for things, as well as the forms that give the actualities of the world qualities of definiteness, are to be found in actual entities. There is no basis for speaking of the eternal objects or forms of definiteness that characterize the world of actual occasions unless they have the ultimate source of their graded relevance in some actual entity. When this ultimate source is acknowledged to be the all-inclusive actual entity that is God, then there arises a conception of God that requires some accounting of his physical feelings.

The consequent nature of God is that pole of divine reality which accounts for the influence of the actualities of the evolving universe on God.

> The consequent nature of God is the fulfillment of his experience by his reception of the multiple freedom of actuality into the harmony of his own actualization.[119]

This pole is concerned with God's physical prehensions. By reason of the relatedness of all things, and in keeping with the coherence of metaphysical principles, there is an influence of the world upon God. In addition to the metaphysical requirements for such an influence, it also provides an important basis for the justification of a religious response to God.[120]

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[119] PR, 530.

Since God shares with every new creation its actual world, the objectifications of those creatures become a part of God's experience. They are incorporated into the unity of God's feeling, clothed with subjective form and directed by God's subjective aim. In this way the abstract character of the primordial nature is completed by the physical feelings of the consequent nature. This complement to the primordial nature is determined, incomplete, consequent, 'everlasting,' fully actual,and conscious.[121] In effect, God's necessary goodness expresses the determination of his consequent nature.

By virtue of his consequent nature, God prehends every actuality for what it is and for what it can be in the perfected state of the harmony of his universal feeling. By virtue of God's consequent nature, the world is felt in a unison of immediacy. The retention of mutual immediacy combined with creative advance results in God's everlastingness. By virtue of the consequent nature and its rightness of feeling, God weaves into the harmony of his universal feeling, the many always becoming one and always creating a new many.[122]

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[120] One aspect of the religious justification that is suggested in God's consequent nature is the means it might provide to deal with the responsiveness of God to man in mutual relationality, a dominant Christian response. PR, 519-520. Some question whether Whitehead's conception of God lends itself to Christian theology at all. See Robert Neville, "Neoclassical Metaphysics and Christianity: A Critical Study of Ogden's Reality of God," International Philosophical Quarterly, IX, 4, pp. 605-624, and Michael David Meilach, Religious Encounter and the Philosophy of Organism: Suggestions for a Whiteheadian Ontology (unpublished dissertation, Fordham University, 1971).

[121] PR, 524.

Though this saving aspect and the immediacy that is involved in it have important implications for the religious character of God, as we shall see in dealing with the religious and secular functions of God and in studying Whitehead's view of God in Religion in the Making, we cannot remain unaware of the problems it also raises, such as the questions of whether God is contemporaneous with every occasion and whether the temporality of God's physical prehensions in any way place him in the subject's past. As important as these questions are, we will not deal with them here since they are beyond the scope of this study and do not affect the central thesis.

Whitehead speaks further of the consequent nature passing back into the temporal world according to its gradation of relevance to various concrescent occasions.[123] The accomplishment of the world's actuality begins in God's conceptual origination and valuation; temporal actualities then bring about a multiplicity of actualities; this attainment issues back into God's perfected actuality; and finally, the completion of his creative action passes back into the world. The action of the fourth and last phase is the love of God that floods back into the world. It reflects the fullness of God as the great companion and the fellow-sufferer who understands.

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[122] PR, 531; cf., 32.

[123] PR, 532. Whitehead's statement that "perfected actuality passes back into the world so that each temporal actuality includes it as an immediate fact of relevant experience" suggests another dimension of God's influence in the world.

Throughout this description of God, Whitehead maintains that the power of God does not reside in force but in the patient operation of the overpowering rationality of his conceptual harmonization.[124] He does not create the world, he saves it. He is the poet of the world, leading it with tender patience by his vision of truth, beauty, and goodness.

According to this description, God's causality is primarily final causality. It is the causality of aim and purpose which rescues the attainments of creatures from falling into the decay of physical repetition by offering an effective lure for feeling. The aim at satisfaction constitutes the final cause or lure whereby there is a determinate concrescence.[125] The lure is the attraction of value inclusive of contrast under identity.

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[124] PR, 525-526.

[125] PR, 134, 161, 382.

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Efficient causality does not seem to play a significant role in God's relation to the world. Efficient causes are constituted by the objectifications of definite actual occasions in the actual world.[126] But objectification requires the "perishing" of an entity, and God is that non-temporal entity who does not perish. Thus there is a difficulty in accounting for efficient causality in relation to God in Whitehead's system. Moreover, efficient causation is associated, at least implicitly, with coercive power and physical force. Whitehead eschews the association of such power with God, both because it leaves little room for the freedom of creatures and their finest religious responses and because it is responsible for the difficulties with regard to God's reaction to evil.

Yet despite these problems with efficient causality with reference to God, the failure to deal with the role of efficient causation in this regard introduces its own problems. In the widespread testimony of religious experience, there is a feeling of being moved and strengthened by a power that is not one's own. The effective release of physical energy requires some form of efficient causation which needs to be related to God's power. In addition, Whitehead's own reference to the creative phase of the world's actualization, in which he speaks of the love of God flooding back into the world, suggests a form of causation which is connected with efficaciousness.

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[126] Ibid. The presentation of God as a non-temporal actual entity introduces several problems, including the difficulty of relating temporality and non-temporality in God in such a way that they are not distinguished so sharply that we cannot account adequately for the influence of God on the world in consequence of his temporal feeling, and also the difficulty of accounting for some form of satisfaction in God since he is not subject to the perishing which is the usual requisite for satisfaction. Some of these difficulties can be handled by regarding God as a nexus or a society of actual occasions rather than as an actual entity. This is the approach taken by John Cobb in A Christian Natural Theology, p. 188f and Charles Hartshorne in "Whitehead's Novel Intuition," see Kline, op. cit., p. 23. For support of the conception of God as an actual entity see Christian, op. cit., pp. 356-360.

We cannot deal with these difficulties in any detail, for to confront them more thoroughly would require a more sustained analysis of Whitehead's conception of God and would take us beyond the scope of the present essay. We can only note these difficulties here since they are related to the religious aspect of Whitehead's thought which is our direct concern.

In view of our primary concern there are several other aspects of Whitehead's notion of God that should be noted here. These have to do with the relation of God's aim to order and with the distinction between God's secular and religious functions.

God's aim is his valuation.[127] It is a valuation toward order of a particular kind, toward aesthetic order which is the feeling arising out of the realization of contrast under identity.[128] Whitehead describes this order as a " 'society' permissive of actualities with patterned intensity of feeling arising from adjusted contrasts."[129] The description of order as a society highlights its relational and organic character. The order that prevails is not a fixed or settled order without novelty. Rather, it is a relational pattern characterized by response and organic adjustment which itself gives birth to novelty. The order bears a teleological impulse toward more complex integrations.

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[127] PR, 373-374.

Whitehead indicates that the aesthetic order permits actualities of patterned intensities to arise from adjusted contrasts. The aim of feeling is intensity, and the order that prevails promotes intensity through the adjustment of contrasts. The variety of actualities are pulses of feeling. United in patterns and patterns within patterns, they form a web of complexity so intricate that at times the contrasts between intensities of feeling compete and border on chaos. The vying of feelings with each other and the overall aim at intensity calls for an adjustment of the contrasts and intensities so as to permit the continuance of intensity in the overall patterned society.

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[128] PR, 381; Cf., RM, 111.

[129] PR, 373-374.

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The overall order is tolerant of various levels of intensity, complexity, and contrast. The patterned intensity that prevails at lower levels of complexity is a limited intensity because the range of feelings and contrasts is limited. A movement toward greater complexity allows greater intensity, but this in turn is dependent upon how much adjusted contrast can be sustained without undue negative prehensions. The positive conceptual prehension of relevant alternatives enhances the qualitative pattern of order and expresses the ultimate creative purpose that each unification shall achieve some maximum depth of intensity of feeling subject to the conditions of its concrescence.[130] God alone embraces the full range of contrasts and patterned intensity. As the embodiment of aesthetic order, God is the ultimate integrator, beauty itself.

The subjective aim of God and the subjective aim of other entities reflect the same pattern of order, but God's aim is all-encompassing and general as well as being marked by a subjective form that loses nothing that can be saved.[131] Whitehead says that what is inexorable in God is valuation as an aim toward order. Order is based on a pattern of generality which, as we have already noted, is a unity of purpose combining identity and contrast in the appetition for intensity. The generality of the order is important both to appreciate the absolute extensiveness of God's relation to the universe and to appreciate the generality of the aim as it is reflected in the subject that embodies it.

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[130] PR, 381.

[131] PR, 525, 531.

In light of Whitehead's view of God as the source of order and the working out of that order in the world, Whitehead makes a distinction between the secular and the religious functions of God.[132] He regards the secularization of God's function in the world as being of as much importance as the secularization of other elements in experience. He asserts that the concept of religious feeling is not an essential element in the conception of God's function in the universe. The relation that God has to all entities in providing the initial aim for them does not necessarily have religious overtones. This is a metaphysical rather than a religious function. There is no indication that it need entail a religious response.

The secular function of God has to do with God's fundamental relation to the world as the source and model of order. God's secular function is his presentation of the graded order of appetitions or the initial aim. The concrescing subject intuits the intrinsic suitability of some definite outcome from a given situation and interprets this suitability as a lure for feeling or a proposition. There is nothing statistical in the suitability. It depends upon the fundamental gradation of appetitions which lies at the base of things. Simple subjects respond with a physical purpose of adversion or aversion, and more complex subjects respond with a more complex subjective form which may even include consciousness. There is nothing particularly religious about this function because it operates in a democratic way in all creatures and does not signify a level of attraction which would call forth the greatest intensity and contrast in feeling.

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[132] PR, 314-316.

Whitehead does not treat the religious function of God in Process and Reality with any great degree of specificity. He states, however, that the religious emotions are found in a higher level of experience than the initial aim.[133] The individual's religious relationship to God yields a more particularized effect. The religious response builds on the general structure of experience, but it reflects a sensitivity to a call within that structure to incorporate a greater contrast and value. This is a response in which individual interest is stretched beyond a particularity that is self-defeating.[134]

The question of God's religious function, then, is a matter of discerning what aspect of God Whitehead sees as evoking a religious response. A study of his conception of God seems to suggest at least two significant elements that account for God's evocation of a religious response. These can only be mentioned here because they will be taken up in greater detail in the next two chapters. First, there is the comprehensive scope of God's valuation and experience by which he entertains the range of contrasts which are the basis for the intensity of his experience. The aesthetic model is the paradigm for the fullness of life and value. Through it the criterion is given for the enlargement of the individual's interests beyond his own self-concern. As its most complete exemplification, God is the ideal which man devotes himself to imitate religiously. The second element of Whitehead's conception of God that accounts for his evocation of a religious response is his sensitivity and responsiveness because of which he preserves in living immediacy all that can be saved.[135] God's tender concern to save the world through his reception of the achievement of all creatures is an aspect of God that does not receive emphasis until the formulation in Process and Reality. As the high point of the final interpretation that concludes the work, this conception provides a final criterion that motivates the fullness of human response.[136] These two aspects bear the most vivid testimony to Whitehead's evaluation of the qualities that are most constructively creative of the individual's commitment to God and to the world.

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[133] PR, 315.

[134] PR, 23.

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[135] PR, 525.

There is, however, one last aspect of Whitehead's philosophy to be considered in laying the groundwork for the examination of his ideas on religion. This is the facet of Whitehead's thought that is concerned with the way that meaning arises out of the subject's confrontation with the one and the many. For Whitehead's approach to meaning we must turn to his view of symbolism or symbolic reference.

E. Symbolic Reference

When we distinguish different meanings within the total

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[136] PR, 519-533. In the final section of Process and Reality, entitled "God and the World," Whitehead brings together the philosophical and religious aspects of God's relation to the world in such a way that his criteria for the religious availability of God stand out in sharper focus. For a negative evaluation of the religious adequacy of Whitehead's God see Ely, op. cit. Responses to Ely and the question of religious availability can be found in Bernard M. Loomer, "Ely on Whitehead's God," Process Philosophy and Christian Thought, ed. Delwin Brown, et al (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1971), pp. 264-286; Nathaniel Lawrence, "The Vision of Beauty and the Temporality of Deity in Whitehead's Philosophy," Kline, op. cit., 168-178; Charles Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1953), pp. 196-212.

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complex of experience, such as the religious meaning of an experience, we are speaking of a specialized dimension or function. The mode of perception whereby we discern such meaning is called symbolic reference.

From the outline of Whitehead's philosophy given thus far, we can see that each subject or each percipient exercises activity in the production of its own experience. Thus, for the percipient at least, perception is an internal relationship between itself and the things perceived.[137] This internal relationship is primarily concerned with our deepest recognition of a solid world of other things which are actual in the same sense that we are actual. It has three main independent modes, each contributing its share to the one concrete moment of human experience. Whitehead calls the two pure perceptive modes presentational immediacy and causal efficacy. The third mode which involves conceptual analysis is called symbolic reference. These three modes are descriptive of the ways we relate perceptively to our "environment" which is the objectification of other actual things which are present to us.

By presentational immediacy Whitehead means what is usually referred to as sense perception.[138] It is our immediate

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[137] PR, 255-279; Sym., 9.

[138] Sym., 13ff.

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perception of the contemporary external world as it discloses itself in terms of the many actual things which make it up. Presentational immediacy is of importance only in high grade organisms whose discriminatory powers are developed. In this mode the world presents itself through the mediation of qualities such as colors, tastes, sounds, etc. These qualities can be described both as our sensations and as qualities of the actual things which we perceive. These are thus relational between the perceiving subjects and the perceived things. Furthermore, these sensa are bound up with the solidarity of actual things. When we perceive color,we do not perceive some general color. We perceive red or green and we perceive it in relation to some objectified entity, be it a chair or a wall or a light.

Contrary to common sense, the discriminate qualities of sense perceptions are themselves abstractions. Because they stand out or can be isolated from the solidarity or relational unity in which they occur, they are definite, precise, vivid, and trivial. These sensa are therefore barren and incomplete as accounts of our perceptive relation to the actual world because they do not directly connect the qualitative presentations of other things with any intrinsic character of those things.

For the connections which make up the intrinsic character of things we must look to another mode of perception. This mode is what Whitehead calls causal efficacy or non-sensory perception. Its source is the visceral feelings which underlie the more definite and distinct sensations. Causal efficacy reflects the relational integrity between the subject and the realities in the environment. This doctrine relies on the assumption that relationships are perceivable in a primitive and direct way. As such, this mode of experience will be vague, massive, and insistent.

A concrete instance of perception in the mode of causal efficacy is our perception of our own bodies. By virtue of causal efficacy we conform to and have a vague sense of our bodily organs. Beyond that, we conform even more vaguely to the world of relations between our "self" and the general "other." While our distinct sensory experience can be definite and easily attended to in our consciousness, our experience in the mode of causal efficacy is pervasive and unmanageable. Causal efficacy is the experience dominating all living organisms from the most primitive. It conveys a sense of the fate from which they have emerged and the fate toward which they go.[139] By virtue of this massive, unmanageable and yet significant character, causal efficacy bears upon the sense of importance mentioned early in this chapter.

Sense data, like the matter of fact, enter into prominence by virtue of the larger field which is the efficacy of the environment. The causal efficacy of the environment, on the other hand, assumes its sense of importance because of the connection and configuration of particular qualities. This connection provides the initial and effective impetus for the subject's activity.

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[139] Sym., 44.

Symbolic reference joins these two modes by means of a conceptual analysis or interpretation. When human experience is in question, perception almost always means perception in the mixed mode of symbolic reference. A complete ideal purity of perceptive experience devoid of any symbolic reference is in practice unattainable for either mode alone. The barest human response requires some degree of meaningful recognition. Since there is no meaning without a connection between the data and the wider perceptive field, symbolic reference is required to integrate them.

Symbolic reference, then, is the source of the basic symbolism of perceptive activity before it is the source of more developed symbols such as images and words. As it is the source of meaning, it can be the source of error, but it is nonetheless essential for any understanding at all. An awareness of its structure fills out the picture of Whitehead's philosophical approach and completes the background for our analysis of Whitehead's understanding of religion. With this background, we can now devote our attention to Whitehead's view of religion to see how these premises relate to it.

The questions that have begun to be suggested will come to full expression only when we examine his explicit statements on religion.

CHAPTER II

WHITEHEAD'S VISION OF RELIGION IN RELIGION IN THE MAKING: INDIVIDUALITY IN COMMUNITY

I. The Meaning of Religion

Whitehead declared at the beginning of Religion in the Making that "religion is what the individual does with his own solitariness."[1] The theme of solitariness so predominates this work, which represents his only exclusive treatment of religion, that a study of Whitehead's understanding of religion is, in effect, a study of solitariness. But anyone who wishes to grasp his understanding must recognize at the outset that Whitehead does not say that religion is solitariness. It is what the individual does with his solitariness. This immediately introduces a fullness and a complexity into the study.

The complexity of Whitehead's view of religion is also indicated by his statement that the topic of religion is "individuality in community."[2] By placing solitariness in the context of community, he focuses the question of the meaning of religion in somewhat the same way that he focuses the central question of philosophy. In other words, as philosophy is concerned with the question of how the many become one in any individual entity, religion is concerned with the same question in terms of the quality of existence.[3]

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[1] RM, 16.

[2] RM, 86.

It is my thesis, therefore, that Whitehead's understanding of religion is a particular instance of a concern which dominates the whole of his thought, namely, the problem of the one and the many. The religious expression of this concern focuses on the relationship of solitariness to community. In approaching the question of the relationship of individuality and community in Religion in the Making, Whitehead uses the method of descriptive generalization for the purposes of analyzing the factors that go into the making of religion, considering the conditions of its transformation, and determining its foundation in experience.[4] Because of his limited purpose in dealing with religion and because of the fact that he did not return to reconsider the views he set forth in Religion in the Making, Whitehead did not develop the results of his generalization into a comprehensive system.[5] Therefore, instead of providing a detailed philosophy of religion, Whitehead has provided a statement concerning the meaning and function of religion.

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[3] PR, 30. "The true philosophic question is, How can concrete fact exhibit entities abstract from itself and yet participated in by its own nature?"

[4] Whitehead states in the preface to Religion in the Making that he is continuing the train of thought applied to science the previous year in the Lowell lectures published as Science and the Modern World. His aims in Religion in the Making, however, are to give a concise analysis of the various factors in human nature which go to form a religion, to exhibit the inevitable transformation of religion with the transformation of knowledge, and, above all, to direct attention to the foundation of religion on our apprehension of those permanent elements by reason of which there is a stable order in the

This chapter will examine Whitehead's conception of the meaning and function of religion as it appears in Religion in the Making. It will do so by exploring his account of religion as "what the individual does with his own solitariness" within the context of the topic of religion as individuality in community. The study will proceed by tracing the evolution from primitive religion to rational religion, by examining the consequences of rational religion in terms of an increase in solitariness through universality and generality

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world. Donald Sherburne, A Whiteheadian Aesthetic (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), 7, comments that Whitehead himself applied his metaphysics to the specific topic of religion, suggesting that the work was basically completed. In some respects this is true, but Whitehead's application was not constructed in a thorough systematic way, nor did it have the benefit of some of the concepts which evolved later in his career.

[5] Several commentators have noted the lack of a developed philosophy of religion in Whitehead's religious thought and some problems it raises for them. See John Cobb, Jr., A Christian Natural Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1965), 216f; Victor Lowe, Understanding Whitehead (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), 91f; Kenneth F. Thompson, Jr., Whitehead's Philosophy of Religion (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), 7.

and by considering the individual's relationship to God as Void, Enemy, and Companion. Before we deal with these specific areas, however, some preliminary considerations are in order regarding individuality, community, and rational religion.

A. Some Preliminary Considerations

There are several basic aspects of solitariness that should be noted before we devote our attention to religious solitariness.[6] These several aspects concerning the fact of individuality include identity, value, subjectivity, and contrast. The fact of individuality refers first to the identity of the concrete fact by which it is known in terms of itself. The individual is what it is prior to its membership in a class of things. Whatever associations or likenesses an individual bears to other individuals depend first upon its ability to stand out alone for what it is as a concrete fact. We can speak of mankind or of humanity only because we have known particular human beings in particular contexts at particular times.

The fact of individuality is also the basis for value.[7] In Whitehead's view value is inherent in actuality itself, for every individual or actual entity has a self-valution which is its interest in what its existence comes to. Value cannot be found in abstraction. If it does not reside in concrete individuals, it does not reside anywhere. Likewise, whatever quality of value or depth of value the individual includes must be compressed within its own standpoint, so that individuality means limitation of value.[8] Thus, limitation is the price of value.

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[6] I am using the terms solitariness and individuality interchangeably as does Whitehead, although I acknowledge that in the common usage of these terms there is a connotative distinction.

[7] RM, 97.

In addition, in Whitehead's scheme, individuality is the subjective locus of self-creativity. Through its own exercise of subjectivity in the perceptive event, the self-creating creature emerges as an individual. In this event or apprehension the individual depends upon the elements of its world as resources, but what it makes of those elements is unique and particular. Individuality, then, summarizes the novel subjective valuation of the self-creating creature.[9]

Finally, individuality is the basis for contrast without which there could be no vividness and quality of experience.[10] Contrast arises from differences between individuals. It is contrast which makes individuality possible, as we can readily see in the simple realization that you are you, and not me. Contrast also accentuates individuality when differences in quality and quantity are compounded. Your individuality and mine are heightened by the differences in the elements and relationships which have shaped us. In this respect, contrast is the source both of richness and of tension. Moreover, in Whitehead's understanding of order it is also the basis for the deepening of value.

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[8] RM, 144-147.

[9] RM, 98-99.

[10] RM, 111.

These basic qualities of individuality are essential for an understanding of Whitehead's concern with the more particular aspects of religious solitariness. Identity, value, subjectivity, and contrast assume additional qualifications as they occur in Whitehead's treatment of solitariness in religion, but they never lose the elemental character they demonstrate in these basic considerations. As with these qualities of individuality, there are certain fundamental presuppositions to be noted regarding community as well.

Several points should be made explicit regarding community, mainly for the purpose of highlighting its essential role for Whitehead and for calling attention to some of its basic aspects which will have relevance for religion. The several aspects to be noted include the essentially social character of reality, the physical roots of community in experience, and the objectivity of community.

First, community refers to the dynamic actual world which is essentially social. Every entity is social and requires the

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society in order to exist.[11] There is no individual entity that can stand by itself, completely independent of others, not even God. The very existence of an entity depends upon the relations it has with the other entities which are constitutive of it. Furthermore, the society for each entity is the universe itself, for each entity is an arrangement of the universe, actual and ideal, according to grades of relevance and irrelevance.[12]

Also, community refers to the actual world which is first experienced physically. The actual world is a community of epochal occasions, each of which is a definite limited physical event.[13] These occasions are the primary units which comprise the community. No occasion of experience can come about without a rootedness in the physical community, with the result that any given instance of experience is possible only so far as the antecedent facts permit.

Finally, community is based in objectivity. Community refers to the world of the many entities which are already actual and which are presented for subjective integration.[14] The self-creativity of the subject is responsible for the integration of the universe, but the raw material for the integration comes by way of the many occasions in the world that have already been objectified. Though Whitehead does not develop this point in detail until his later writings, in the respect mentioned, community represents a world which has "perished" into objective immortality. Unless it had done so, it would not be available for the becoming of the other.[15]

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[11] RM, 104, 98.

[12] RM, 108, 98.

[13] RM, 108.

While the account of religion as individuality in community and the essential relation of these two notions in Whitehead's system conveys a sense of comprehensiveness, it also implies a tension, for as experience readily tells us, individuality and community do not always function in easy relation to each other. In fact, they frequently represent a pull in opposite directions. Individuality and community require each other for their identity, but in the concrete they often challenge each other's identity. Our task, then, in studying Whitehead's view of religion, must be to sort out the complex relationships with all the contributions and conflicts it represents.

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[14] RM, 112-113.

[15] Supra., Ch. I, p. 50. PR, 43, 94, 126, 130, 102. "The actual world must always mean the community of all actual entities, including the primordial actual entity called 'God' and the temporal actual entities." God, as non-temporal actual entity, does not come under the requirement of perishing.

One of the principal means that religion has for dealing with this tension is rationality. In studying Religion in the Making, it will become evident that what the individual does with his own solitariness in relation to community depends upon rationality. The character of the individual is formed through what he believes and his ability to make connections.[16] Whitehead speaks of religion as the art and the theory of the internal life of man, so far as it depends on the man himself and on what is permanent in the nature of things.[17] Insofar as the individual's character is guided by an art and a theory, there is a rational dimension to religion. Indeed, it is rational religion that is Whitehead's central concern, and it is not until we trace the development of rational religion that we can begin to understand his emphasis on solitariness.

Before we begin to consider Whitehead's analysis of the development of rational religion specifically, it is well to note in a preliminary way what rational religion is and what it is not. Rational religion is not a set of beliefs one arrives at as a result of a process of reasoning. Religion has its inferential consequences to be sure,

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[16] RM, 15.

[17] RM, 16.

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but the rational aspect of religion does not refer principally to its foundation in inference. This would go counter to Whitehead's conviction that all meaning must be rooted in experience.

In the first place, on the basis of Whitehead's description of the evolution of religion, rational religion refers to those religions that are the outcome of a religious consciousness that is universal rather than tribal.[18] Secondly, in consequence of this, rational religion refers to that stage of religion characterized by general principles which elucidate thought and direct conduct. It is the stage that characterizes man's present self-understanding. Human beings can and do question their beliefs and attempt to support them. Rationality is the basis for religious relationships in which critical discernment and reform are possible. This is so because present structures of human existence not only permit, but even call for, periodic re-examination and re-valuation.

Whitehead surveys the historical movement of religion from the self-conscious perspective of our contemporary self-understanding with all its critical dimensions. As he surveys the wide expanse of man's development, he sees the shifting currents of religious emphasis as a movement from the guidance of emotion to the guidance of rationality. This movement is accompa-

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[18] RM, 18.

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nied by a greater universality and generality in religion, by an increased sense of order permeating the universe whereby one can direct his behavior and relations with others, and by an increased sense of solitariness. The following sections will elaborate these qualities.

B. The Evolution from Tribal Religion to Rational Religion

According to Whitehead's analysis, as religion developed it moved through four stages.[19] These stages are ritual, emotion, belief, and rationalization. Ritual and emotion are closely related. Whitehead describes ritual as a social means of stimulating emotion. It is the habitual performance of definite actions which have no direct relevance to the preservation of the physical organism of the actors. Ritual, which signifies man's link with his animal predecessors, originates from the primitive use of superfluous energy and leisure. It flows from the tendency of living bodies to repeat their own actions. The repetition of necessary actions such as hunting for food and migrating at certain times of the year issued into the repetition of these actions for the sake of the attendant emotions. In mankind the discovery that emotions could be excited for their own sake made it possible to strive after a certain emotional effect. This in turn provided a powerful means of sensitizing the organism and shaping expectations.

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[19] RM, 47. In his analysis of solitariness in Whitehead's view of religion, Donald Crosby, "Religion and Solitariness," Journal of the American Academy of Religion, March, 1972, XL, 21-35, notes that Whitehead's account of communal religion, indeed his whole account of the evolution of religion, is open to a number of objections, the principal one being that the notion of evolution in religion is based on very light and questionable evidence which cannot be supported by clear data. Whitehead's principal concern, however, is not the pinpointing of the origins of religion, but the general character of religion as man evolves. He is concerned with the effects of man's total development on the way he expresses himself religiously. Though Crosby's criticism would be well-taken if Whitehead were concerned with delineating the point of transition from one form of religion to another form, this matter is somewhat secondary with Whitehead. Thus the argument loses some of its force.

Whitehead notes that the interplay of ritual and emotion occurs most effectively in a social setting.[20] Since ritual is more moving and emotion is more powerful when a whole society is participating in some way, these social phenomena are binding forces in primitive religion. Ritual and emotion exemplify the more physical bases of religion, the forms of re-enactment. When a rational religion regresses, therefore, it most easily expresses itself in terms of the uncritical re-enactment of ritual and emotion.

In themselves, however, ritual and emotion cannot maintain the religious attitude indefinitely. There is an impetus toward generalization in the religious attitude which signals a longing for justification and a desire for a rationale. In the early forms of religion this longing was first expressed in the individual beliefs which were expressed as myth. Myth satisfied the demands of incipient rationality.[21] Man looks for reasons, for some suggestion why the rituals should be continued. For primitive man, myth satisfied the demands of emerging rationality for it provided the basis for the hope that there were some connections in an unfathomed world. Myth represented a significant focus in the movement toward the rationalization of religion.

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[20] RM, 22.

Once belief began to operate in the form of myth, a new formative agent entered into the religious development of man. Just as when ritual encouraged emotion beyond the mere response of practical necessities, now the incipient rationality of individual beliefs encouraged thought apart from the mere struggle of meeting immediate circumstances.[22] The movement toward generality advanced a step, for although beliefs were still largely uncoordinated, religious behavior could no longer be promoted without some rooting in the nature of things.

But myth, too, had its limitations, though it introduced a greater generality into religion. It was adequate for its own age, but as time went on it could not sustain itself. The principal limitation of mythical religion is the lack of an adequate ground for the elucidation of experience and for the criticism of religious belief and behavior. This limitation is the result of a limited conceptuality and the lack of sufficiently general principles to coordinate beliefs. Beliefs held together to a certain extent, but only within a certain narrow context with a minimum of contrast.

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[21] RM, 23.

[22] RM, 26.

To put the situation of primitive religion, including its reliance on rituals and myths, in terms of Whitehead's fully developed philosophical scheme, in tribal forms of religion as in primitive forms of experience, the physical aspects of experience predominate. The primitive forms of religion are guided by a tendency toward the re-enactment of the subjective forms of past occasions.[23] The basic criterion for judging the quality of religion within the tribal model is conformity to a pre-established pattern. Members are bound into conformity to the same physical pattern, but the pattern does not provide a means for dealing with the emergence of new and more universal relations in experience. Nor does it provide a means to generalize with regard to those relations and to make decisions regarding one's individual responsibility to them.

The growth of community and the growth of individuality introduce a greater tension into religion, a tension which requires an advance beyond the particularities of primitive religion toward more general principles of unity. This basic tension between community and individuality is the pull exercised by the physical tendency to preserve secure patterns over against the pull toward a novel synthesis that takes greater account of emerging relations.

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[23] PR, 362-365, 374, 375. Supra., Ch. I, 62-63, 67.

Whitehead situates the age of rational religion within the last 6,000 years.[24] The precise time of the emergence of this rationalizing tendency is not so important as is the fact that we can find within this general period a new and distinctive character in the structure of man's existence. This new type of thinking and living arose independently in several places on the Eurasian continent around the middle of the second millenium before Christ.[25] The new approach to reality was marked by a more complex and coordinated structure of rationality. It was a radical break from the mythical view and introduced new possibilities for individuality and freedom in religion through the power of generalization and the coordination of beliefs.

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[24] RM, 28.

[25] For a fuller philosophical account of the implications of this new mode of thinking for Christian existence see John B. Cobb, Jr., The Structure of Christian Existence (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1967), 52f., 107f. Cobb notes that in the sixth century before Christ there lived Confucius and Lao Tzu in China, Gautama Buddha in India and Zoroaster in Persia. At the same time the prophetic movement was reaching its height in Israel and Greek philosophy was coming to birth through Thales and Pythagoras. The structure of existence was being altered by the new role of rationality.

The development of rational power introduced a new vitality into religion by providing a means of evaluating its quality and directing its concerns more integrally. Rational religion unifies the beliefs and behavior of an individual's life by providing a central focus sufficiently general to transcend particular rituals, emotions, and beliefs.

> Rational religion is religion whose beliefs and rituals have been reorganized with the aim of making it the central element in a coherent ordering of life--an ordering which shall be coherent both in respect to the elucidation of thought, and in respect to the direction of conduct towards a unified purpose commanding ethical approval.[26]

A more complex rationality both made possible the strengthening of religion as an integrating force and gave it a means for self-renewal and purification. Thus religion could more effectively operate as the "force of belief cleansing the inward parts."[27]

The purification and reform that is made possible by basing religion on higher principles of unity is attested to by the supreme examples of religious solitariness, the prophets and the martyrs.[28] They reflect the contribution of rationalization to religion in a dramatic way because they call attention to the general truths held by the wider population. While the vivid apprehension of final truths has often occurred for great religious figures in a supernormal moment of insight, the validity of these truths is not a function of their emotional accompaniments.[29] Rather, the truths they perceive are of such general character that they are present to all. What rational religion attempts is the systemization of these final truths so that the evidence for them will maintain itself at all emotional temperatures and in a variety of environments. The generalization of religious truth, then, delivers religion from the temporality of emotion and from the stagnation of physical feeling.

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[26] RM, 30.

[27] RM, 15.

[28] RM, 28-29.

The movement from tribal religion to rational religion also brings with it an increase in solitariness. Tribal religion is communal religion. The members of the tribe participate in the same ritual seeking to reproduce the same emotion, and thus the quality of their response is judged by their conformity to a pattern which admits little diversity or individuality of expression. But in rational religion, one's intimate convictions become the touchstone for the shaping of his character, by virtue of the religious conceptions which move him.[30] These convictions shape the individual as individual.

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[29] RM, 63.

[30] RM, 15.

For Whitehead, the solitariness which constitutes the heart of religious importance does not emerge until belief and rationalization are well established. The movement of religion through ritual, emotion, and belief to rationalization is a movement of the deepening of importance. Importance or value comes to the fullness of its expression in the individual whose identity is formed under the guidance of great general ideas. As has been just noted, the great religious intuitions have their origin in relatively few individuals who are able to realize by the quality of their perceptive powers an importance which they convey to others who feel it more dimly.[31] This is the case with the great religious figures who stand out in their solitariness: "Prometheus chained to his rock, Mahomet brooding in the desert, the meditations of the Buddha, the solitary Man on the Cross."[32] The sense of importance, summed up in the solitary lives of these gifted individuals, becomes paradigmatically expressive for others.

These considerations on the movement of religion from primitive forms to rational forms result in some general notions regarding the role and structure of belief in the formation of character at the present stage of human existence. To complete this sec-

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[31] RM, 121.

[32] RM, 19.

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tion on the development of rational religion, some general points should be made in order to show how Whitehead analyzes the continuing operation of belief.

First, we must situate belief within the basic notion of communication. Beliefs have a grounding outside the solitary individual, and rational religion is concerned both with the objective ground of the belief and with the way that the individual apprehends the material for belief. In other words, belief is dependent upon expression. Whitehead notes that expression is the one fundamental sacrament, the outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace.[33] He observes that there are two forms of expression, primary expression and responsive expression. Primary expression is the immediate diffuse expression contributed firsthand by each individual. It is the contribution of each to the knowledge of all. Secondary or responsive expression is the more common form of expression that we usually refer to specifically as such. It is the indirect presentation of an intuition through the expression of another.

Primary expression is the first stage of forming a common expression of direct intuition. There is very little of this primary expression, says Whitehead, for the great formative generalities are often buried under the rubbish of irrelevant detail.[34] It is only slowly that general truths emerge out of the unity of the actual world in which we live, and it takes a person of extraordinary sensitivity and perception to apprehend and to articulate what already functions as a kind of dumb intuition for all.

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[33] RM, 127.

It is not clear how this view of expression relates to Whitehead's later articulation of importance and expression.[35] For the most part it appears that primary expression refers to the fundamental mode of expression which is the effect of the countless objectifications diffused in the world.[36] That is to say, expression is the objectivity of effective feeling each individual contributes to the knowledge of all. Yet imbedded in and responsible for this primary expression is an interconnectedness that Whitehead later describes as importance. It seems that when Whitehead says there is very little firsthand expression in the world, he may be referring to the radical sense of importance which assumes somewhat different expressions in different cultural and temporal settings. The close association of primary expression with importance seems

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[34] RM, 129. Cf., AI, 162.

[35] MT, 1-41. Supra., Ch. I, 21-28.

[36] MT, 21.

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evident when he adds that what is permanent, important, and widely spread receives a clearer definition through responsive or secondary expression.[37] At any rate, even though Whitehead's usage of the term expression is not precise in Religion in the Making, it seems reasonable to say that primary expression stands for general truths which possess the coherence of first principles.

Primary expression refers to the important general truths that gifted individuals are able to grasp and express within the particularity and limitations of the actual world. These individuals intuit the centrality of certain final truths and express them in a synthesis in such a way that the originality of their own expression is the element that remains unformularized.[38] In this way the communication of their insight contains an unmanageable or uncontrollable quality which prevents the insight from being truly appropriated in a mechanistic way. In the matter of the expression of great final truths, even more than in the limited expressions of ordinary language, there remains an element lying beyond clear and precise linguistic articulation.

Secondary expression is the more common form of expression which conveys the intuitions of general truths as they

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[37] RM, 129.

[38] RM, 131.

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have been objectified by others. Because of this intermediate character, secondary expression may not have the same impact as primary expression. Yet secondary expression has a very useful role to play, for it provides a medium whereby we can more easily, more distinctly, and with more active control come into contact with the basic motivating intuitions in our lives. Responsive expression often uses the forms of learned literature and imitative conduct, as well as dogma, art, and celebration to set forth with some clarity what has been experienced inchoately. In this way expression provides an enlightened interpretation which is more accessible to a wide range of individuals, and it opens the door to vivid realization of value, to greater effectiveness, to apprehension of scope, and to the survival of value. What it lacks in immediacy, it makes up pragmatically.

Rational religion, then, is dependent upon both forms of expression. Secondary expression is the common means used by formal religions in assisting the individual's formation of character, as we can see by examining Whitehead's account of the doctrinal side of religion.

> A religion, on its doctrinal side, can be thus defined as a system of general truths which have the effect of transforming character when they are sincerely held and vividly apprehended.[39]

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[39] RM, 15.

The system of general truths and the values it embodies exercises a formative influence when the truths and values are sincerely held and vividly apprehended. To put this in the language of Process and Reality, doctrinal expressions function as propositions or lures for feeling.[40] Since a proposition is the attribution of a predicative pattern to a logical subject, the apprehension of a proposition includes an invitation to embody that pattern in some way.

Propositions may be important or unimportant. Their efficacy in transforming character in a deeply religious way depends upon their importance. The question of their truth or falsity is not to be dismissed, but in the long run, the difference that propositions make for those who apprehend them depends upon whether they are important or trivial. Whitehead assumes that religious propositions are concerned with matters of importance. The shape of what is important, however, may change from one age to another, causing a loss of meaning. But, given a particular era with a fairly well-defined sense of importance, religious truths will be concerned with what can be vividly apprehended and sincerely held.

In other words, the doctrines of religion must be grounded in the sense of importance that permeates the concrete circumstances of life. Unless the truths of religion are expressed in propositions that remain close to experience, they drift toward triviality. There is a certain happiness of expression, therefore, that promotes vivid apprehension and sincere commitment. The individual seeks this quality of expression in order to communicate the formative influence of general truths. This is the return from solitariness to society.[41]

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[40] PR, 280-316, 343, 395.

There is a tension inherent in this communicative aspect of religion. Expression has limitations that are easily forgotten. Expression represents a perspective, a bringing of the many into one focus. It is therefore an abstraction which cannot adequately convey the breadth of the material with which it deals. This is especially the case with language which represents an additional abstraction, above that of expression in general. It is easy to lose sight of this limitation and to treat expression as a rather complete account of the world. To treat secondary expression as exhaustive of meaning leaves the individual with the mistaken impression that he has more control over his experience than, in fact, he does. If the individual is open to the process of experience, he will realize the tensions that experience poses for his formulations. Needless to say, this is a healthy tension for religion.

There is another tension resulting from the limitation of expression which is illuminated by Whitehead's position that the many become one and are increased by one. Any expression is a temporary stage along life's way. Once an integration is expressed, it becomes part of a world in which new expressions are continually coming to be. Religious expressions aim at such generality that they transcend much of this flux, but religious expressions are still unavoidably bound to a certain sphere of thought in which they arise. Therefore, no particular doctrinal expression can claim finality without claiming a commensurate finality for the system of thought within which it arose.[42] To sum up Whitehead's position in this regard, a dogma in the sense of a precise statement can never be final; it can only be adequate in its adjustment of certain abstract concepts.[43] The tension of its status will continually recur as new conditions arise which call existing formulations into question.

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[41] RM, 132.

Finally, a particular tension arises between the individual and the community regarding expression. The community that shares the same basis for religious meaning attempts to arrive at a common expression which will make the truth vivid and which will preserve its value for the members. When conditions call for a re-examination of the expression and the community's fidelity to it, it is individuals who first raise questions and it is individuals who shape the values into new expressions which the community may be slow to accept. Thus despite the sharing of a basic ground of meaning, there are differences of penetration into that meaning and there are differences in the times when individuals perceive the need for a re-examination of beliefs. To deal with these problems and others, rational religion has an essential reliance on principles of universality and generality. The following section will consider the ways that universality bears on rational religion.

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[42] RM, 131.

[43] RM, 126, 122. As we shall note later in this chapter, Whitehead did not oppose dogmas, but rather he stressed their usefulness. He objected only to the finalization of dogmas. Cf., Dial., 165.

C. Rational Religion and Universality

Within the context of rational religion, solitariness and universality are closely associated. The great rational religions themselves are the outcome of a religious consciousness that is universal rather than tribal or even social.[44] They occurred in an expanding world. The growing extensiveness and complexity of relations could not sustain religion whose expressions were bound to the physical and conceptual limitations of tribal understanding. As the spatio-temporal world of various human beings became

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[44] RM, 47.

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characterized by greater contrasts and diversity, there arose a change in the way men related to each other and to their God.

At the stage of history when mythical religion began to break down, the world as a whole became the focus of consciousness rather than the tribe. When the boundaries of the tribe could no longer contain its members, and when individuals' safety increased outside the tribe, a certain detachment from one's immediate surroundings could take place. Both a detachment from physical surroundings by a spatial widening of the world and a detachment from the confusion of immediate detail through the integrating effect of generality produced a world consciousness. This detachment is one of the first marks of a universalizing spirit.

The detachment that accompanies universality is not the detachment of lack of interest. The detachment of universality is a detachment from lesser concerns for the sake of larger ones. A tribal or social consciousness is taken up with the particularity of detail and repetition of form. In tribal religion, individuals engage in the same rituals which create the same emotions, and they possess the same prerogatives by virtue of belonging to the same group. One relates to the other who is like himself. Individuality is not clearly established by contrast, and thus solitariness is hardly evident. When there is detachment from particular surroundings, one's interests can be stretched beyond self-defeating particularity. This advance toward universality and generality can be illustrated by its effects on relations with others and with God.

When one is concerned with immediate details in relations with others, larger concerns are easily overlooked. When one relates to others on the basis of certain particular characteristics such as race, national affiliation, or family background, the range of people to whom one can relate deeply is limited. This is so because there is no general basis for dealing with the contrasts between people. In order to enter into more universal relations, it is necessary to guide those relations by general principles which will acknowledge and promote contrasts and yet at the same time which will permit a detachment from the contrasts so as to incorporate them into larger concerns.

This detachment from particular concerns for larger purposes applies to the relationship to God as well as to man. The movement from tribal to universal concerns in religion includes a conception of God which is new and in some respects almost profane.[45] Whereas the God of tribal religion is a God who commands, the God of rational religion is a God who exemplifies. In tribal religion, conduct is mixed up with the notion of self-preservation. Conduct is right which will lead some god to protect

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[45] RM, 39-40.

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and preserve the individual or tribe. One seeks to know God's will in order to influence it, so that God's particular commands may be used for the preservation of one's own interests. In a purified religion, rationalized under the universality of world consciousness, the concept of rightness takes on a different emphasis. Conduct is right which reflects the goodness of God who exemplifies the rightness most fully. One studies God not to know his will but to be like him. Thus, God reflects universal concern, no longer being the enemy one conciliates but being the companion one imitates.

Universality and the detachment it implies introduces a greater solitariness into religion.[46] As one confronts universal claims which detach him from his own particular concerns, he finds himself engaged in a solitary struggle. As one is able to relate to more people and to more diverse conditions in the world, his own individuality becomes more prominent. This occurs both because of the unique complexity of his own self-creation and because the contrast between himself and others becomes more evident. The safe assurances of group identification fall away, and one stands as an individual among other individuals. Now salvation comes not from being Greek or Jew but from being a certain kind of free and responsible individual.[47] In living out this universal approach, one relies more upon general principles in his assessment of values.

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[46] RM, 35.

The generality which guides the individual in his solitariness has its origin in the religious experience itself. Whitehead describes the origin of rational religion as an intuition of value both for the self and for the universe.[48] This intuition immediately issues into a universal claim regarding the way one directs his life.

Rational religion has its origin in the concurrence of three allied concepts in one moment of self-consciousness. Their relationship to fact and to each other reflects an insight into the ultimate character of the universe. These concepts are: 1) the value of an individual for itself; 2) the value of the diverse individuals of the world for each other; 3) the value of the objective world which is a community derivative from the interrelations of its component individuals and also necessary for the existence of each of these individuals. As value is inherent in any occasion, no matter how primitive, it is inherent in a much more complex way in the higher phase of experience reflected in the religious intuitions.[49]

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[47] RM, 35; Galatians 3, 28.

[48] RM, 58-59.

The valuation within the experiential origin of rational religion underlies the preceding observations on universality and detachment. In the first instance, value is inherent in actuality itself.[50] The individual's recognition of self-value is simply his enjoyment of his own self-existence. The basic self-interest is present in all entities whether conscious or not, though in the case of religious experience the self-value is conscious. Value is coterminous with being. Being in Whitehead's view, however, is complex and relational, so that when he refers to the value of an individual for itself he is speaking at the same time of the value of the diverse individuals of the world for each other.

The second concept in the moment of religious consciousness is the value of the diverse individuals for each other. This mutual valuation is a function of Whitehead's basically relational framework. Relations are constitutive, and there can be no self-value without relational value. Each actual entity is an arrangement of the elements of the universe which contribute to the self-value of that entity.[51] Whereas the first concept of self-value was nothing more than the entity itself, it represents a kind of prefigurement of the ontological principle.[52] But that principle cannot be understood except as a way of accounting for the one as an arrangement of the many which make up the universe. Thus, these two concepts taken together naturally lead to the third, the value of the objective world.

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[49] RM, 97, 120, 146.

[50] RM, 97.

The value of the objective world is the concept which completes the one moment of religious self-consciousness and directs the religious outlook toward universal concerns. The community of the world is derivative from the interrelations of the individuals that comprise it, and at the same time it is necessary for their existence. On the basis of this interrelationship, the initial feeling value issues into the feeling of the world as a realm of adjusted values.

The feeling of the world as a realm of adjusted values is a feeling of order. The insight that grounds religion is an insight into the basic fact of order. Whitehead's analysis of the meaning of religious experience itself finds it to be an immediate insight into order. He describes religious experience thus:

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[51] RM, 105, 108.

[52] PR, 36-37, 65.

> This is a revelation of character, apprehended as we apprehend the characters of our friends. But in this case it is an apprehension of character permanently inherent in the nature of things.[53]

The basic religious intuition, applicable to the diverse religious experiences of mankind, is an intuition into the character of permanent rightness. Though the emphasis given to the qualities that comprise rightness shifts and varies at different times and in different cultures, the sense of rightness itself endures. Moreover, the rightness is based on the principle of the limitation of value, whose source and appropriateness is God himself.[54]

From this account of religious experience we can see why Whitehead highlights the role of value in religion. He sees religion as explicitly concerned with values, and, furthermore, based on the conviction that the world is a mutually adjusted disposition of things issuing in value for its own sake.[55] Religion is concerned with the concrete relations of values, for unlimited possibility and abstract creativity can procure nothing.[56] Since value is not concrete without limitation, religion is essentially concerned with the rightness of limitation.[57] Limitation derives both from the telescoping of the world into a solitary individual and from the antecedent facts which are themselves a source of limitation. Given these necessary and interconnected limitations, religion concerns itself with the maximizing of value within the structure of limitation. It concerns itself with the depth of value which finds its fullest exemplification in God.

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[53] RM, 60.

[54] RM, 147-148.

[55] RM, 59, 138.

[56] RM, 146; Cf., PR, 46-47.

By virtue of the ideal of valuation that God presents to each occasion, the solitary subject intuits the immediate occasion as failing or succeeding in reference to the ideal relevant to it. In other words, there is a rightness more or less attained or missed as a result of the aim the subject intuits as the ideal possibility for his satisfaction. This aim would seem to correspond to what Whitehead later dealt with as initial and subjective aim.[58] In terms of the conceptual valuation of the predicative pattern operating as a lure, the feeling may be described as a propositional feeling. The relative success or failure of the occasion to exemplify this pattern is the feeling of rightness more or less attained or missed.

In the case of religious intuition, the predicative pattern

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[57] RM, 146-147.

[58] RM, 59; Cf., PR, 373ff.

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of the proposition presented to the subject represents a lure to embody a depth of value. In that respect it represents the experience of God, though it is not here described as the hybrid physical feeling of Process and Reality.[59] The experience of an aim toward the depth of value in this case is an aim which invites the subject to strive for a value beyond his immediate satisfaction. It suggests a response which takes account of universal effects that accompany world loyalty.

The wholehearted response to the value in religious experience is the feeling of a movement toward more universal relations. Rational religion starts with the value of an individual for itself, but it can find no value in the attainment of its life until it has merged its individual claim with the universal claim of the objective universe. The question, "What in the way of value is the attainment of life?" can only be answered by the appropriation of a universal claim. Surrender to this claim is world loyalty.[60]

The fact of valuation is itself a function of the conceptual pole of experience.[61] The movement toward universality requires an extension of the operation of the conceptual pole so as

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[59] PR, 343-344, 377.

[60] RM, 59.

[61] PR, 367-369.

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to provide an instrumentality for more depthful living. Toward this end, reason plays an important role in religion where it serves to criticize, emphasize, and establish final causes.[62] In so doing, it fulfills its more basic function which is to promote the art of life, an art which is likewise the concern of religion. Before we examine the operation of reason in the generalization that accompanies religion, it will be well to summarize some of the effects of universality in rational religion.

The universality that accompanies rational religion has various enlarging effects, all of which accent the individual's solitariness in one way or another. First, there is a release from provinciality in religion. In communal religion the horizon of interest rests largely with the welfare of the immediate social group. Religious interests focus around that group to the exclusion of others, so that frequently other groups are anathematized as faithless or as not belonging to the elect. In rational religion, as for example in Christianity or Buddhism, one's concern must reach to all human beings without regard for national or personal loyalties.[63]

A more universal approach to religion is also a means of deliverance from the barbarism or brutality that may accompany societal religion.[64] When individuals do not conform to the highly particularized beliefs and practices of communal religion, they are easily regarded as inimical to religion and treated harshly. Universality in religion protects relations from cruelty because it does not lend itself to reasoning that supports such a response. As a result there are no grounds to persecute, malign, ostracize or ignore the other.

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[62] FR, 26.

[63] RM, 39, 43.

Another expression of a universalizing influence in religion is its sensitizing effect. Instead of being absorbed in the acceptability of the particular details characterizing others, one can transcend the many diversities and find a deeper source of unity on which to base his response to others. To put this another way, a greater freedom is made possible by the widening of conceptuality in religion. One can rise above the mere physical conditions of his environment by his awareness of the order which shapes the environment. This freedom from immediate, particular pressures makes it possible to exercise a greater sensitivity toward others.

In rational religion there is a more universal character underlying authority. Authority cannot be based upon arbitrary

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[64] RM, 26.

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commands or the motivation of fear. Rather, it must be based upon the discernment and application of universal principles. There is no real place for authoritarianism because the principles which guide individuals are in the nature of things and thus are common to all, though all are not equally gifted in perceptivity.

Finally, universality in religion reflects an intellectual expansiveness. In his solitariness one is led to reflect upon world loyalty, to ask what in the way of value is the attainment of life. He is moved to search, to think, to ponder, to ask what is the meaning of life. This universal attitude reflects the longing that the facts of existence should find their justification in the nature of existence.[65] As world loyalty, religion expresses itself in a quest for unifying value. The reflective search for general principles does not rest until the individual finds principles adequate to support the surrender of his own claim and to merge it with the universal claim.

These effects of universality do not come about without the tension and struggle that is involved in dealing with particular situations. Indeed, as far as the effects themselves are concerned, they are the loci of the greatest tensions for they represent the most important occasions of advance beyond the self-interest of the group and the individual. Within the universal outlook of rational religion, generalization plays a central role in dealing with such tensions by giving one a means to deal with them. In addition, without generalization it is impossible to fix the fundamental terms by which we refer to God and to the world.[66] Without a self-critical understanding of general principles and their universal references, religion lacks a basic power. For a more complete consideration of this requirement, it is necessary to examine the role of generality in rational religion.

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[65] PR, 83.

D. Rational Religion and Generality

According to Whitehead's analysis of religious experience as the intuition of a permanent rightness in the nature of things and his description of the origin of the intuition in a solitary moment of religious consciousness, there is an inherent generalization in religion. The tendency toward generalization has a direct relevance to the question of what an individual does with his own solitariness, for, as we have seen from the individual locus of the expansiveness of relations toward universality, a wider conceptuality is essential to the advance.

In the intuition of permanent rightness, one experiences an immediate occasion as failing or succeeding in reference to an ideal relevant to it. This ideal points to a claim extending beyond the immediate occasion. Inherent in that intuition is the feeling that one can transform the good existence into the better existence.[67] We have noted that Whitehead views the function of reason as the promotion of this art. In the systematic formulations of speculative philosophy, reason promotes this aim in two ways.[68] Speculative philosophy seeks to establish a practical technique for well-attested ends, and it provides a continuing means of elucidating that technique. Whitehead's account of the contribution of religion to metaphysics illustrates the way that religion itself lends support to this project.

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[66] RM, 76.

The apprehension of an enduring character in the universe includes in itself certain metaphysical presuppositions. These presuppositions along with their givenness in experience uphold the philosopher's trust in his own project. "Insofar as we trust the objectivity of the religious intuitions, to that extent we must also hold that the metaphysical doctrines are well founded."[69] This is so because the basic contribution that religion makes to metaphysics is the recognition that our existence is more than a mere succession of bare facts.[70] Beyond the flux and the passing away of occasions there is a permanence, an enduring character which supports intelligible relations. The contribution of religion is its insight into the basic sense of order that is given in immediate experience. Without it, metaphysics could not conduct its business.[71]

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[67] FR, 8, 18.

[68] FR, 80-81.

[69] RM, 84.

The intuition of order given in an immediate occasion carries with it the concept of the world as a realm of mutually adjusted values. The adjustment of values is based upon the principle of order to which the immediate occasions of religious intuition give a content and a context. Otherwise, such a notion of order would merely be an abstract proposition regarding the adjustment of values. In terms of the generality of the meaning of this intuition, emotions, purposes, and physical conditions are subservient to the basic factor of the order that grounds the emergence of value.[72]

Though the world is a realm of mutually adjusted values, every individual item of the universe does not conform to the char-

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[70] RM, 77, 115.

[71] SMW, 13.

[72] RM, 59.

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acter of the order in every detail. There is both conformity and diversity, and these form the contrast which that item yields for religious experience. In this way the occasion can be viewed as failing or succeeding in reference to the ideal relevant to it. So far as the conformity is incomplete there is evil in the world.[73]

In Whitehead's analysis of religious experience as the intuition of a character in the nature of things, emotions are subservient to the most general character of order. But this character of the experience becomes most clear in analysis, and we cannot disregard the fact that emotions are often a significant force in the impact of the experience. Whitehead is concerned that the very intensity of the emotion which religious experience generates may endanger its authority, for intensity is a poor guarantee for the correct interpretation of the experience. For this reason, religion requires metaphysical backing.[74] Such backing provides critical and elucidative assistance in the extension of the meaning of the original experience.

The contribution of religion to metaphysics, then, is the immediate apprehension of a character or an order in things.[75] We look to metaphysics to elaborate that order for religion. Metaphysics gives clarification of meaning where that meaning is not clear beyond the immediate occasion. It gives a justification for the religious insight that continues its importance at low emotional temperatures when the intensity of the occasion has faded.

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[73] RM, 60.

[74] RM, 81.

Rational religion stands between the immediate insight of religious intuition and the relatively precise formulations of metaphysics. From Whitehead's account of rational religion, we can derive two ways in which it transcends religious emotions. It transcends the more heavily emotional forms of primitive religion which are expressed mainly in ritual, and it transcends the emotional limitations of intensive individual occasions where religion is already more rationally developed. Rational religion transcends the primitive emotional forms of religion by virtue of its coordination of beliefs. The impact of this coordination is evident in Whitehead's definition of rational religion as religion whose beliefs and rituals have been reorganized with the aim of making it the central element in a coherent ordering of life. Through this reorganization, the restrictions of social pressure and the narrowness of excitement do not dominate religion. Nor does belief fail to exercise a deeply formative role. Instead, the influence and impact of religion is extended to meet new and more pressing demands. Rational religion also transcends the religious emotions which are mixed up with the immediate source of religion's own insight. In so doing, rational religion does not transcend the intensity of the experience of God, but it rises above the transitoriness of the emotional intensity of that experience. Rational religion provides a means for preserving the meaning and importance in the fundamental religious experience.

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[75] This view of the starting point and contribution of religion to metaphysics reflects Whitehead's contemporary application of the classic cosmological approach to religious experience. For a recent summary and evaluation of the cosmological and ontological approaches see John E. Smith, "Self and World as Starting Points in Theology," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, I, 2, Summer, 1970, 97-111.

In its generalizing activity, rational religion parallels metaphysics. Religion bases itself upon a small selection of the common experiences of mankind, and it applies the meaning inherent in these experiences to all of experience.

> Religion claims that its concepts, though derived primarily from special experiences, are yet of universal validity, to be applied by faith to the ordering of all experience.[76]

In this way rational religion arises from that which is special and particular, but it extends to what is general. It includes an impulse toward generalization. Whitehead states that in this way, rational religion aims at being that metaphysics which can be derived from the supernormal experience of mankind in its moments of finest insight.

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[76] RM, 31.

The similarity of the scope of rational religion, described above, to the scope of metaphysics is striking. We can readily see this similarity by comparing it to Whitehead's account of the task of descriptive generalization in Process and Reality.

> In this description of philosophic method, the term 'philosophic generalization' has meant 'the utilization of specific notions, applying to a restricted group of facts, for the divination of the generic notions which apply to all facts.'[77]

Generalization is not only the method of speculative philosophy; the extent of the applicability and adequacy of the generalization is its test and validation.

Rational religion and metaphysics bear certain similarities, as these quotations suggest, but they also include some differences which are important. Both rational religion and metaphysics extend the structure of meaning in a limited area to an extensive area. They are both based on certain factors within the limited occasion which are deemed to be of far-reaching significance. Both have reference to a totality; one attempts to elucidate the totality of reality, the other attempts to shed light on the meaning of the whole of life.

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[77] PR, 8.

Their differences stem from the kind of circumstances on which they are based and from the character of application they attempt. The generalization of rational religion arises from the supernormal experiences of mankind as a spontaneous reception of meaning. It is both an insight into the nature of things and a feeling of one's place within that scheme. Philosophical generalization, on the other hand, takes its origin from one select field of interest within the normal experience of mankind. It is not so much based on the spontaneous reception of meaning as it is based on the deliberate search for general principles of meaning within a specific group of facts. Thus it is more innately critical.

Another basic difference between the generalization of rational religion and that of metaphysics is the character of their application. Metaphysics is concerned with the descriptive analysis of all experience; it receives its confirmation by establishing itself as an adequate tool for interpretation in various fields of interest. Its purpose is elucidative and guiding. Religion, on the other hand, is concerned less with the analysis of experience than with the justification of the ultimate claim of existence. This is a claim which evokes a response in the individual to purposes beyond the value of the individual himself. In this respect religion is a movement toward generality operating consciously as a perspective of faith. That faith forms the individual in his solitariness.

The qualities of religious generalization that we have drawn out of Whitehead's account have a specific application in Whitehead's account of the form that generalization takes in dogma. A dogma is the precise enunciation of a general truth divested as far as possible from particular exemplification.[78] On this score, it is not devoid of emotion, but the emotion operates in terms of a direction of interest. Unless there is this direction, we do not observe at all; but the interest which functions in dogmas is a purified emotion which directs the individual beyond narrow purposes.[79] The purpose and value of dogmas is to direct and focus the general truths which aid the individual in what he does with his own solitariness. Thus dogmas are precise expressions which aid the individual's integration of religious purposes. In the long run these expressions are necessary conditions for vivid realization, for effectiveness, for apprehension of width of scope, and for survival.

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[78] RM, 122.

[79] RM, 120.

Whitehead does not share the distrust in dogma that is prevalent in many circles today. Rather he asserts that its unfavorable implications are the result of a failure in the habit of thought. The original meaning of dogma focused on its contrast with what is empirical. Those whose outlook of thought was empiric held that experience was the only thing necessary for explanations.[80] In Whitehead's view experience and thought are inseparable, and dogma refers to those general ideas which are functioning widely, though their precise formulations may not occur for some time. Whitehead's principal objection to dogma is the distortion that occurs when its purpose is not understood and when zeal for its propagation loses sight of its purpose.

The source of the distortion of dogma lies in a deeply ingrained attitude which trusts excessively in verbal formulations. We have already noted Whitehead's insistence that the truths of religion are not to be understood merely in terms of their verbal expressions. In addition to the limitations of language, there is a limitation to the systems of thought that ground verbal expression. In order to manifest the true power of the general truths of religion, we must be willing to let go of verbal formulations and the systems which support them when these become inadequate. The religious virtue of sincerity requires that religion face its challenges in the same spirit that science approaches the new conditions it faces.

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[80] RM, 124-125.

> Progress in truth--truth of science and truth of religion--is mainly a progress in the framing of concepts, in discarding artificial abstractions or partial metaphors, and in evolving notions which strike more deeply into the roots of reality.[81]

We can understand how the structure of the world supports this spirit by examining Whitehead's conception of order.

All order is based on generality, the generality of pattern that characterizes the basic relations between things. Aesthetic order is peculiarly characteristic of a processive and relational world, and its generality is a generality that includes not only stability but also movement and change. It is an order that views the world as a realm of adjusted values, mutually intensifying and mutually destructive.

Whitehead does not devote special attention in Religion in the Making to the detailed spelling out of the meaning of aesthetic order, but in light of his system and the ultimate principles that shape it we can see that aesthetic order is intimately linked to the ultimate category of creativity. For Whitehead, all order is aesthetic order.[82] Every instance of experience reflects the comprehensive and pervasive pattern whereby the whole world conspires to produce a new creation. Every occasion, whether microcosmic or macrocosmic, is a creative instance of the many becoming one. Each entity is an aesthetic arrangement of the entire universe.

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[81] RM, 127.

Of course, all the elements of the universe do not attain equal importance in the creative occasion. The elements of the universe impose themselves upon the subject,and the subject incorporates those elements in varying degrees of relevance and irrelevance. As the content and context for each synthesis changes, the delegation of relevance or irrelevance may change. In this way, the actual world determines the limits and possibilities available for the creative process at any given point. The actual world includes God who ultimately orders the possibilities. All the elements of the complex whole contribute to one effect, but because some elements contribute more directly than others, those which are not important are relegated to irrelevance in the aesthetic unity.[83]

In explaining the interests that shape aesthetic unity,

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[82] RM, 101.

[82] RM, 83.

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Whitehead describes the structure of aesthetic experience as guided by two principles of creative purpose, identity and contrast. "All aesthetic experience is feeling arising out of contrast under identity."[84] In the first place, the novel creation that emerges from the creative process preserves some sense of identity with the ground from which it emerges. Identity specifies continuity and the occasion's ground in the actual world of its past, that is, with the actual fact that gives rise to the new occasion. The value of antecedent occasions is contributed to new occasions, and thus a certain character is preserved, a certain definiteness of general type.

The second principle of creative purpose which characterizes aesthetic experience is the principle of contrast. The novel consequent fact expresses a contrast in relation to the ground from which it emerged.[85] The novel occasion is graded in relevance with regard to its antecedent ground because in itself it represents a new instance of value, which by virtue of the new world it includes, is not identical with the value entertained by its ground. The physical ground of the past enters into the formation of the new subject through that subject's conceptual valuation of its ground. In the transition from bodily occasion to bodily occasion, there is a novelty of contrast within the one concept of synthesis based on the subject's renewed valuation of its ground. In the transition from bodily occasion to mental occasion, there is a contrast of the previous synthesis with an analysis, an adjustment of valuation which to a certain extent undoes the synthesis formerly attained. Thus in the mental occasion which involves reversion and a higher degree of contrast, concepts meet blind experience with an analytic force in order to judge the relevance of that occasion to the principles of creativity that shape it.

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[84] RM, 111.

[85] RM, 112.

Since each actual fact at any level is a fact of aesthetic experience, it does not depend upon consciousness. Consciousness does not arise until we have the specific contrast that is the affirmation-negation contrast.[86] Both identity and contrast are present in all the lower stages of experience since all occasions have mental and physical poles.[87] In the higher phases of experience, especially in conscious phases, contrast becomes increasingly important as the conceptual pole becomes increasingly important, but always in relation to the antecedent physical ground.

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[86] PR, 371-372.

[87] RM, 114. "The most complete concrete fact is dipolar, physical and mental. But for some specific purpose, the proportion of importance as shared between the two poles, may vary from negligence to dominance of either pole."

We can see from these brief remarks that aesthetic order includes a degree of indeterminacy and adventure. In other words, this order is quite different from a logical or conceptual order in which one can say if x is the case, y clearly will always follow. Since the creative synthesis of each new occasion involves the arrangement of the whole universe, the new occasion is influenced by a massive web of complex interrelationships. This antecedent ground limits any given instance of experience, but included in that limitation is the hidden web of connections that adds an uncontrollable quality to the process. Therefore, the individual cannot feel that once he understands the principles of creative purpose grounding the order, he has all he needs to direct his life unerringly. There always remains the spirit of adventure that accompanies real novelty.

Whitehead's approach to order, then, is deeply experiential. It accepts novelty as an emergent that is dependent upon relationships, and thus while the order ultimately has its source in God, its character is discerned in concrete experience. Furthermore, there is a tension in the order that is preserved despite the unity that order implies. Indeed, the unity persists by reason of the tension.

Tension is a quality of order in Whitehead's scheme, for the perpetual interaction between the many and the one requires the vibrations that keep the process going.[88] The fundamental principle of aesthetic experience, the realization of contrast under identity, is at the religious center of Whitehead's view of the solitary individual struggling to merge his individual claim with the claim of the objective universe. This tension is not a dualism or a contradiction but is a genuine tension that makes for the quality of life. Whitehead's insight into the character of experience demonstrates that the tension is essential to the dynamism of unity.

On the basis of this essential tension which is written into order, it is clear that the religious tension between individuality and community cannot be handled by deciding in favor of one or the other, any more than one can decide between identity and contrast. But the question that remains once we have analyzed the basic elements of aesthetic order is a question that pertains to the relationship between individuality and community as well as to the relationship between identity and contrast. How are we to determine when identity with the past should receive emphasis and when the situation requires greater attention be given to the contrasts within the actual world? How are we to affirm the importance of the valuations of the religious community that are already objectified without ignoring the valuations of the individual who attempts to bring the world into his own synthesis?

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[88] RM, 111-112.

Because of the tensions that are always operative, there is no easy answer to this question. Moreover, the answer varies according to the purposes one has in mind, whether one has in mind the problem of what is involved in the creation of a stable community of value or whether one is concerned with the formation of free and responsible individuals whose unique value and richness are promoted. Here again, the purposes cannot be taken in isolation from each other.

One of Whitehead's guiding purposes in Religion in the Making was the determination of the factors that go into the making of a religion. Another purpose was to account for the persistence of religion. For this reason, he takes a long and wide view, and the means he used for his purposes are the same means that are required to deal with the questions cited above. That is to say, the basic means for handling the tensions is generalization. For Whitehead, in the long run the persistence of religion in the individual and in the community depends upon the capacity for renewal and the inclusion of new contrasts. The explanation of the progress of religion on the whole as well as the specific questions of the formative principles of the religious community and the religious individual depend upon generalities. The principle means of handling contrasts and determining the order that permits renewal is generalization. This enables us to see the relationships between things as a whole and their parts. The next section will take up some of these matters in

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connection with the progress of religion to its final satisfaction in the relationship of the individual to God the companion.

E. The Individual and God as Void, Enemy and Companion

In describing the development of religion, Whitehead speaks of three stages that religion includes if it reaches its final satisfaction, that is, if it expresses the full living out of the religious vision. Religion is the transition from God the void to God the enemy, and from God the enemy to God the companion.[89] Though Whitehead himself does not give sustained attention to them, these metaphors are pregnant with meaning and the whole of Religion in the Making can be seen as a kind of commentary on them. In this section we will explore their contribution to our understanding of Whitehead's view of religion. As we do, I believe that they should lead us to a fuller picture of Whitehead's emphasis on solitariness and generalization.

It is difficult to discuss God as void, both because of the nature of the concept and because of the little attention Whitehead gives to it. However, if we consider the notion in light of what it says about order and solitariness we will begin to get a sense of what it is about. We can locate this meaning best in the context of Whitehead's description of primitive religion. God as void is expressive of a universe in which connections are not apparent and in which individuality and responsibility are very limited. Rationality does not function in any significant way at this level of existence for the very presuppositions of a coherent rationalism are absent.[90] Whitehead tells us that such rationalism presupposes a complex of definite facts whose interconnections are sought. Primitive man faces an unfathomable universe to which he can respond only through ritual and emotion. Aside from the routine of tribal necessities, the background is one of indefiniteness, lacking any relevant order. What lies beyond as background, to whatever degree it is sensed at all, is "void of definition."

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[89] RM, 16.

Without a sense of interconnections beyond the routine of life, and without a means to apply any flashes of insight into order, life lacks a basis for importance. Generality cannot function to lift human beings out of the world of isolated acts because the rational structures to do so are not present. In addition, at this stage the individuality of the self has not yet emerged, and so the basis for deliberate and directed relations is limited.

Because the individuality of the self is not yet operative in any significant way, the individual remains immersed in communality, dominated by the activities and judgments of the group without a sense

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[90] RM, 24.

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of the contribution his individuality or freedom makes to the group. Likewise, whatever dim force God might be conceived as does not include any sense of God's importance for the individual. What happens when an order begins to be discerned? This signifies a transition to the next stage of relating to God as enemy.

God appears as enemy when some order is apparent and some connections are discerned, but when the order appears to be opposed to the deepest human activity and purposes. At this stage, there are beliefs about particular limited aspects of order, but a sense of order in any complete or general way is lacking because the beliefs are largely uncoordinated. There is, however, some advance beyond mere unreflective battling with circumstances, and, as the shadows of an order begin to emerge, there is an attempt to make contact with whatever order there is and to control it insofar as that is possible.[91] This situation is exemplified in the stage of myth, the stage of uncoordinated beliefs, when one tries to get in touch with the deities responsible for particular occurrences to obtain a special favor or to avert a particular danger. But this is a precarious operation at best, and one can become locked in the ritualistic fear that he will not meet the conditions for conciliation. Therefore, though the religious concepts at the stage of God the enemy may have the advantage of transporting religion beyond the data of immediate sense perception toward the beginning of a sense of order, they may also be crude or even horrible.[92]

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[91] RM, 40. This is the stage in which man studies the will of God in order that he might be preserved.

At this stage of religion solitariness is still functioning at a low level, for relations with God are not based on the universality of relations that flows from a sense of order. Before the sense of order prevails, solitariness is sporadic at most and is felt when one begins to relate to others in a partial way. The other is known as other, but only in terms of what he offers for one's own purposes. Solitariness in the intermediate stage between immersion in the tribe and the world loyalty of wide universal relations is a unique stage of confronting the God of arbitrary purposes. When the unsupported solitariness of this stage grows unmanageable or unbearable, one may either despair or flee from the enemy and sink back into the void of non-relation.

The stage of relating to God the enemy also has a more contemporary application. God appears as enemy, or at least has a significant inimical aspect, when he is viewed as responsible for the kind of order which appears to be opposed to man's nobler inspirations. Whitehead's criticism of Christian theology centers on its presentation of a dualistic order which makes God an exception to metaphysical principles and results in an exaggerated emphasis on transcendence and fear.[93] Unless man sees God as playing a substantial part in the order he experiences in the world, similar problems can arise as confronted tribal man in his approach to God the enemy. But since it is first a religion and then, secondarily, a search for a metaphysics, Christianity has the capacity to reform its own theological understanding.[94] This reform can benefit from the re-examination of the kind of order operative in the world. The discernment of order brings us to the final stage in the evolution of religion which is the stage of man's relating to God the companion.

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[92] RM, 26.

The transition from God the enemy to God the companion is the stage that characterizes religion when it reaches its final satisfaction. It is the stage of rational religion. At this stage of development, one recognizes that the universe is not a bare succession of facts and that religion is not merely a collection of uncoordinated beliefs. There are interconnections beyond the mere routine of life which guide human behavior, and there is a sense of importance that gives a definite character to the coordination of thought. Above all, there is an order pervading all of reality, an order that is revealed in a primary religious insight into the nature of things. Once this order is established, it is possible to reorganize ritual and belief in light of the coherence discerned in religious experience. Once one perceives the generality and universality of the order, he can speak of God the companion. It is at this point that we pass from the general notion of God the companion that characterizes various forms of rational religion and turn to the illumination that Whitehead's own system offers to this metaphor.

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[93] RM, 72. Although Whitehead's treatment of the loss of meaning and the contemporary quest for God brings out the danger of this kind of emphasis in Religion in the Making, the point comes out perhaps even more strongly in PR, 519-521, 525-526; SMW, 188-192; AI, 169-171.

[94] RM, 50.

God is companion, first, because of the order which he reflects and of which he is the source. We have already noted Whitehead's specific reference to God the companion in relation to its implications for universality in rational religion. This metaphor expresses a shift in the emphasis of rightness.[95] God's goodness is the rightness or order that he reflects and the fullness with which he embodies that order. This is the goodness man seeks to imitate.

To put the conception of God as companion in terms of value and the relation of order to value, God's goodness is his limitation of value through his aesthetic ordering. To be an actual thing is to be limited, for to be unlimited would be to lack definiteness.

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[95] Supra, 140-141.

God's definiteness involves limitation in two fundamental ways. He is limited by the limitations of the actual world in which he is immanent, and he is limited in that he does not include evil as evil.[96]

Of course, there are some ways in which God is unlimited. God is above change in his complete conceptual realization of the realm of ideal forms.[97] The world is passing in time, but amid the flux of that passing, the formative elements that are inherent in the actual world, God, creativity, and ideal forms, do not change. The physical occasions which build up the actual world are essentially in transition.[98] They issue from process and require process, but God is the non-temporal actual entity guiding the process. He includes all possibilities of physical value conceptually by his graded grasp of the ideal forms. He holds the ideal forms apart in equal conceptual realization of knowledge.

The unlimited aspect of God's nature is not directly related to his role as companion. The unlimited aspect is indirectly related to this metaphor for God's complete conceptual realization of the realm of forms has its base in the actual world.[99] "God in the world is the perpetual vision of the road which leads to the deeper realities."[100] In this sense, God is companion for he is always with the world in the creative process by virtue of the order he provides.

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[96] RM, 148.

[97] RM, 146-147.

[98] Ibid.

> The order of the world is no accident. There is nothing actual which could be actual without some measure of order. The religious insight is the grasp of this truth: That the order of the world, the value of the world in its whole and in its part, the beauty of the world, the zest of life, the peace of life, and the mastery of evil, are all bound together--not accidentally, but by reason of this truth: that the universe exhibits a creativity with infinite freedom, and a realm of forms with infinite possibilities; but that this creativity and these forms are together impotent to achieve actuality apart from the completed ideal harmony, which is God.[101]

We see, therefore, that God's goodness is the rightness of his limitation, given the conditions of the actual world. Even creativity and the ideal forms, which in their own ways are unlimited, would be powerless to achieve actuality without the power by which God sustains the world, the power of himself as the ideal. Apart from God who orders, there would be no actual world, and apart from the actual world with its creativity there would be no rational explanation of God's ideal vision.[102]

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[99] RM, 149.

[100] RM, 151.

[101] RM, 115.

But this incarnation of God in the world as its companion does not fully demonstrate the way that the world influences God. Admittedly, at any given instance, God as the complete harmonization of the ideal forms is influenced by the world in the sense that whatever quality of existence can be achieved through his vision is limited by the facts of the actual world. But even though Whitehead refers to God as an actual entity, he does not deal with the question of the way that God, like any entity, is affected by other entities.[103] This is an issue that did not surface clearly until Process and Reality, and even there only quite late.[104] Though Whitehead refers to God as an actual entity in Religion in the Making, God's knowledge of "the relationships of particular modes of value is not added to, or disturbed, by the realization in the actual world of what is already conceptually realized in his ideal world."[105] This may mean either that God is still functioning very much as the principle of limitation

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[102] RM, 149-151.

[103] RM, 88, 91, 95, 101, 146.

[104] PR, 523f.

[105] RM, 147-148.

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of Science and the Modern World[106] or that the character of God's vision and the relationship between values is extremely general. The issue is not dealt with directly until Process and Reality where Whitehead proposes the consequent nature of God which is conscious and therefore can take somewhat greater account of the more particular modes of value, although this is not to say that God's aim cannot still be quite general. The description of God in Religion in the Making corresponds more closely to what Whitehead later described as the primordial nature of God.

The description of God as companion, then, rests largely on his abiding immanence as the source of order and the lure toward the realization of deeper values. In terms of human existence, man's reflection of God's goodness takes the form of an expansive valuation which directs human purposes to ends which are impartial to self-interest.[107] God is the element in virtue of which judgment stretches beyond the facts of existence to the values of existence and from the values of existence to the nature of existence. In this respect the impetus toward generalization that is characteristic of religion includes the generality of faith which embraces the value that is inherent in the nature of things. God is that element in virtue of which human purposes extend beyond values for one's self to values for others. Through the subject's pursuit of such value for others, God transforms the value for others into value for the subject. Thus the impartial concern for others and dedication to that aim constitutes a value in itself that flows back into the individual to deepen his value.

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[106] SMW, 178.

[107] RM, 151-152.

Whitehead mentions another aspect of God as companion, that is, his transmutation of what is lost into a living fact within his own nature.[108] The kingdom of heaven is God, but the kingdom is not merely the separation of good from evil. The kingdom is the overcoming or transmutation of evil that is already actual into good by way of building on the limitation it presents. God overcomes evil by presenting the novel consequent aim for that occasion which will permit the restoration of goodness. The consequent is constituted by all the ideal forms of possibility graded in their proportion.[109] The transmutation of evil into good occurs in the actual world by reason of the meeting of the actual world with the ideal vision included in God's nature with the result that that particular limitation becomes the occasion for a new valuation.

God has in his nature the knowledge of pain, evil, and degradation for just what it is, but in union with God these facts are not total loss. They are part of the ground out of which new occasions of value occur. The all-embracing ideals of God weave an immortal element into the mortal rhythms of things which makes it possible for new good to come out of the limitations and evil of past events. As the ideal consequent, God provides the means by which evils which have occurred do not have the final word.

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[108] RM, 148.

[109] RM, 145.

We can see from Whitehead's account of God as companion that solitariness is not diminished; rather, it remains and is deepened. Both God and human subjects are solitary by virtue of their complex and comprehensive grasping of the elements of the universe into the unity of their subjectivity. The quality of companionship results from the way that each weaves the data of the world into his essential unity, how fully one takes account of the value of other entities. Of course, this is dependent upon a certain capacity for generalization or sorting out what are the most important elements which will direct the individual toward the greatest realization of value. The greatest realization of value has to take account not only of the immediate value for the integrating subject, but of what in the long run will benefit the community of the world as well. Thus, solitariness is intensified by the deferral of immediate personal satisfaction.

When religion reaches its final satisfaction, then, in God the companion, both community and solitariness are increased. In

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rational religion community is no longer understood as referring to those who are simply in some kind of physical proximity or to those who are like one's self. Community is taken in a larger sense to include the value of all that is not the self. In this way the community is not only larger, but it is also more complex and is increasing in complexity. It offers more richness because it offers more contrasts. The only way this larger community can be more than a loose collection of many somewhat disparate individuals affecting each other in an uncoordinated way is that the individuals themselves function as conscious, coordinating centers of unity, and that God himself is the ultimate source of the unification of the community of value. This is the road to deepening solitariness and its guide is generality. If the individual grows in the quality of his solitariness, he grows in the quality of his companionship as well, for whatever integrations he attains are contributed to the world for the enrichment of others. In this sense, God is the greatest companion of all.

Some tensions remain between solitariness and community, but we will defer considering them until we summarize and conclude this chapter. Before we do that,we will complete Whitehead's picture of religion by drawing out the function of religion in relation to this account of its meaning.

II. The Function of Religion

Given the preceding account of Whitehead's understanding of religion, we can now draw out the function that emerges in relation to that meaning. Meaning and function are very closely related, in fact, inseparable. But it is helpful to distinguish them in order to see more clearly the fundamental activity and aim which characterizes religion and thus to provide a means for the subject's evaluation of his own response and for the determination of the efficacy of the various objective expressions of religion.

Here we must note that in one way religion does not have a function. Whitehead reminds us of this when he observes that one does not use religion as one uses arithmetic.[110] Rather, one _is_ religious. Religion is not a device that we can pick up or not at will, for in its most primary sense it is not a thing but a quality of one's relationship to God and to the world. It is the religious quality in relating that expresses the characteristic activity of religion and enables us to speak of the function of religion. Both in its interior subjective aspects which point to its aim and effects for the subject and in its exterior objective expressions which are available

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[110] RM, 14.

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for the inspiration and the scrutiny of others, religion is a phenomenon of man which reflects a certain purpose relative to the direction of his life and the quality of his existence.

In light of Whitehead's account of the making of religion and the character of its movement, we can discern several functions. Among these are the longing for justification, the impetus toward generalization, and the quest that promotes the adjustment of values. As a first step in investigating these functions we should call attention to a distinction that is made by Whitehead regarding the functions of science, metaphysics, and religion.

Whitehead has expressed some concern regarding the decline of religion.[111] Specifically,he has observed that religion and philosophy have received successive shocks from science with a culmination in the challenges in the middle of the nineteenth century. In some respects philosophy has met these shocks more easily than religion, for it is less wedded to an aboriginal picture of the world.[112] In dealing with the challenges of science, philosophy divided into two streams. One stream subordinated itself to science by dedicating itself to the coordination of notions employed by current scientific practice. The other dissociated itself from science by asserting that science deals with finite truths representing a world of appearances,while philosophy is concerned with ultimate reality. In Whitehead's own view neither subordination nor dissociation is necessary, for both science and philosophy have their proper but related functions. Science is directly concerned with how things happen, not with the ultimate principles that underlie its account.[113] Philosophy, on the other hand, is concerned with the descriptive generalization of the forms that ultimately spell out the character of the universe.[114] Religion makes its own contribution and has its own aim distinct from both the purposes of science and of philosophy which in their self-understanding originate from a systematized scheme of abstraction.

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[111] RM, 72, 43; SMW, 188f.

[112] RM, 136-137. We might add to Whitehead's reason the difficulty that religion has with change because of its inherently conservative character which seeks to preserve value, once it takes on communal expressions.

The importance of rational religion is that it stands or falls with its fundamental position that we know more than can be formulated in one definite scheme of abstraction, however important that scheme may be in its elucidation of an aspect of the order of things.[115] The final principle of religion which it contributes to both of these enterprises is that there is a wisdom in the nature of things from which flows both practice and the theoretical analysis of fact.

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[113] RM, 83; SMW, 8; PR, 24.

[114] RM, 82.

[115] RM, 137.

This intuition of the fact of order, radically given and incapable of any final formulation in science or philosophy, is evidenced in two basic ways. The success of special theoretical sciences, physical and otherwise, supports this given character at the base of things. Without this rooting in experience, there would be no grounds on which to base the generalizations of science and philosophy. Secondly, the intuition of order remains even when there are significant changes in the understanding and elucidation of order. In this way the fact of order is more fundamental than any of its formulations, whether for practical or theoretical reasons.

Religion, therefore, functions in its most basic sense to preserve contact with the character of the universe, which character for Whitehead includes a dynamic process. Because of this, religion expresses an inherent movement toward generality when it insists that the discernment of relationships forms in itself the very substance of existence.[116] Thus, in a sense, the religious insight leads to the kinds of generalizations found in the specialized purposes of philosophy and science.[117] Religion insists that the world is a mutually adjusted disposition of things issuing in value for its own sake, and in this way grounds any more systematic endeavors to elucidate that order or to use it to direct practical affairs.

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[116] RM, 138.

Because religion is rooted in an immediate experience of order, the individual seeks further justification for the order he perceives in various aspects of his life. Religion includes the aim toward inclusive relations in life, an aim which functions effectively through the longing for justification. The longing, however, is based on a sense of trust in the order which is rooted in experience. One might object that the experience is self-sufficient and does not require justification, but in the long run when immediacy has faded and new contrasts challenge former syntheses, one seeks a confirmation of what has been experienced inchoately.

The longing for justification is a function of religious intuition not because the intuition lacks a certain degree of immediate self-sufficiency but because the intuition itself includes an impulse to seek interpretation beyond the immediate occasion. This tendency is connected with the religious insight into the nature of things. The longing for justification emerges from the religious intuition and issues into rational religion which spells out the metaphysical beliefs implicit in the original experience.

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[117] SMW, 12-13. Whitehead notes that the religious outlook of the Middle Ages and its faith in order is one of the factors that made modern science possible. Cf., PR, 24.

The longing for justification is an aspect of the central position religion holds in the coherent ordering of life.[118] Religious insight reveals that existence is not a bare succession of facts. From this original insight one is drawn to seek the basis for the facts of existence in the nature of existence, to draw out in greater detail what is present in germ, and to apply it to the interpretation of experience when the intensity of the intuition is no longer present.

To a certain degree, the intuition will perpetuate itself instinctively, but unless one strives to comprehend it more fully by becoming more consciously and critically aware of the general principles it exemplifies, the intuition will not move effectively beyond its patch of immediacy. In itself, religion possesses this longing, and it cannot function effectively in the long run unless it responds to the longing self-consciously. Science can get along by working with an implicit metaphysics because it can concentrate on the pragmatic value of the metaphysics without attempting a coordination of its first principles.[119] Religion cannot do this very well because if it leaves its general principles uncoordinated, its dogmas will have little more significance than being expedient means of stimulating emotion. The dogmas will lack the intellectual power that is appropriate to notions of great importance.

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[118] RM, 30.

[119] RM, 83.

Religion must find justification for its faith, for unless it does so,it easily slips back into repetition and begins to call forth lower, less comprehensive religious responses. If religion does not seek some degree of clarity in its self-understanding and in its expressions, it will neither be able to deal with new situations that arise nor with its own tendency toward regression.[120] Clarity, of course, does not imply a neat and tightly consistent picture of exactly how all relations hold together. Rather the clarity with which Whitehead is concerned is the clarity of coherent and broad first principles. The breadth of impact that rational religion can exercise,as well as the reform of which it is capable,will depend upon the scope of its general principles.

The longing for justification is a yearning for "more." Through this longing religion directs purposes beyond the facts of existence to the value of existence, beyond the interest in self-value to the impartial interest in the value of others.[121] Without the tendency and the use of adequate means to promote it, religion lacks power. It remains tied to the narrow and trivial concerns of particular circumstances. The longing for justification is a recognition that religion is concerned with matters of deep importance, and that therefore it needs a rational framework that will exploit that importance to the fullest. This recognition underlies Whitehead's comment that the ages of faith have been the ages of rationalism, for a wide conceptuality provides a means of spelling out the importance of religion and for explicating the details of its trust in order, bringing about its strengthening.

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[120] The study of religion and solitariness by Crosby, loc. cit., is surprisingly silent on the role of generality in Whitehead's view of religion. Further attention to the essential relation of solitariness and generality would help to correct his view that Whitehead provides a normative account of religion in accord with what he thinks it should be.

This brings us to another function of religion related to the longing for justification. That function is that religion furnishes an impetus toward generality. Whitehead's analysis of religious experience as an intuition of permanent rightness includes in its definition the feeling of the immediate occasion as failing or succeeding in relation to the ideal relevant to it.[122] The sense of rightness attained or missed, with more or less completeness of attainment or omission, points to the extension of the meaning of that occasion beyond its application to the present occasion. If there is such a degree of attainment or omission felt, then other occasions that lie ahead present opportunities for an advance in harmony. But in order to guide and to maximize the harmony, general principles must be discerned, developed, and coordinated.

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[121] RM, 151-152.

[122] RM, 59.

The intuition of permanent rightness, then, is an intuition of order which requires generality to complete it and to extend its application to other occasions. The intuition of order leads to a generalizing of all of life through rational religion and of all of reality through metaphysics. In this regard the generalizations of religion that result in religious dogmas have a parallel to the generalizations of science that result in scientific dogmas. The dogmas of religion are the attempts to formulate in precise terms the truths disclosed in the religious experience of mankind, while the dogmas of science attempt to formulate in precise terms the truths disclosed in the sense perceptions of mankind. As we have noted, while science may be able to operate pragmatically without a systematic coordination of the principles under which it functions, religion must engage in a more or less comprehensive carrying out of its implicit metaphysics in order to sustain itself in the long run.

To the extent that life is dominated by religious experience, it is conditioned by the formative principle reflected in the universal claim. The formative principle that expresses permanent rightness has reference both to particularity and to generality. It is exemplified in individual occasions, but it may be discerned generally. It is completed and actual and yet lies beyond the completed occasion. It compels recognition and yet in varying degrees it may be disregarded.[123] The intuition, therefore, is not in the nature of a psychological habit that is purely private. Rather it has a general evidential force by reason of its universality. This evidential force is extended intellectually by the impulse toward generalization.

It might appear from the preceding discussion that religion is headed toward abstraction, for the religious impulse toward generalization reveals that there is a quality of life which always lies beyond the mere fact of life.[124] This quality reveals the generality of order which may be abstracted and held out as an ideal. But there must be included in this order the quality of the quality which is the concrete contribution made by the individual who is actual and passing to the order that informs the world. In the final analysis, the impetus toward generality is not directed toward abstraction but toward the fullest actuality that can be left as an important fact for the world. Beyond this quality which the individual contributes, there is no recourse for it is what it is, the stubborn, irreducible fact. This is the reason for the importance of what the individual does with his own solitariness.

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[123] Ibid.

[124] RM, 77-78.

This brings us to the third function of religion which is the promotion of the adjustment of values. In this respect religion functions both as a desire to realize harmony and as a quest for the unattainable, for it expresses the desire for harmony in a creative world which constantly brings forth new actualities whose relations require constant adjustment. The desire for harmony will always discover an incompleteness in actuality, for it is in the nature of things that every new synthesis creates a new entity to be integrated into subjective experience. Quest is an essential factor in aesthetic order.

The promotion of the adjustment of values is a function of God himself who is present in every unit of experience as its vision of the ideal harmonization. The religious quality of the adjustment of values is its aim at depth of value or the union of the ideal forms with the actual facts so as to elicit a renewed feeling-value. In this regard, God's promotion of the adjustment of values is the basis for the individual's quest for God who is ever present and ever out of reach. The religious intuition which is in touch with this aim reflects the general aesthetic feeling of identity and contrast in the promotion of renewed value feeling, and for that reason self-preservation is not the final value in a purified religion rationalized under the influence of world consciousness.

Since value is not simply value in a static sense, but is feeling-value which must be renewed and given life in subjectivity, evil takes on a new dimension. Evil is exhibited not only in physical and mental suffering but also in the loss of higher experience in favor of lower experience. Another way of looking at the function of religion we are addressing is to see it as the promotion of higher experience, for left to its own resources, the physical side of experience will result in the running down of energy. This represents a loss of value and regression to a less important quality of existence. The state of the individual in the process of losing value is an evil for that person. His adjustment to the demands of his world is not commensurate with the conditions that would promote renewed feeling-value. Once the individual has settled for an objectified lower realization of value, it becomes an evil for others since what might be is not.

An example of this loss of higher experience may be found in religion itself when individuals ignore the quest for deeper value. Whitehead notes that this is the case when good people of narrow sympathies feel they have reached a state of stable goodness.[125]

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[125] RM, 95. The refusal to rest in past achievements is essential to Whitehead's understanding of religion and religious experience. The centrality of adventure in his religious outlook was

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They may become unfeeling and unprogressive so that they neither recognize the contrasts that would enhance their solitariness nor make a full contribution of the quality of their existence to the world. In this way, their moral correctitude may represent an evil, for the failure to let go of a good that belongs to another context can easily contribute to triviality in religion.

In light of these considerations regarding the deepening of value, we must note the role of final causality in religion. Though Whitehead does not give explicit attention to the notion of final causality in Religion in the Making, it is evident that it has dominated his religious vision. God's function in relation to the world, and particularly in relation to man, primarily involves final causality. The power by which God sustains the world is his power as ideal.[126] It is God who calls the world to actualizations that will deliver it from the physical decay of mere repetition. It is God who guides the adjustment of values that is necessary for the advance from values already objectified. In all of these relations the mode of operation is final causality.

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aptly expressed in a remark he made concerning the difference between aesthetic experience and religious experience. Aesthetic experience excites but it also soothes, he said, while religious experience excites but does not soothe. Dial., 59.

[126] RM, 149.

Final causality is also the principal causal influence behind the individual's religious development in solitariness. The community represents the world that has already "perished" into objective immortality. In order for the subject to express any value himself, he must transform what is dead into a living reality within himself, and this is accomplished through the operation of final causality that gives a direction to his own realization of value.

We have seen the role of reason in religion, specifically we have seen its contribution in the movement toward universality and generality as well as solitariness. We know from Whitehead's later more explicit discussion of reason that reason functions to constitute, criticize, and emphasize final causes, and thus to more effectively promote the adjustment of value.[127] The self-conscious operation of rationality in religion, then, not only reveals the final causes which are functioning within the religious sensibilities, but it is also indispensibly linked to the criticism and evaluation of those causes. This important role of final causality supports Whitehead's account of the movement of religion and its persistence.

Efficient causality seems to have little contribution to make to the religious formation of the individual at the stage of rational religion. It may have had a more important function in the

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[127] FR, 26.

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early stages of religion which were concerned with the self-preservation, but in the long run final causality has emerged as the principle guiding religious purpose.

With these remarks, we bring to a close the examination of Whitehead's account of religion in Religion in the Making. It remains for us to summarize that view briefly and to evaluate it before considering Whitehead's later approaches to religion to see what they might add to the picture presented so far.

Summary and Evaluation

In this chapter we have been considering Whitehead's view of religion as it is presented in Religion in the Making, studying it as a religious expression of the problem of the one and the many. In general, we can say that Whitehead sees the solution of the problem of the one and the many in religion as accomplished basically through rational means. The eventual emergence of rational religion is the large-scale manifestation of this resolution which has its roots in the individual resolution of the problem through the application of general principles. In order to reinforce this conclusion, to reiterate its relation to solitariness, and to highlight some questions it raises, let us recall briefly the major areas that were treated.

Whitehead has analyzed the development of religion as the movement from more emotional and physically expressive forms to more rational and universally expressive forms. The structure of man's existence at present, the way he relates to his world demonstrating responsibility and control in it, and the extension and purification of religious experience through a widening conceptuality give considerable support to Whitehead's analysis.[128] His reflection highlights the general structure of religion and the shift of emphasis that was necessary for religion to accommodate itself to a world grown increasingly complex.

Whitehead's point of emphasis, however, raises a question regarding the effect of the transformation of religion on its more physical elements and on the continuing role of those elements. We would have to agree that over the broad expanse of human history, religion has assumed a greater dependence on rationality, and that this increased role of rationality enabled it to extend the scope of its importance. But within the long-range view that Whitehead takes, he seems to leave ritual and myth behind as lower forms of religion. He insists that dogmas are necessary for vivid realization and effectiveness among other things. But do not ritual and myth continue to contribute to religion by encouraging vivid realization

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[128] It should remain clear that Whitehead's purpose has been to provide an account of the general shape of the evolution of religious thought, not to give a precise account of the transitions from one stage of development to another.

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and effectiveness also? Do they not help to focus the emotional power within religion? Human beings are bodily creatures and inevitably will express themselves concretely and physically, even though the bodily expressions will be informed by conceptuality. While we must admit that in the long run myth and ritual have not been the primary basis for the persistence of religion and the purification of its understanding, they, too, once purified, continue to perform an important, though different, function. At any rate, they cannot be ignored,for they continue to operate unconciously and uncritically if they are not included in our religious self-understanding. For this reason, we are left with the question of how they are to be conceived in rational religion.

Solitariness has been shown to be the keynote in the progress of religion from particularity to universality. The expansion of religious concerns and purposes beyond the tribe brought about a universality that recognized the larger claims of value. When this had occurred, the community beyond the tribe represented a new framework for religion, and correspondingly a new locus of deepening religious value took shape in the individual. This framework, including more complex and contrasting values, required a different kind of integration, one in which religious experience could not reach its completion until it issued into world loyalty. Whitehead's treatment of this framework of religion and religious experience demonstrates the kind of universal relations that characterize world religions such as Christianity and Buddhism.

In his account, however, Whitehead does not discuss the community as support for more universal relations. The movement toward universal relations involves a greater degree of solitariness, to be sure, for one can only take account of the complex and contrasting values of a multitude of others by bringing their values to a unity in himself. He cannot respond to universal value unless he incorporates that value into himself and acts freely and responsibly in relation to it. But one does not build such understanding alone, nor can one continue to live out such an expansive outlook without a support and a strengthening. Moreover, the possibility of such living cannot arise in the first place unless the antecedent conditions permit it. You can only speak of mercy among a people who in some respects are already merciful.[129] The individual's relations within the actual world, including his relation with God, contribute to the support of his pursuit of deeper value. Without a feeling of such support, solitariness would become unbearable. To put it another way, the full dimensions of solitariness can be preserved only by preserving the tension that remains between solitariness and community. No matter how gifted the individual is in his perceptivity and

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[129] RM, 32-33.

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capacity for experience, he seeks validation and even criticism of his integration of meaning and value. At times the confirmation or rejection of community is an inadequate guide for the individual's insight, but some feeling of the confirmation of others in community is often the precondition for trust in the insight.

In one way Whitehead does recognize this need by his view of the role of generality in religion. The basic character of the religious intuition is that it reveals a generality in the nature of things which is available to all and supportive of all. The rationalization of that generality extends its influence and enables it to exercise a wider intellectual force by the key it offers for the interpretation of experience, whether in rational religion or in metaphysics. But the revelation of such generality, helpful as it is and basic as it is, does not fully account for the quality of assurance that enables the individual to respond magnanimously and religiously to the expansive purposes that challenge him in the universal claim. The fact that some can live thus, with greater strength and responsiveness than others, comes not only from the clarity of their vision but also from a power they derive from their relationships. We are left with the question of where this source of empowering resides in Whitehead's presentation of religion.

We should note another tension between individuality and community which Whitehead mentions but does not stress. Generality and particularity are aspects of community which remain in tension. Generality needs a context in which to function.[130] Leaving community to play itself out over a wide range served by the integrating assistance of generality alone may result in a religious outlook that is so general as to become shallow. While the particularized context of a religious community may result in a religious outlook that is narrow, on the other hand it also affords a locus for intensifying and supporting the individual's religious commitment and purpose. The tensions of the particularized religious community within a world religion do not necessarily result in a return to lower forms of religion. That is certainly a danger of concentrating on a narrower community. But there is a corresponding danger in focusing on a community that is very wide, for value may become so diffused as to lack an adequate standpoint and intensity. This situation is corrected to a certain extent by solitariness, but the tensions there, as we have noted above, also require some reference to community. Therefore, in generality and particularity of community we have a tension that contributes to the vitality of world religion, and thus which seems to be worthy of further emphasis.

In our investigation of Whitehead's view of religion, we have found an emphasis on the movement toward greater generality in the evolution of religion, and we have found an analysis of religious intuition in which the awareness of generality or rightness is inherent. The religious intuition is an apprehension of the general character of things along with an application of that character to the prehending subject who feels it as an aim more or less attained or missed. The intuition corresponds to the experience of God, although Whitehead qualifies this by stating that in its most basic and universal form this experience is not one of a personal being.[131] His presentation of this intuition raises some further questions regarding intuitions. It leads us to ask what is the nature and role of intuitions, how do the religious intuitions express the central thesis of this study, and what are some of the forms religious intuitions might take other than permanent rightness. Whitehead's account in Religion in the Making does not furnish a clear answer to these questions, and so we must take them up more directly in a subsequent chapter which will deal with the matter of intuitions.

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[130] RM, 130-131.

The advance of solitariness in religion raises another question regarding the individual's relationship to God which in the evolution of religion moves through relating to God as void, enemy, and companion. These metaphors present a most perceptive picture of the advance to fullness of relationship in religion. They are based to a large extent on the development of rationality in religion and on the increased awareness of an order or a character in the nature of things. But here we must ask whether Whitehead's account of God as companion does full justice to the religious implications of the metaphor. God is clearly companion in the sense that he is the source of order and in that he reflects the same order which is present in all of reality. Man's growing awareness of this rightness leads to the realization that he is to imitate the harmony and order that is present in God as the greatest good. But this presentation of companionship omits a certain mutuality of presence and concern. We do not have a complete picture of the way that God influences the world efficaciously as well as teleologically. In other words, there is a quality of God as confirming and empowering presence that is not developed. Nor do we have a clear picture of mutuality and the way that the world influences God its companion. The emphasis may be due to Whitehead's presentation of God largely in terms of his primordial nature in Religion in the Making. This raises a question regarding the religious character of Whitehead's God to which we can return in the next chapter where we will examine Whitehead's later religious ideas.

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[131] RM, 61f.

Finally, Whitehead's treatment of the function of religion has been shown to revolve around the longing for justification, the impulse toward generality, and the promotion of mutual adjustment of values. This view of the function of religion is characteristic both of Whitehead's long-range view of religion over the course of history and his view of God as the ideal vision calling man to deeper values. There is no doubt that this is an essential quality of religion and that the finer moments of man's history have demonstrated visions of life that are characterized by a call to more and more expansive relations. In the final analysis, however, Whitehead has not provided a rationale within the function which will account for what supports man in his pursuit of greater value. He has not indicated the resource within man's relationship to God that empowers him and frees him from his own limitations and faint-heartedness.

These questions that have been raised come to a concentration around the matters of the physical and emotional aspects of religion and the efficaciousness of God. In the following chapter we will examine the references to religion in Whitehead's later works to determine whether they support the picture of religion that emerges in Religion in the Making or if there are any changes in that view. At the same time we will see what light those later works might shed on some of the questions that have been raised here.

CHAPTER III

RELIGION IN WHITEHEAD'S OTHER WORKS

In his discussion of Whitehead's philosophy of religion, Victor Lowe suggests that Whitehead's broad base in all the general discussions in the area of theology rests on his view of religion as a whole and its relation to philosophy.[1] Our examination of Religion in the Making has borne this out, as well as supporting the specific thesis that his approach to religion is an expression of his basic concern with the problem of the one and the many.

None of Whitehead's other works have the concentrated focus on religion that we find in Religion in the Making. Nor do these other works specifically re-examine any of the notions of religion that were set forth at that early stage. Nevertheless, they do exhibit a continuing interest in religious matters. It will be our task in this chapter, then, to examine the other works of Whitehead where his chief discussions of religion and his conception of God occur to see in what way they relate to his earlier perspective and emphases.

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[1] Victor Lowe, Understanding Whitehead (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), 95. Lowe notes that after thinking about Whitehead's religious thought for many years, his reaction to it as a whole is still unsettled, though he does not clearly indicate why this is so. In the final analysis, Lowe feels that more specific attention needs to be given to the individual person as the primary unit in terms of which some problems should be discussed rather than occasions or societies of occasions, 378. Yet in another place, he is perfectly willing to concede that there is considerable value in the secular function of God because it is not too exclusively concerned with man, 110. I do not suggest that these two reactions are incompatible. It may be that the locus for establishing the adequacy of Whitehead's religious view needs to be more clearly focused on the interchange of power.

Aside from Religion in the Making, the works where Whitehead's chief discussions of this topic occur are Science and the Modern World, Process and Reality, Adventures of Ideas, and Modes of Thought. In our examination of these works, which will be treated in chronological order, some brief mention will be made of other works such as may have an indirect or limited bearing on the topic.

I. Science and the Modern World

In Science and the Modern World, Whitehead judges religion to be part of the upward movement within civilization.[2] He notes at the beginning of this work, however, that the progress of civilization is not wholly a uniform drift toward better things.[3] The unique movement of religion displays it to be no exception to the overall pattern of advances, reversals, and declines. Religion, like civilization, shows a movement upward if we map it out on a scale large enough, but within the historical view distortions, reversals, and cruelties in religion often obscure the general drift toward its purification. Nevertheless, particularly in Science and the Modern World, Whitehead sees religion in the long run as an essential expression of an upward movement.

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[2] SMW, 192.

[3] SMW, 3.

With this massive view as background, Whitehead's purpose is to explore science as an energizing force in the modern state of mind. He does so by considering its broad generalizations and its impact upon other spiritual forces, especially religion.[4] Whereas in Religion in the Making Whitehead is concerned with the development of religion, in Science and the Modern World he is concerned with the development of science and with what is its effect on the developments within rational religion. He touches upon some general connections between religion and science in Religion in the Making, but for the most part he deals with these more specifically in Science and the Modern World.

The most important factors regarding religion and science that emerge from Science and the Modern World have to do with religion's contribution to the rise of science and with science's contribution to religion through its critical formulations and its spirit of adventure. These two factors plus Whitehead's idea of God will be the focus of attention in the examination of this work.

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[4] Ibid.

At the outset of the book, Whitehead observes the important contribution religion made to science, for he finds the rise of science in the sixteenth century to have had its roots in the medieval trust in the rationality of God and the orderliness of nature.[5] In Whitehead's analysis, faith in the possibility of science, generated antecedently to the development of scientific theory, is an unconscious derivative from medieval theology.

Accepting the basic reliance of science on order and a cosmology, Whitehead devotes these Lowell lectures of 1925 to demonstrating that the fixed cosmology that has persisted through the successive generations since the rise of science is in need of rethinking and reformulation. The problem with the scientific cosmology which has persisted lies with its assumption that ultimate brute matter is senseless, valueless, and purposeless.[6] The relation of God to such a view seems quite irrelevant. But even before dealing with the question of God, Whitehead asserts that this assumption of scientific

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[5] SMW, 12-13.

[6] SMW, 17. For a fuller discussion of what is implied in the reformulation of metaphysics consequent upon the rejection of this cosmology, see Chapter X, "Abstraction," and Chapter XI, "God."

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materialism is unsuited to the scientific situation at the present time. There are more subtle employments of the senses than this view indicates, and there are presuppositions of coherence and meaning which it ignores. Whitehead's response to this problem is to deal with the internal and external elements of perceptivity in an organic way without choosing between subjectivity and objectivity.

The alternative doctrine of organism which he proposes as a substitute for scientific materialism takes into account the value and purpose inherent in experience. In these first formulations of his metaphysical position, a kind of rough draft of Process and Reality, Whitehead takes the position that the things experienced and the cognizant subject enter the world on equal terms.[7] His spelling out of this relation is an outline of the essentials of a philosophy adapted to the requirement of science and to the concrete experience of mankind.

A basic intuition into the orderliness of nature issues into various systems explaining that order. All are based on the originative faith in some sort of harmony. This faith that is dependent on reason to elaborate and purify it is the trust that the ultimate nature of things holds together in a harmony which excludes mere arbitrariness.[8] The faith in the order of nature which has made the growth of science possible is a particular example of a deeper faith which cannot be justified by any inductive generalization, for it springs from direct intuition of the nature of things disclosed in our own immediate experience. The experience reveals that beneath the harmony of logic lying on the universe as a necessity, there is an aesthetic harmony that stands as a living ideal molding the general flux in broken progress toward subtler issues.

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[7] SMW, 89.

Given this initial basic relation between science and religion, Whitehead spells out their continuing relationship in a special chapter. These two areas, he says, represent the two strongest forces, apart from mere sense impulses, which influence human beings. Moreover, because of their strong influences, he asserts that the future of history will depend upon the present decision as to what is the relationship between them.[9] Their relationship all along has been one characterized by a certain amount of conflict. But the tension is a source of opportunity. Again and again in the course of history, science has challenged religion and Christian doctrine has had to be adjusted to achieve integrity with cosmological assumptions. On the other hand, science, too, has had to make adjustments which have been suggested in religious assertions.[10]

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[8] SMW, 18.

[9] SMW, 181-182.

In light of these considerations, Whitehead adds a precautionary note regarding dogmatism in science or religion. We should believe nothing in either sphere of thought which does not appear to us to be certified by solid reasons based on the critical research of either ourselves or competent authorities. But granting this precaution, we should not abandon the doctrines of either too hastily when there is a clash between the two on points of detail. It may simply be that we are more interested in one set of doctrines than another at a given time. If we have any sense of perspective and the history of thought, we shall wait and refrain from mutual anathemas. The sense of a large-scale view serves as a protective element against immediate absorption in the present details, and it prevents the exclusion of relevant contributions made by all the details in a larger, more adequate view.

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[10] SMW, 182-184. The changes in the interpretation of Christian doctrine as a result of scientific advances from the heliocentric theory to evolutionary theory are fairly obvious. Interestingly enough, Whitehead notes that in some respects the positions that have been taken by religious authorities have also retained a place in later more complex scientific positions. For example, the Galilean position held that the earth moves and the sun is fixed while spokesmen of the Inquisition held that the earth is fixed while the sun moves. Newtonian observers held that both the sun and the earth move. Now, says Whitehead, we can hold any one of these three statements provided that one fixes the sense of "rest" and "motion" in the way required by the statement adopted. In other words, all sides had hold of important truths, but with the knowledge of those times, the truths appeared to be inconsistent. Here is another support, we might add, for the case for generalization.

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Given these precautions and observations regarding the cross-fertilization of religion and science, Whitehead observes that religion has not taken full advantage of the opportunities presented by the clash of doctrines.[11] In formal logic a contradiction is a sign of defeat, but in the evolution of true knowledge it marks the first step in progress toward a victory.[12] Every age produces people with clear intellects who have elaborated a scheme of thought, religious or otherwise, which exactly fits those experiences which claim their interest. Such people are easily apt to ignore or to explain away all evidence that does not fit in consistently with their scheme. Though they rightly seek to preserve their interpretation of experience from the fluctuating extremes of fashionable opinion, in the long run this is possible only by taking the whole evidence into account through the guidance of ideas which are adequate in their generality. But even these general ideas are not static in their relationships, and new lights are constantly being thrown on them. Over a period of time, they are transformed by the urge of critical reason, the vivid evidence of emotional experience, and the cold certainties of scientific perception. Consequently, as Whitehead demonstrates in Religion in the Making, with the transformation of knowledge comes the transformation of religion.

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[11] SMW, 186.

[12] SMW, 187.

When Whitehead looks at religion over the past two centuries, however, he sees a gradual decay of religious influence in western civilization. Because those who have tried to communicate religious views have been largely insensitive to the inevitable transformation of religion that must occur and have failed to use the necessary resources of intellectual power, religion has tended to degenerate into a formula which merely embellishes a comfortable life. Part of the present difficulty in religion,as Whitehead sees it,stems from two reasons. First, religion has been on the defensive because it has failed to keep pace with the unprecedented intellectual progress of the period; and second, there has been an unanswered need to re-examine the meaning of religion on the basis of the movement that has been slowly transforming the shape of religious interest.[13]

The first difficulty that religion faces is its resistance to change. On the other hand, this spirit of conservation is well-founded because it preserves the proper ideas of religion from being tossed about by the notions that are fashionable but poorly grounded and that could cause it to lose sight of its own genuine message. At the same time, religion must also disengage itself from adventitious notions which have crept into its self-understanding by reason of its use of imaginative pictures to express its own ideas. The catalyst that often precipitates this disengagement and change is the movement of advance in science. Normally, an advance in science will mean that various beliefs require some sort of modification.[14] If the belief is a sound expression of religion, such a modification will only express more adequately the exact point of importance. The transformation will be a gain because it will bring what is of importance into clearer focus.

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[13] SMW, 188-190. The question of the meaning of religion is taken up as a direct issue in Religion in the Making, as was evident in the focus of the preceding chapter of this essay.

The present decline of religion has been the result of a period of unprecedented intellectual progress which presents a new challenge for religion to criticize and reformulate the general principles which determine its importance. The solution to this first difficulty of religion is a disposition toward change in the same spirit as that of science. Though religion is the expression of one type of the fundamental experiences of mankind, the expression grows more accurate and reaches new depths as it develops in its own thought.

The second difficulty that is responsible for the decline in religion is the failure of those directly involved with religion to re-examine the meaning of religion. Religious people often express what they mean by religion in terms that are suited to the emotional patterns of bygone days or that are directed to modern emotional interests of a non-religious character. Specifically, Whitehead means that religion too often has recourse to fear as a motive force or to the anticipation of a kind of power that science has demonstrated is inherent within the forces of nature itself. Thus, to rely for motivation on psychological factors which do not promote responsible selfless behavior or to rely on an understanding of God's activity which bypasses science's contribution to the understanding of cause and effect is to relegate religion to being an outworn habit that has little reference to how things really operate in the world.

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[14] SMW, 189. A very recent case in point is the modification of the doctrines of creation and original sin which result from the challenge of evolutionary evidence.

The answer Whitehead suggests to this second difficulty of religion is to rethink the main position of religion that accounts for its immediate command of assent. He describes religion as the reaction of human nature to the search for God.[15] Whitehead's principal concern in establishing the meaning of religion is to determine the reaction that sums up the religious motive for the present age. When religion begins to rely on motives such as the organization of society, it loses touch with the deeper realities that are more central to its importance. Though religious motives highlight the conviction that God is with the world, at the same time the search remains, for the understanding of how God is with the world changes as science and philosophy help to disengage outworn cosmologies. The purification of belief

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[15] SMW, 151.

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brings with it the purification of motives.

In light of these considerations, religion is not to be conceived of as a mere guide for conduct, though conduct is bound up with religion as an inevitable by-product. Rather, religion is concerned with the nature of things and is wholly wrapped up in the contemplation of moral and aesthetic values, in the beauty of holiness.[16] How one contemplates and incorporates these values is responsible for the form that religion takes. For Whitehead, this "how" strikes at the very heart of religious importance, for it is guided by the commanding vision that determines the shape of one's life. The religious aspect of the formation of character reflects a yearning for the infinite, but the infinite as present within the finite.

> Religion is the vision of something which stands beyond, behind, and within, the passing flux of immediate things; something which is real, and yet waiting to be realised; something which is a remote possibility, and yet the greatest of present facts; something that gives meaning to all that passes, and yet eludes apprehension; something whose possession is the final good, and yet is beyond all reach; something which is the ultimate ideal, and the hopeless quest.[17]

This initial indication of the meaning of religion is not wholly spelled out until Religion in the Making where it is rooted in the intuition of permanence and Process and Reality where the permanence

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[16] SMW, 185.

[17] SMW, 191-192.

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is rooted most fully in the nature of God. Nevertheless, the intimations of those further developments are present in the statements of Science and the Modern World.

To summarize the motive force of religion we should turn our attention briefly to Whitehead's comments on worship.[18] Worship is the immediate reaction of human nature to the religious vision. In a deep sense, then, worship is religion, for it is the surrender to the ultimate claim of existence in an immediate reaction which subsequently issues into a longing for justification. Neither religion nor worship is a "thing" in its immediate phase but rather, is a quality of response in relationship.[19] It is the surrender to the claim for assimilation, urged with the motive force of mutual love. Worship is a response to the religious vision which aims at the harmonious adjustment of complex detail.

Two special features of Whitehead's processive and relational view, which are centered in the question of power, emerge strongly in this characterization of worship. The motive force for worship is not coercive power, and consequently the response of the spirit to the claim for assimilation reflects the freedom of a creative response. The true worship of God is not inspired by fear or desire for security. It is inspired by the intrinsic worth of the claim resulting from God's ideal of what might be. The source of religious motivation, then, is rooted in persuasive power.

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[18] SMW, 192.

[19] Whitehead does not discuss external forms of worship here, and of course in Religion in the Making the topic of worship in its external forms is subsumed under the topic of ritual. Nevertheless, it seems that the rationale for worship needs to be re-examined in process-relational categories in light of Whitehead's presentation of the nature of God.

The second feature that flows from this expression of power is that of adventure. The response that contributes to the actualization of the vision is the response of surrender, a surrender that does not insist upon immediate satisfaction but that is willing to live in the spirit of adventure. The worship of God is not a rule of safety; it is an adventure of the spirit, a flight after the unattainable.[20] The value of worship is not due to any certainty regarding its effect, but rather to the importance of the endeavor and the striving without which there could be no deepening of harmony and valuation.

Whitehead's conception of God in Science and the Modern World is conditioned by this view of power, but its religious implications are not directly related to the notion of God. Whitehead's conception of God in Science and the Modern World is a conception that is shaped almost exclusively by philosophical concerns. In his brief chapter on God, he notes that Aristotle's God was not available for religious purposes.[21] Aristotle followed the metaphysical train of thought, which could only lead him to the notion of a Prime Mover. Whitehead doubts that any properly general metaphysics can lead to a religiously effective view of God. Nevertheless, the metaphysical task represents a first step without which no narrower experiential evidence can be enlightening. Whitehead's interest here is to establish the necessity of God, for in his view nothing in limited experience can make our ideas of God intelligible unless the general character of things requires such an entity.

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[20] SMW, 192.

Whitehead substitutes the conception of God as the Principle of Limitation for Aristotle's conception of God as Prime Mover. It is on the grounds of limitation that he sees the basis for the necessity of God, since there are no unlimited or abstract possibilities.[22] By virtue of some limitation the particular value of things emerges. Furthermore, when a single occasion is viewed in terms of possibility, and possibility is viewed in terms of a single occasion, their explanation must be taken a step further since no entity can be viewed in isolation from other entities. Actuality is togetherness, and the definiteness of togetherness requires some sort of grading of possibilities. The possibilities which Whitehead discusses here as eternal objects assume a kind of 'abrupt' realization in the individual occasion, but this is dependent upon a grading of possibilities whose source lies in a principle of limitation which is God.

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[21] SMW, 173. Stephen Ely, The Religious Availability of Whitehead's God (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1942) noted this phrase and responded to it by judging the availability of Whitehead's God for religious purposes.

[22] SMW, 174.

If we recall the immediate expressions of limitation in the world noted at the beginning of the last chapter, two reasons for limitation are evident. Each occasion is limited because antecedent conditions limit it and because limitation is necessary for the definiteness of value. Since there is an actual course of events which might have been otherwise, but nevertheless is as it is, subsequent occasions must conform to what has already been actualized. Secondly, the synthesis of actualities requires some standard or guide providing an antecedent direction for the realization of value.[23] Since limitation is the price of value, there can be no discernment of value without antecedent standards to discriminate gradations, contraries, and oppositions relative to any occasion. Thus, if we are to trust in the reality of actual occasions, the conditions described require a principle of limitation. Some general how is necessary to account for the particular realization in the what of the matter-of-fact.

This is the basis for Whitehead's conception of God as a principle of limitation. Beyond the fact of the limitation itself, no further reason can be given for its being the kind of limitation it is. The character of the limitation is the basis for the emergence of reasons. As the source and principle of limitation, God is the ultimate limitation,and in this sense his existence is the ultimate irrationality. That is to say, beyond the fact of limitation which lies at the heart of things, there is nowhere to go for justification.

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[23] SMW, 177-178.

Whitehead's philosophical method brings him to a notion of God that fulfills the metaphysical need for a principle of concretion, but as he suggested at the outset of the chapter on God, the notion of God that emerges from this enterprise is not necessarily the God of the religious vision. For further insights regarding God, one must look to special experiences. Of course, these experiences will be conditioned to a certain extent by one's antecedent understanding of reality, but at the same time these experiences give a valid empirical content to an otherwise abstract principle. They reveal not only that God is, but in some way they reveal how he is.[24]

In this summary of the religious emphases of Science and the Modern World, we have seen that Whitehead's first statements on religion are hints of what was to come in Religion in the Making. Since Religion in the Making continued the train of thought set forth in the first series of Lowell lectures Whitehead gave, there is no significant difference in the religious view presented in the two works. There is a shift, however, in the notion of God. On the one hand, the God of Science and the Modern World is a principle of concretion which is not itself concrete; on the other hand, in Religion in the Making, Whitehead sees God as an actual entity, though as we noted in the last chapter, this conception was not developed and still bore a considerable resemblance to the God of Science and the Modern World. To varying degrees in both of these works, Whitehead seeks to single out the quality of religion at its best that expresses an unreserved dedication to larger, more expansive living, and he also seeks to determine the conception of God that is available for such expansive religious purposes.

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[24] SMW, 178.

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II. Process and Reality

The topic of religion did not surface again with quite the explicitness with which Whitehead treated it in Religion in the Making, but it did come up in more implicit ways in several of the later works where his treatment reflects some of the same concerns. There are two basic ways that Whitehead confronts the matter in Process and Reality. In his magnum opus he is explicitly concerned with religion by virtue of its relation to philosophy and implicitly, and more pervasively, by virtue of the contribution of its spiritual insight to an adequate conception of God.

The first chapter of Process and Reality is an elaboration of the task and method of speculative philosophy. The conclusion of that chapter reminds us of Whitehead's earlier comments on the relation of religion and science to philosophy, both in Science and the Modern World and in Religion in the Making.[25] Here, as in those two earlier works, he accents the mutual contributions of these two perspectives which enable him to situate religion within the large view which gives full sway to the breadth and depth of religion.

As we saw from our examination of Process and Reality in an earlier chapter, philosophy does not initiate interpretations. It finds them in matters of practice.[26] The speculative search for a rational scheme is a search for more adequate criticism and more adequate justification for the interpretations we already employ. As Whitehead graphically points out, if we want a record of uninterpreted experience we would have to ask a stone to record its autobiography. Amid the various separate interpretations of individuals within the flux of a solid world, we look for a unity of interpretation. Philosophy seeks to recover the totality obscured by the definiteness of individual occasions. It seeks to correct the excess of subjectivity that results from the fluctuating function of consciousness.[27]

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[25] SMW, 12-13; RM, 83, 136f; PR, 23f.

Against this background of generality, we are introduced to the distinctive function of religion within the whole through the notion of moral selectivity in individual experience. Moral selectivity reflects conformity to the demands of importance disclosed in the rational vision of philosophy. When moral intuition of an ideal for harmonious adjustment is touched by emotional force, sensitive experience is transformed into moral interest. When Whitehead speaks of morality or moral intuition in Process and Reality, he apparently is dealing with a quality that is not significantly different from religion.[28] The point at issue is that moral or religious interest expresses particularity which is bound up in its own unique way with generality. The antithesis between the individual interest and the general good can be resolved into a manageable tension only through a rational framework that justifies submission of the individual's interest to the general good when this is relevant. This is another expression of Whitehead's earlier presentation of religion as world loyalty.[29] Moreover, it brings to light the realization that the individual's self-interest is a minor intensity until it transfers its claim to a wider sweep of interest whose greater entertainment of contrast increases intensity.[30]

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[26] PR, 22.

[27] Ibid.

The sense of lived contrast within an effective moral outlook provides the emotional intensity that delivers philosophy from the cool detachment of rational solutions. Philosophy provides the generality which fuses science and religion into one rational scheme, but it is ineffective unless it finds concrete expression in the active affairs of religion and science. The function of religion, then, in relation to the broad scheme of philosophy is to connect the rational generality of philosophy with the emotions and purposes springing from existence within a particular setting.[31] In this way religion takes the general ideas whose importance philosophy has highlighted and demonstrates the effectiveness of those ideas in guiding the individual's interests toward the greatest good.

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[28] PR, 23, 67, 521.

[29] RM, 59. "Religion is world loyalty. The spirit at once surrenders itself to this universal claim and appropriates it for itself."

[30] PR, 23, 128. "The heightening of intensity arises from order such that the multiplicity of components in the nexus can enter explicit feeling as contrasts."

In Religion in the Making, Whitehead has pointed out that religion's contribution to philosophy through the religious intuition of permanence provides a basis and support for philosophy's further elaborations of order. Again he notes that once this contribution of religion to philosophy is established, rational religion relies on philosophy to support a coherent understanding of the definite religious expressions that arise at a given time. In Religion in the Making, Whitehead spoke of the longing for justification or the impulse toward generalization that is inherent in the originative experience. As he puts the same thought in Process and Reality, religion is the ultimate craving to infuse into insistent particularity of emotion the non-temporal generality that belongs to conceptual thought alone.[32] Here is another illustration of Whitehead's religious expression of the problem of the one and the many.

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[31] PR, 23.

[32] Ibid.; Cf. RM, 83.

Whitehead adds an interesting postscript to this comment on the religious integration of particularity and generality. In the higher organisms, the differences of tempo between the mere emotions and conceptual experiences produce a life-tedium unless the supreme fusion of emotionality and rationality has been effected. On the basis of this natural tendency toward fatigue, it would seem that unless some religious purpose, inclusive of sufficient tension and contrast, provides a mode of religious integration to guide the individual's activities, he will experience a kind of alienation or purposelessness that calls the meaning of life into question. Thus religion is not an optional addendum to life but is bound up with the question of the quality of life and its survival.[33]

Whitehead's treatment of the proper concerns of science and religion contributes to the clarification of the basis for religious importance. Whitehead says that scientific interest is a variant of religious interest, but that the divergence between the two comes from the phases of experience with which they are concerned.[34]

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[33] Whitehead makes no reference to any need for formal religion since his understanding of religion is much broader. His observation regarding the supreme fusion of emotionality and rationality has reference to the general religious sensitivity that reflects the deepest meaning of religion. When formal religion fails to assist this fusion, as is too often the case, there is a loss of meaning in religion itself. Cf., FR, 66, 89. Whitehead speaks of reason in almost the same terms that he speaks of religion. Cf., SMW, 192.

[34] PR, 24.

Science focuses on the harmony of rational thought with percepta themselves while religion focuses on the harmony of rational thought with the sensitive reaction to percepta from which experience originates. Religion is concerned with the formation of the experiencing subject, what he does with his solitariness.[35] Religion accents the importance of what the individual becomes by providing a rational basis for him to deal with the ultimate claim of existence. That claim is based on the integration of breadth of thought interacting with intensity of sensitive experience.

The individual's response to the ultimate claim of existence is his path to justification. The claim expresses what is necessary for fullness of life, which is both its own reward and the basis for the deepening of value for the sake of others. In the final analysis, this individual synthesis of value is the most substantive contribution the individual can make to the actual world and to God. The ultimate integration beyond this individual contribution rests with God who brings the many into his own oneness. For a clearer picture of the kind of religious vision and conception of God that evokes such a response in Whitehead's view, we must turn to his final interpretation in Process and Reality, to his treatment of the ideal opposites, especially God and the world.

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[35] Ibid.; Cf., RM, 16.

The last section of Process and Reality, consisting of twenty scant pages or so, may be read as a religious culmination of the preceding philosophical scheme. In this section, Whitehead makes explicit some of the tensions that have been operating all along between the one and the many, and he seeks a final synthesis which will preserve the dynamism of creativity while dealing with the religious problem of the preservation of value. Ultimately, the section is directed to the nature of God and God's relation to the ultimate ideals which stand in tension with each other.

The ultimate ideals of which Whitehead speaks form the basis for the way that we define the religious problem. The general types of ideals he notes are various expressions of the many in one: joy and sorrow, good and evil, disjunction and conjunction, flux and permanence, greatness and triviality, freedom and necessity, God and world.[36] These follow the general caution Whitehead offers concerning the chief danger to philosophy which he sees as narrowness in the selection of evidence, but they are more than the broadening and extension of range through generalization. They accent the creative tensions of life and the aim to overcome incompatibilities. Our understanding of ideals and their application to religion must be comprehensive and impartial. In other words, we must include within our understanding the whole dynamic rhythm of competing ideals. Whitehead includes opposite ideals as a way of enabling us to see how there is a fluctuation in emphasis at different times, and to show that various qualities of temperament control the mentalities of different epochs.[37] But the stress on ideal opposites goes farther than this. It builds on the intuition that God includes these contrasts and, in time, even transforms incompatibilities into contrasts to bring all that has been attained into the fullness of his integration.

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[36] PR, 518.

In his brief treatment of the ultimate ideals, Whitehead has not dealt equally with all of them. His particular interest has focused on permanence and flux, order and novelty, and good and evil. In a very basic way, flux and permanence is at the center of the tension of many and one. There is something that abides and something that escapes, but the two can never be disjoined. Permanence can be snatched only out of flux, and the passing moment can find its adequate intensity only by its recognition of permanence. But the recognition of permanence does not mean that the realization of an ideal is merely the exemplification of something that is timeless. It means more than this. Realization plants timelessness on what is in its essence passing. Time loses its character of perpetual perishing by giving birth to the moving image of eternity which is objective immortality.[38]

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[37] PR, 512-513.

God's unity and unification of the many includes permanence and flux. The individual's achievements, what he does with his own solitariness, perish and pass into objective immortality, but in God's nature they are transmuted into a living, ever-present fact.[39] The multiplicity of individual types of self-existence passes over into God's consequent nature which is ever enlarging itself.[40] The permanence of his valuation through the perfect unity of his adjustment takes account of the flux in the world and the valuations of the many. The permanent richness of his experience grows through the enlarging of his relations with the many. Thus we can see that Whitehead's aim in Religion in the Making to direct attention to the foundation of religion on the apprehension of permanent elements in the nature of things attains its final vindication in the nature of God.

The contrast between order and novelty is another set of opposites that commands Whitehead's attention. Here, too, the relationship between order and novelty cannot be settled by choosing one or the other. If the art of progress is seen as the preservation of order amid change and change amid order, their integration is essential. Each calls for the contrast of the other. This becomes evident when we consider the moment of dominance where a novel achievement that we have sought gains its day. We soon realize that this is the very moment when blessing passes into curse, for the satisfaction of process always requires a new principle of refreshment. Order is not sufficient. Nor is novelty sufficient. What is necessary is order entering upon novelty. With this integration and preservation of tension, the massiveness of order does not degenerate into mere repetition, and the novelty is always reflected against a background of system.[41]

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[38] PR, 513-514; ESP, 117, "Philosophers have taken too easily the notion of perishing. . . Almost all of Process and Reality can be read as an attempt to analyse perishing on the same level as Aristotle's analysis of becoming."

[39] PR, 531.

[40] PR, 530-531.

Both of the opposites just described, permanence/flux, and order/novelty, reflect religious concerns expressed in Religion in the Making, though they were not discussed there in terms of their being ideal opposities. Another set of opposites was also important in that work. It is the contrast of good and evil.[42] In Process and Reality, however, Whitehead deals more specifically with the fundamental character of evil, and this leads in turn to his account of the most general formulation of the religious problem.

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[41] PR, 515.

[42] RM, 148-149.

The ultimate evil is deeper than any specific evil. It lies in the fact that the past fades, that time is a perpetual perishing.[43] In the temporal world, the past is available only through objectification, and objectification means elimination or abstraction. But Whitehead suggests that there is no reason why this should be the full story. The question, then, is how the good that is achieved, the value that has been realized, may be preserved without loss. Thus Whitehead formulates the most general statement of the religious problem as the question whether the process of the temporal world passes into the formation of other actualities, bound together in an order in which novelty does not mean loss. The problem centers around the permanent relational influence of entities, and Whitehead responds to the problem with his conception of the consequent nature of God which represents a further development of the God he sketched in Religion in the Making.

In Religion in the Making, Whitehead spoke of God's transmutation of evil, but he did not spell out the structure of God's relating that accounts for the transmutation of evil. In Process and Reality, Whitehead elucidates this structure in his account of the consequent nature. Moreover, by virtue of this nature, the ultimate evil is overcome and the subject's immediacy of valuation is preserved. Whitehead's conception of the dipolarity of the conceptual and primordial nature also suggests that an element which is felt at one point as being incompatible with other elements of the world may be taken account of eventually by being transmuted into a contrast when physical conditions permit.[44]

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[43] PR, 517.

Whitehead's treatment of the ideal opposites and their relation to God not only gives us a graphical illustration of the scope of his religious vision and its reliance on generality, but it also gives us an insight into his own religious sensibility. He goes so far as to indicate some of the roots of that sensibility in Process and Reality.

We can see some of the sources of Whitehead's approach to the question of God by considering some of the influences on Whitehead's thought in this area. Whitehead's conception of God flows from a combination of insights derived from his philosophical awareness of the generality of relations and the theological vision of Christianity.[45] His is an integration of metaphysical and religious insights designed as a corrective to the conception of God's nature that has prevailed. The prevailing view of Christian philosophical theology has presented a doctrine of God as a transcendent creator who stands outside of creation to a large extent, imposing his will on the world. For Whitehead this is a conception of God that is religiously inadequate because it fails to include a coherent basis for the tender elements of God that reveal his true responsiveness.

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[44] PR, 224-225, 377. Whitehead intimates this in Religion in the Making, 153-154, when he speaks of the universe as slowly passing to new creative conditions in which our physical world as we know it will be transformed beyond our familiar ideas.

[45] PR, 519-520; Cf., AI, 166-167.

Thus Whitehead sets his doctrine of God over against several classic formulations within the broad perspective of theistic philosophy. In the great formative period of theistic philosophy that ended with Mahometism, three strains of thought emerge to shape the conception of God. These are the images of God as imperial ruler, personification of moral energy, and ultimate philosophical principle. They are expressions of the divine Caesars, of the Hebrew prophets, and of Aristotle.[46] Beyond these, Whitehead offers yet another suggestion which has not so far found consistent metaphysical expression but which both expresses ideals that are religiously motivating and also is consistent with his system. This is the suggestion that in the Galilean roots of Christianity, God is neither ruling Caesar, ruthless moralist, nor unmoved mover. Rather, God is the poet of the world leading it with tender patience,

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[46] PR, 519.

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and he is the great companion who understands.[47]

Whereas in Religion in the Making Whitehead analyzed religious experience and pointed out its contribution to metaphysics, relating this to a God who leads the world by his ideal vision, here in Process and Reality, he not only discusses the relation of religion to metaphysics but he also more directly investigates what the metaphysical principles require as to the nature of God.[48] He does this in response to the religious problem which we have noted, using the resources of his own religious system, but adding that the cogency of his argument depends entirely on its elucidation of the somewhat exceptional elements in conscious experience which are classified as moral and religious intuitions.[49]

Whitehead's doctrine of God, which we have already discussed in the initial chapter on Whitehead's philosophy, is a statement of what the metaphysical principles require. While this is his basic intention, it is not untouched by his sensitive interest in the religious insights of the Platonic and the Christian inspirations, as well as his own religious insight. Because of the mingling of these

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[47] PR, 526, 532.

[48] PR, 521.

[49] Ibid. We have already noted that these are roughly equivalent in Process and Reality.

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influences, it is difficult, if not impossible, to tell whether religious insights have given rise to metaphysical speculation or vice versa.

In keeping with Whitehead's own analysis of the relation of religion and metaphysics in Religion in the Making, it would seem that any metaphysical system has its roots in a religious insight. Though there is a certain degree of interpretation inherent in any experience, there is a directness in religious experience which, for Whitehead, presents itself as the fact of limitation. Though a coherent interpretation of the relation of God and the world calls for a metaphysical systematization, the factors that determine the systematic interpretation in the first place are religious to some degree.[50]

The religious insight in Whitehead's perception of the fact of limitation is the quality of relationality which is generally applicable and which has its fullest exemplification in God. It is this insight into relationality that points the way to what is most worthy of worship.

As we noted in Science and the Modern World, the power of God is the worship he inspires. If the power God exercises is despotic or coercive, he is not worthy of a religious response in

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[50] SMW, 178; RM, 84. In the most basic sense the discernment of the ultimate factors that lie at the heart of a philosophical system requires a sensitivity to the importance within the whole of which we have been speaking.

Whitehead's view. Here, in Process and Reality, we have another aspect included. It is God's mutual relationality with the world. God himself must be moved or influenced to justify the evocation of the religious response. This sensitivity of God is expressed in his consequent nature and his preservation of all that can be saved.[51]

The mutuality of relations introduces a problem with which Whitehead has not dealt. This is the question of God's efficacious influence on the world. In speaking of the consequent nature of God and his physical realization of the temporal world, it is necessary to account somehow for the efficient power of that realization flooding back into the world.[52] This is of special importance in accounting for the experience of a release of energy in the individual's experience of God, for that empowering is bound up with the efficaciousness of his own religious motivation. We have already noted this problem in the first chapter, and we can only indicate here again that it remains an unsolved issue.

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[51] PR, 531. The distinction between God's primordial and consequent nature seems to lie at the heart of Whitehead's distinction between the secular and religious functions of God. The secular function of God is his presentation of initial aim to every creature, "the prehension by every creature of the graduated order of appetitions constituting the primordial nature of God," PR, 315-316. This is an intuition of the intrinsic suitability of some definite outcome from a presupposed situation. "It must not be thought that these non-statistical judgments are in any sense religious. They lie at a far lower level of experience than do the religious emotions." Apparently the religious quality of God's relationship to the world is to be sought elsewhere than in his primordial nature. Nathaniel Lawrence, "Ethics, Aesthetics, and Philosophical Theology," Alfred North Whitehead: Essays on His Philosophy, ed. George L. Kline (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), 172, explains this and supports the objection Whitehead himself raised in Science and the Modern World. Lawrence explains that the primordial nature of God is like Aristotle's prime mover in that it is eternal, complete, and the object of desire toward which all things are drawn, but it is not conscious until the conceptual and physical feelings are fused. "Clearly," says Lawrence, "this aspect of God is not available for religious purposes." Cf., Lowe, op. cit., 110. "The challenge to religious people is to contemplate these secular functions of Whitehead's God without jumping to the conclusion, as some have, that the concept is not available for religious purposes."

In summary, we can see from this brief treatment of Whitehead's presentation of religion in Process and Reality that this work reveals the same basic emphases emerging as are in Whitehead's earlier works, the relation of religion as a whole to philosophy, the interaction of generality and particularity, and the metaphysical grounding of the conception of God which is expressive of the problem of the one and the many. We find little change in Whitehead's account of the relations of religion, philosophy, and science, or in the interaction of the generality of conceptual thought and the particularity of religious emotions. There is a new development in his conception of God, however, in the introduction of a distinction of dipolarity in God, his consequent as well as primordial nature. Whitehead also makes more explicit his formulation of the religious problem. This articulation of the religious problem gives full recognition to the tensions that are operative in the ideal opposites and to the complexity of contrasts that leads to the deeper realization of value.

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[52] Daniel Day Williams offers some suggestions along these lines in "How Does God Act?" Process and Divinity, ed. William L. Reese and Eugene Freeman (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1964), 161-180.

III. Adventures of Ideas

Adventures of Ideas deals with the effect of certain ideas in promoting the slow drift of mankind toward civilization. It is Whitehead's own attempt to frame a speculative scheme of ideas explanatory of this historical adventure.[53] The topic of religion enters into this discourse in several ways: as an exemplification of the interaction between generality and particularity, as an expression of the moral effects of divine persuasion, and as a dominant factor in the intuition of peace. Discussion of the role of intuition in religion will be reserved for a separate chapter; therefore, in this section we will consider the important relationship of generality and particularity and the contribution of the persuasive element in history which finds its clearest exemplification in religious motivation.

In some respects, the first two chapters in Adventures of Ideas, though not directly concerned with religion, recapitulate many of the ideas in Religion in the Making. Whitehead's discussion of the human soul and the importance of this idea in promoting the decline of slavery and the advance toward freedom expresses the way the notion of the importance of man has been tested and purified by generalization.[54] Thinkers in the great classical civilizations were convinced of the importance of the human being as the supreme example of a living organism, and it was this conviction that stood behind their assumption that a large slave population was necessary to perform services that were unworthy to engage the activities of a fully civilized man. Belief in the importance of man has remained, but the premises which support this belief have changed so that for moderns the importance of man cannot be asserted without insisting upon the freedom that is necessary for each individual to attain his status. Ideas of great generality have been responsible to a large extent for driving human life forward, and they have contributed significantly to the deepening of importance.

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[53] AI, vii.

The significance of generality is a key factor in Whitehead's account of the progress of civilization and the role of religion as a civilizing agency. The Christian assimilation of the Platonic understanding of the importance of the soul has added its own unique dimension, but both are rooted in a congenial generality. The religious appropriation of the idea was more specialized than the philosophic version, which for Whitehead is an illustration of a principle that dominates the history of ideas. It is that a general idea of importance lies in the background, and except for a few individuals, it is realized fleetingly and partially. Whether the idea of great generality attains a significant persuasive force depends in large measure on the appearance of individuals who particularize it in special expressions. When this happens the general idea loses some of its magnificence, but it gains force in its peculiar adaptation to the concrete circumstances of a particular age.

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[54] AI, 12f.

> The force of the appeal lies in the fact that the specialized principle of immediate conduct exemplifies the grandeur of the wider truth arising from the very nature of the order of things, a truth which mankind has grown to the stature of being able to feel though perhaps as yet unable to frame in fortunate expression.[55]

Whitehead notes that this was the kind of contribution Christianity made in representing highly specialized forms of general notions.[56] Sometimes the specialized expressions are beautiful and inspiring; sometimes they are brutal and ineffectual. But even when great ideals get mixed up with evils, the greatness remains to serve the human race in its slow ascent. The concrete exemplification in individuals and in institutions stands as a basis for criticism of current practice.

Whitehead illustrates the continuing need for a system of general principles by considering the fundamental basis for the promotion of practical reform. He reminds us that the humanitarian ideal coupled with a religious sense of the kinship of men helped to settle policies designed to promote freedom and extirpate slavery from the world. Strangely enough, at the same time this release became more generally effective, the notion of generalization began to fade in respectability.[57] Hume introduced the doubt that there could be such a thing as the love of mankind as such, and several intellectual movements have borne this out, especially Bentham's utilitarian principle and Comte's positivism. But these movements, while introducing practicable programs of reform, in the long run have been unable to account for why the humanitarian ideal should be inculcated in others. All they can do is to assert that if people have this passion they will act on it. But beyond this there is no stretching of purpose to discover the metaphysical principles that promote such living. More ultimate principles than these are needed, says Whitehead, if we are to provide a reconstructed justification of the doctrine of humanitarianism toward man.

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[55] AI, 16.

[56] AI, 18.

In other words, Whitehead is making the point again that he has stressed in his prior works, namely, that a metaphysical scheme is necessary to give some coherence to the discussions that are conducted between various fields or disciplines and to acknowledge the unity of truth that supports the search for justification. This unity of truth does not merely wait in the background for enough individuals to carry it into practice. In subtle ways it operates to promote the gradual growth of the environment so as to sustain the weight of exemplification. The ideals cherished in the souls of human beings enter into the character of their actions. Interactions within society modify the social laws by modifying the laws of nature so that mind and matter continue to inform each other, not only in relation to what is but in view of what might be. In keeping with this, the great religious movements have demonstrated a willingness to carry their insight exemplified in individual occasions into rational discussion for justification.

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[57] AI, 38. Whitehead had answered the direct objection to metaphysical generalization in PR, 20-22.

The principal idea with which Whitehead has been concerned in these chapters of Adventures of Ideas is the platonic notion of ideal relations between men based on a conception of the intrinsic possibilities of human character. The ideal has its own power to promote specialized value. Mere physical fact is neutral with regard to this power, for the physical occasions condition the sorts of values that are possible, but they do not determine specialties of value. The ideal accounts for this specialization through a creative power, an eros linking it with the supreme Eros. Eros is the soul's enjoyment of its creative function and is roughly equivalent to that aspect of love which is the urge toward perfection.[58] It is rooted in the supreme Eros, God, incarnated in the first phase of the individual subjective aim.[59] This persuasive power plays a central role in Whitehead's understanding of effective religious interest.

The present state of religion is Whitehead's concern in his chapter entitled "The New Reformation" where he applies the principle of persuasive power to the understanding of the energizing force and emotional impetus in religion. Whitehead again notes the signs of decline in religion.[60] Its dogmas do not dominate; its divisions do not interest; its institutions do not direct the pattern of life. And yet Whitehead sees hope for the renewal of the religious spirit as an effective element in human affairs. The first basis for renewal is the discernment of a general agreement among the diverse particular beliefs of Christianity in order to find ideas of sufficient general power to effect a religious response. His rationale for the survival of religion is based on the convergence of these general ideas in the one aim under the divine persuasion.

In spelling out his formulation, Whitehead cautions against seeking to base religion in the simplicity of emotion, for without the aid of philosophical ideas of coherent generality, religion would have sunk into unimportance long ago. The systematic formulations of religion are valuable means for emphasis, purification, and stability. Without the effort at rationalization, religion degenerates into mere feeling. Feeling is an important aspect of religion so long as it is joined to the general ideas whose importance can justify it. Whitehead here describes religion in terms reminiscent of both Process and Reality and Religion in the Making when he says that "religion is concerned with our reactions of purpose and emotion due to our personal measure of intuition into the ultimate mystery of the universe."[61]

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[58] AI, 148.

[59] AI, 198.

[60] AI, 160f.

The question of emotions arose in Religion in the Making in a somewhat negative manner by reason of the predominantly emotional quality of primitive religion and the inability of religion to sustain itself at low emotional temperatures without the aid of rationality. The question of emotion in religion arose in Science and the Modern World in connection with the contemporary decline of religion due in part to its reliance on emotions more at home in another age. The role of emotion occurred in Process and Reality in connection with the power it lends to general ideas. In Adventures of Ideas, Whitehead brings all these aspects together. This does not occur fully until he treats the intuition of peace, but in the chapter on "the new reforma-

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[61] AI, 161.

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tion," we have the emotions raised to a new sensitivity toward the divine persuasion which has exemplified religion in its finest moments from Plato to Augustine. Moreover, Whitehead asserts that a civilized religion should aim at the training of such emotions as naturally arise from civilized rational criticism of the metaphysical intuitions powerful in great epochs of human history.[62]

The emotional force that Whitehead deems most worthy of religious response is the self-evidence of the guiding Eros of the universe inherent in the nature of things. This stands out in his analysis of the formative influences on Christianity. He describes the formative period from its background through development over a period of about twelve hundred years.[63] During this period, three phases stand out as being of special significance for Christianity. The highlights of the phases are Plato's final position that the divine element in the world is to be conceived as a persuasive rather than a coercive element, Jesus Christ's revelation of the nature of God and his agency, and the formation of Christian theology in the schools associated with Alexandria and Antioch. The first and last of these are primarily phases of intellectual activity against a background of moral insight. The middle phase which forms the driving power of the Christian religion is primarily an exhibition of moral intuition in life with a sufficiency of intellectual insight to give an articulate expression of singular beauty in the life of Jesus.

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[62] AI, 162.

[63] AI, 164f.

Besides his concern with generality and particularity in these phases, Whitehead was calling attention to the kind of power that is the motive force of religion. Plato's view of God's agency is an alternative to the doctrine that sees in God coercive forces wielding the thunder.[64] He provides a doctrine of divine persuasion by reason of which ideals are effective in the world and forms of order evolve. When examining the most religiously moving general ideas in Christianity, Whitehead sees the evocative elements in the life of Jesus as those which exemplify tenderness of effect: the Mother, the Child, the lowly man, the tender words as life ebbed.[65] He concludes that the power of Christianity lies in its revelation in act of what Plato divined in theory.

The third phase that stands out for Christianity covers the inception of Christian theology during which time theologians attempted to construct a trinitarian doctrine of God. This doctrine of God included his direct immanence in the world, an account which replaced Plato's solution of immanence that relied on secondary images and

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[64] AI, 166.

[65] AI, 167.

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imitations of the divine. In this respect, says Whitehead, they made a metaphysical discovery and pointed to the way in which Platonic metaphysics should be developed in order to give a rational account of the role of the persuasive agency of God. Unfortunately, he adds, theologians never made the advance into general metaphysics because they supposed that the nature of God was exempted from all the metaphysical categories that applied to individual things in the world. In the final analysis, the immanence of God in the world was not clearly established because at the same time God was the one absolute, omnipotent, omniscient source of all being. In this basic way he was exempt from the metaphysical categories. Thus, the general conception of deity stopped movement toward further generalization.[66]

The problem with unqualified omnipotence, as Whitehead analyzes it, is that it is difficult to say anything intelligible regarding the nature of God and also that omnipotence is too easily accompanied by the problem of attributing to God responsibility for every happening, not to mention evil. For Whitehead it is the business of theology to provide a rational understanding of civilization, including within this the way that God acts within the world. This, he adds, is a task in which theology has largely failed because it has focused on the coercive elements that are inevitably associated with the doctrine of an absolute, omnipotent God.[67] He poses for theology the task of developing as its foundation an interpretation of the universe that grasps its unity amid its many diversities. The diversities are the obvious compulsive elements which clash in our experience. Yet there is a direction whereby the clash is transcended in the unity of purpose. This enterprise is supported by the response to persuasive power exemplified in the life and vision of Jesus himself.

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[66] AI, 169.

The religious vision is difficult to grasp and to maintain because it needs both beliefs of a general character and emotions. However, because of their detachment, it is in the nature of such general beliefs to destroy emotion rather than to generate it. The attainment of an appropriate and effective emotional pattern by novel general ideas may take centuries, not that these insights are unknown, but that there are often dominant interests that inhibit reaction to that type of generality. The history of religions is the history of countless generations required for interest to attach itself to profound ideas. Yet Whitehead adds that although the religious spirit is always being buried, distorted, or explained away, it remains, flickering and fragile,but persistent in the history of mankind's movement toward civilization.[68]

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[67] AI, 70.

[68] AI, 172.

Our examination of Adventures of Ideas has shown Whitehead's views on religion here to be consistent with his earlier views both in detail and in his basically positive assessment of what religion can contribute to the advance of civilization, despite its failures. The generality of thought and the particularity of religious emotions find an important role in the advance of civilization, as they did in the advance of religion. The emphasis on solitariness is not written so boldly, but it nevertheless is a pervasive element in the struggle of individuals to bring ideas of great generality to a definite focus. In addition, the role of divine persuasion is a central factor in the advance of civilization as in the advance of religion, for the ideal vision of God guides the world with all its diverse perspectives toward an increasingly complex and adequate unity.

IV. Modes of Thought

Whitehead's treatment of religion emerges somewhat differently in Modes of Thought than it does in his other works, although his basic position remains the same. He does not consider the topic of religion in relation to philosophy or science, does not set out to demonstrate the qualities of emotional response that are religious, and does not attempt to deal with the question of God in any direct way. Rather, his treatment of religion here is much more encompassing and general, though it still remains in continuity with his earlier thought. Whitehead's approach to religion in his last book carries out the dominant theme of the work, namely, that factors in experience are clear and distinct in proportion to their variability and that the more fundamental factors which are invariable remain dim and vague in the background of thought.[69] The mode of thought that is religious has a particular relevance to these fundamental invariable factors, and it can be examined further through the notions of importance, transitions, and the aim toward unity.

We have considered the fundamental outline of importance and its relation to Whitehead's philosophical scheme in the chapter dealing with his metaphysics.[70] The specific purpose of considering importance in relation to Whitehead's view of religion is to accent the character of religious importance and to draw out the relation of religious importance to the vague and unmanageable elements of experience which are perceived in terms of the great generalities.

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[69] MT, vii.

Importance, as we have already noted, is an extremely elemental notion. It can be analyzed only with great difficulty because its elements are self-evident and are experienced fundamentally as given. Moreover, importance is difficult to analyze because it is a quality of our experience of the world as a whole, perceived first in the mode of causal efficacy. Perception in this basic mode includes the feeling of a character suffusing the whole and rising to prominence only through particular expressions which do not exhaust the ground of importance. Importance points to a basic quality of existence rather than to a secondary qualification of it. Thus importance carries a feeling of generality inherent in the world.

Within the general framework of importance there are various species, such as morality, logic, religion, or art.[71] Each of these species represents a particular perspective on generality. Because of the participation of the various species of importance in the general notion of importance, it can sometimes happen that the prominence of one or of a few of the species obscures the general notion of importance. No one of these various forms of importance explains the final unity of the purposes in the world. Each contributes a perspective from which one or more of the other species may be somewhat irrelevant. We are not concerned with examining each of the species of importance here, but we are concerned specifically with examining what gives religious importance its particular character.

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[70] Supra, Ch. I, 21-35.

[71] MT, 11.

We are aided in discerning the nature of religious importance by observing the distinction Whitehead makes between religion and morality. It is here in Modes of Thought that he first makes such a distinction between them. Morality is always the aim at the union of harmony, intensity, and vividness which involves the perfection of importance, the general value structure for a particular occasion.[72] It consists in the control of process so as to maximize importance. Both morality and religion arise as aspects of the human impetus toward the best in each occasion, but morality represents a somewhat more particularized emphasis through its concern with application to the detailed occasion, while religion represents a more general emphasis through its large-scale concern with the unity of ideal in the universe.[73]

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[72] MT, 28.

Religious importance represents an open perspective on generality. It is concerned with the felt generality of value that is brought to bear on the present occasion, inclusive of a broad range and richness of contrast, and it is also concerned with the extension of the generality to the future so as to encompass eventually as contrasts what are now incompatibilities. Thus religious importance reflects the impetus toward the fulfillment of value in the universe as a whole. In keeping with this unity felt and thereafter promoted, when one experiences an individual occasion as religious, he is in touch with a character that lies beyond the control of purpose, a character whose generality is given and is not the product of conceptual activity.[74] Within this framework of understanding importance, religious experience can be described as a feeling of infinitude. Or, to put it in terms of value, the intuition of holiness is the intuition of the value of the details for the totality.[75]

As we have noted, religious importance signifies a generality that lies beyond the control of purpose. This importance is based on a sense of totality in which the universe is felt as one, a totality which is differentiated subsequently into the sense of the whole, the many, and the self which is a unifying standpoint. Thus it lies beyond one's own power to create importance which bears within itself the value of the details for the totality. A vivid example of the unity of the self that feels importance is our realization of ourselves in the recent past fused with our enjoyment of ourselves in the immediate present as a particular unity. The feeling of importance starts with a sense of power lying beyond the control of purpose which is reflected in the creativity of external occasions impressing themselves on the creativity of the immediate subject and which carries the subject's aim toward the realization of value.

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[73] Ibid. Because of the power of generalization that is involved in religion, one can discern morals but not religion in higher non-human animals.

[74] Cf., AI, 285.

[75] MT, 120.

The power that Whitehead thus describes in Modes of Thought is the compulsion of creativity, a drive toward aesthetic value for its own sake.[76] He does not spell out its role in relation to religious importance, but he suggests that the feeling of religious importance includes the feeling of a unity already achieved which impels one to expand the range of elements one can encompass into a new unity. The power expressed in this feeling of religious importance is the power of creative composition which constitutes the drive of the universe. It points to God's direction of all individual integrations. Composition includes efficient cause maintaining its power of survival and final cause maintaining the appetition for creation.[77] Both these forms of causality are aspects of the same forward movement promoting generality of relations, and each has its relation to religious importance, though in Whitehead's conception of religion the emphasis falls on the role that final causality plays in extending the generality of relations.

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[76] MT, 119.

Whitehead's treatment of religious importance, therefore, bears out the theme of Modes of Thought that fundamental factors in experience remain dim and unmanageable. The largeness of vision that accompanies religious importance requires a sensitivity to the great generalities inherent in the nature of things. We have already seen the generality that manifests itself through order rooted in relations. Transitions are another element of that order which make a special contribution to the expansion of relations.

Because they highlight a specific quality that characterizes order, transitions are essential to any discussion of Whitehead's understanding of the fusion of particularity and generality or of the fusion of the finite and the infinite. The fusion of the finite and the infinite, a way of looking at the one and the many, participates in the dynamism of relations. Subjects, which fuse generality into their particularity, are created by transitions. Without the transitions bringing about finite concreteness, infinitude is a mere abstraction. For this reason, neither finitude alone nor infinitude alone is sufficient.[78] On the one hand, the finitude of the present occasion is a transitory enjoyment without a sense of the far-reaching relational significance of the occasion. Thus, taken in itself, it reflects triviality. On the other hand, infinitude is a generality without a base unless it is particularized. Thus infinitude taken in itself or viewed as the only topic of real significance cannot get beyond vacuous abstraction. It is only by taking account of transitions, whereby the finite occasion with its infinite relatedness continually comes into being anew, that we can grasp a sense of the processive-relational character that dominates Whitehead's vision of reality and of relational religion. Transitions demonstrate that relations are constitutive, that the universe is not static, and that the fusion of the infinite and the finite is never fully or finally achieved.

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[77] Ibid.

The significance of transitions for religious importance is often neglected. The transitions in themselves are not religious. Transitions are simply the basis for the initial feeling in each concrescence. But one's sensitive reaction within the transitions, what the individual does with his own solitariness and what he becomes through transitions, does indeed have religious significance. Transitions are the basis for religion's functioning as a disrupting and energizing force in civilization. They are the contexts in which God's aim comes into operation and through which the universe not only maintains itself but also demonstrates an upward movement. Unless sufficient attention is given to transitions in religion, the important challenge that religion represents is lost. Transitions highlight the unmanageable aspects of religious experience, both in the origin of creative relations outside of the the subject and in the direction of integrations whereby value is deepened. Whitehead observes that theology has neglected the significance of transitions and their unmanageability to its own detriment. It has concentrated instead on order and clarity of purpose.[79]

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[78] MT, 78.

When religion gives its attention exclusively to order and clarity in the universe or in existing social situations, religion can easily succumb to making its primary concern the preservation of existing forms of order. In so doing, it fails to fulfill its creative role. Recognition of the generality of transitions and processes permits a climate that is amenable to the deepening of value through increasingly wider integrations of contrasting values. The aim which guides transitions, according to Whitehead's view, is an aim of adequate generality that reaches out for more and more complex and richer forms of value. Transitions, therefore, are the vehicles and the arenas where generality is extended.

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[79] MT, 79. "Transcendence of mere clarity and order is necessary for dealing with the unforeseen, for progress, for excitement."

Another notion in Modes of Thought which has relation to Whitehead's vision of religion is the generality that is present in the aim toward unity. In religious experience, one feels the aim of the many to become one that is present in each occasion as a unity of aim for the universe as a whole. Religion is concerned not just with the ideal for each individual occasion, but with a commonality of aim which includes individual aims. The universal aim expresses the direction of the generality by which the many are guided toward unity.[80]

Whitehead sees religion as emphasizing the unity of ideal in the universe. In a relational framework, religion functions to promote the enlargement and deepening of value through the progressive incorporation of contrasts. But religious importance provides a perspective that embraces the widest possible value, not only in terms of its incorporation of contrasting values enriching the present but even in terms of its aim to incorporate the elements that are incompatible for the present occasion. Religion looks toward the transformation of these elements into contrasts when future conditions permit.

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[80] MT, 120.

Thus, in this respect, the ideal aim is never outworn or totally achieved, for there are always new contrasts to be included and new incompatibilities to be transcended. For Whitehead, this is the basis for the vigorous expression religion finds in every advancing civilization. Religion concentrates on the power that makes this aim possible.

> It is the notion of that power in history which implants into the form of process belonging to each historic epoch, the character of a drive towards some ideal, to be realized within that period. This ideal is never realized, it is beyond realization, yet it moulds the form of what is realized.[81]

The ideal aim at unity has its source in the aim of God and from the order he embodies. The aim expresses a generality which is first felt in a fundamental way as the individual's aim but which emerges into a wider conceptuality as an aim for the universe. As conceptual generalization emerges into a more conscious position, it depends more on abstraction.[82] But the abstraction which is the price of growth in consciousness leads in turn to an expanded physical capacity to feel diverse and contrasting elements as touched by the

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[81] Ibid.

[82] MT, 123-124.

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aim toward a unity for the universe.

Whitehead's thesis in Modes of Thought regarding the pervasive generality of the invariable elements of experience as well as their unmanageability adds another emphasis to the generality we have already observed in religion. The general character in the nature of things that religious experience discerns accents a vague and unmanageable aspect of reality. This massive and unmanageable character qualifies religion in its most significant moments, for it is then most evident that religion cannot rely on its own designs. It must surrender to the design that is given in the universe, a design which will lead to the individual's fulfillment of value.

The religious mode of thought, then, reflects these principal elements that have been noted, importance, transitions, unity of aim. The generality is given, but it is also extended through the function of reason which Whitehead describes as responsible for the upward movement of the universe.[83] The religious mode of thought, therefore, carries within its structure the impetus toward generality that permits the deepening of value and the stretching of interest beyond self-defeating particularity. It promotes the art of life by promoting the extension of generality to encompass an ever widening and deepening range of contrasts.

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[83] Cf., FR, 29-31, 89.

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We have seen that Whitehead's treatment of religion in Modes of Thought supports his basic perspective. Certain aspects, however, receive greater attention than they did elsewhere. For example, the notion of importance which was present in Religion in the Making receives clearer expression here, enabling Whitehead to make a distinction between religion and morality. Likewise, transitions, which are implicit in Whitehead's stress on solitariness in Religion in the Making, stand out more as a factor of generality. Above all, the unmanageability of the most general factors of experience, in importance, in transitions, and in the ideal aim in the universe, places religion squarely at the heart of the movement of all reality.

Summary

In our examination of Whitehead's discussions of religion in works other than Religion in the Making, we have found the recurrence of several dominant themes. In addition, there are some ideas that are present in several places but with less force than in Religion in the Making. The central ideas found in the other works can now be summarized to see in what way they support the thesis that Whitehead's outlook on religion is an expression of his basic concern with the problem of the one and the many.

The first of the recurring notions that finds considerable emphasis in the works we have just examined is the notion of generality and particularity. In Science and the Modern World, religious thought is seen to make a significant contribution to the advance of science through its insight into generality. While these two areas have continued to cross-fertilize each other, the discoveries of science have made a special contribution toward the purification of religious belief by presenting a challenge that it attain a more adequate basis for generalization. In addition, it has given religion a spirit to emulate.

Process and Reality likewise builds on the theme of generality and particularity by indicating their specific roles in relations between philosophy and religion. Philosophy provides the most comprehensive elucidation of general ideas, while religion translates them into expression in particular thoughts, emotions, and purposes. Through its particularization, religion lends a force to philosophical generalization which delivers it from ineffectiveness.

Adventures of Ideas developed this same theme in relation to the advance of civilization. Here, Whitehead brought out the role that ideas of great generality have played in the advance of civilization, noting especially the significance of their expression in religion. The specialization or particularization of these general ideas through religious modes of expression has increased their emotional impact, and it has made the ideas more generally effective.

In Modes of Thought, Whitehead discusses generality in terms of the vague and pervasive general factors in experience that underlie the various modes of thought and species of importance. In this work, Whitehead brings out the role of generality in importance, transitions, and ideal aim, aspects of experience that lie beyond human invention. We have taken these a step further to uncover some of their religious implications and have found that in Modes of Thought, as in all the other works, Whitehead saw the operation of generality as accounting for the integrating power of religious thought.

Another notion that finds prominence in the works we have considered is the notion of God's aim working as a persuasive power calling the individual to new and more comprehensive integrations as the world advances and increases in complexity. In Science and the Modern World, this is not spelled out since God is presented as a principle of limitation. But it manifests itself in Whitehead's definition of religion as the vision of something which is the ultimate ideal.

This theme is continued in Process and Reality, specifically in God's primordial nature through which he is presented as the poet of the world, leading it toward its more complete realization. In this work, however, we have God functioning also to preserve all that can be saved. In calling attention to the role of God as companion who cares, Whitehead brings to light a new aspect of the many and the one in relation to God. Whereas he previously accounted for God's role in the integrations of subjects solely through his presentation of aim, now he adds God's integral physical realization of the achievements of the many individuals of the world. Not only does God entertain the possibilities for each individual's completion, but he also assumes that completion into his own nature.

In Adventures of Ideas, God's persuasive power is stressed again through his part in the upward movement of the world. It receives special attention in the generality of Platonic thought and the particularity of Jesus' expression. Persuasive power and God's ideal aim are not emphasized to any great extent in Modes of Thought. Nevertheless, these notions are present in the drive of the universe which Whitehead relates more deliberately to both efficient and final cause.

There are other religious themes which are present in the works just considered, but which Whitehead has not treated to the same extent that he treated them in Religion in the Making. Solitariness is not especially evident in all of the works we have noted, but it wields a strong influence in Process and Reality where Whitehead brings out the criterion of solitariness, breadth of thought and intensity of sensitive reaction which sum up the ultimate claim of existence.

The theme of religious emotion also threads its way through these works, although it assumes a more positive focus than it did in Religion in the Making. In Process and Reality, Whitehead stresses the motive force that emotions contribute to general ideas, and in Science and the Modern World, he stresses the need to re-examine the religious emotions that are relevant to contemporary experience. In Adventures of Ideas, Whitehead speaks of the struggle of general ideas to attain emotional impact. This latter work is one of the few places where the tension between the two becomes particularly evident.

On the whole, then, we do not find a significant difference between Whitehead's view of religion in Religion in the Making and the discussions of religion that are present in some of his other works. Nor do we find a confrontation of the questions that were raised at the conclusion of the preceding chapter. Whitehead is concerned with the problem of the one and the many in the several ways noted, but the striving for integration that we find in religion finds its primary assistance in generalization and in God's aim which he entertains conceptually. The consequent nature of God is presented mainly in terms of his physical realization of the attainment of individuals, rather than in the way it floods his love back into the world. For the completion of our study of Whitehead's concern with the one and the many in religion, we must turn to a specific treatment of intuitions.

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CHAPTER IV

THE NATURE AND ROLE OF RELIGIOUS INTUITIONS IN WHITEHEAD'S THOUGHT

In this study of Whitehead's understanding of the meaning and function of religion, we have come to recognize the important role played by religious intuitions. Intuitions are central to the individual's religious response, and they also play an important role in the relationship between religion and philosophy.[1] But in this study we have not yet found, nor have we attempted to explore, the meaning and role of intuitions within Whitehead's system itself and the way his conception of intuitions participates in his religious outlook.

Whitehead has not set forth the nature of intuitions with any great degree of explicitness. Yet there is good reason to believe that his understanding of intuitions participates in an important way in the basic approach he takes to religion. Therefore, the problem with which this chapter will be concerned is the elucidation of the nature of intuitions, particularly religious intuitions, in light of the general thesis of this study that Whitehead's view of religion is an expression of the problem of the one and the many.

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[1] RM, 84, 121, 128, 131; PR, 23.

It will be immediately evident that this probe of intuitions will not provide a full-blown theory, but only a general preliminary interpretation. Since its primary aim will be to make Whitehead's understanding of intuitions more explicit, the view that emerges can only indicate the general contours of a relational approach to intuitions on the basis of which a more complete theory might be built. It follows, therefore, that the general structure of intuitions which we discern cannot be applied in a full systematic treatment to the analysis of all the intuitions Whitehead has cited in connection with religion. Such an application lies beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, the exploration can provide some of the essential structures for such an application as well as give support to the general thesis which has been elaborated regarding Whitehead's basic view of religion.

The first phase of this exploration will be to attempt to find a path along which to move in establishing Whitehead's understanding of the character of intuitions and to draw out the essential structure of intuitions. This having been done, we can seek to apply the basic statement of the nature of intuitions to some of the religious intuitions Whitehead has specified.

I. The Nature of Intuitions

Though Whitehead makes reference in Process and Reality to instinctive intuitions and intuitive judgments, these classifications which belong respectively to propositional feelings and to intellectual feelings do not really provide an explanation of intuitions per se.[2] They suggest aspects of the higher phases of experience which help us to understand intuitions in terms of their relation to consciousness. But even at the higher stages of experience, there may be whole recesses of feeling which in the final satisfaction acquire mainly the characteristics of a more primitive phase.[3] In light of this final character and in order to explore the implications of our general thesis for the understanding of intuitions, we will concentrate our attention on the fundamental bases for intuitions in Whitehead's philosophical position.

Our study of Whitehead's view of religion revealed it to be concerned with the topic of individuality in community.[4] The topic spelled itself out experientially in terms of the movement toward greater generality realized in particularity. Intuitions in general, and religious intuitions specifically, reflect the same structure of meaning based on the interaction of the one and the many. It is our task here to see how this is to be understood in relation to the general structure of feeling in Whitehead's system. Whitehead's treatment of rational religion and its movement toward greater generality is based on the more direct feeling of generality that is inherent in the foundational religious experience.[5] It is this feeling of generality in religious intuitions that needs to be examined.

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[2] PR, 49-50, 211-212, 216, 233, 253. These references to intuitions do not include any analysis of the character of intuitions; nor does Whitehead's account of instinctive intuitions, PR, 427-428, or intuitive judgments, PR, 406f.

[3] PR, 427-428.

Intuitions reflect the insight or the revelation of a general character in the nature of things which is perceived with a certain directness and force, rather than perceived through rational processes. In other words, intuitions are feelings of generality felt in the context of a fusion of the physical and conceptual aspects of experience. Therefore, they require a ground of relation between the physical and the conceptual.[6] What we need to determine is the basis

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[4] RM, 86.

[5] RM, 58-60.

[6] Ultimately, we find this ground in the dipolarity of all experience. PR, 423, 366. In the case of intuitions, however, we are seeking the specific connection of the conceptual and the physical in terms of the way the feeling of content is integrated with the physical aspects of the experience.

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for the generality in physical feeling. Unless we can do this, the burden of integration lies with the conceptual activity of the subject, and the peculiar character of intuitions is lost. Moreover, unless we can determine the generality inherent in the datum the subject perceives, it will appear that he is creating a generality or a sense of community and attributing it to the nexus that is prehended, rather than truly feeling the general character that is there in the unity.

In intuitions, generality must in some way be felt physically as well as conceptually, for in Whitehead's understanding there is no valid conceptual generality which does not have its basis in physical feeling. The physical rootage of the extended conceptual generality that is rationally derived is to be sought in a quality that is inherent in the physical feeling. This commonality or generality has its concrete form in the physical and its abstract form in the conceptual. Therefore, the kind of generality that is more highly developed conceptually can only be understood against the background of a general quality within the physical.

Whitehead recognizes a physical basis for generality within the structure of reality by virtue of the essential physical relatedness of all entities. This basic physical relatedness is responsible for the force and directness with which intuitions are felt. We can see this in the most primitive form of feelings, in conformal or vectoral feelings which are concerned with the physical connections between feelings. Even here in the fundamental feelings which underlie more complex feelings, entities are felt in a primitive manner as requiring each other.[7] The feeling is a feeling of relationality, the vectoral feeling of these entities here requiring those entities there.[8]

None of the higher or more complex feelings, including intuitions,are without this underlying feeling of relationality. The feeling of relationality is a felt quality of the most basic sort of generality, marking both the content and the subjective form of the feeling. A felt quality is a feeling of generality which is inherent in the feeling and not derived from it. Though Whitehead does not develop the notion of a quality as felt in this way in intuitions, it is a valid way of describing what is, in effect, a consequence of his basic approach. This general feeling of relationship which underlies intuitions is a result of the feeling of entities requiring each other and is cited as an aspect of the moment of religious consciousness.[9]

In its most fundamental form, the feeling of relationality is based on the vectoral feeling of inheritance.[10] Actual entities are bound together in a relational network in which they feel each other through inherited qualities. These qualities entertained by actual entities are felt by subsequent entities through the forms of definiteness which are thrust forward. Thus, the very act of transition which is relationality in operation, involves a physical feeling which is causal.

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[7] PR, 384.

[8] PR, 133, 323.

[9] RM, 58.

[10] PR, 481, 382-384, 268, 271, Cf. 426.

The higher feelings, therefore, are first felt physically through defining characteristics of nexūs. The kind of feeling which describes the prehension of a nexus is a transmuted physical feeling. Such a feeling is the basis of both the sense of relationality and the sense of unity in the nexus. Since we do not appear to perceive simple causal feelings of individual actual entities, the vague causal feelings of inheritance and relationality in higher feelings are bound up with transmuted feelings which offer some sense of a whole, a unity, a nexus.[11] From the indefinite penumbral awareness of objects at the border of conscious and unconscious experience to the conscious awareness of relationality and community in intuitions, the feeling of relation involves nexūs felt through transmuted feelings.[12]

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[11] PR, 362. "It seems as though, in practice, only transmuted feelings acquire consciousness, never simple physical feelings."

[12] PR, 267. "It is quite untrue that the feelings of various types of influences are dependent upon the familiarity of well-marked sensa in immediate presentment. Every way of omitting the sensa still leaves us a prey to vague feelings of influence."

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Transmuted feelings are physical feelings in which the nexus that is the datum of a complex physical feeling is felt as a unity.[13] When a percipient subject feels analogous simple feelings of various actual entities in terms of their common entertainment of the same eternal object, then in a subsequent phase of integration the subject transmutes the datum of the conceptual feelings into a characteristic of the nexus. That is to say, in the transmuted feeling the conceptual phase of the feelings issues into a single conceptual feeling of the datum. The entire nexus is felt as characterized by an eternal object which qualifies all the entities which comprise it.

From this brief description, we can see that transmuted feelings represent a simplification of feelings and that they also provide the basis for further simplifications and abstractions. It has already been noted that physical entities are bound together in a relational network in which they feel each other through inherited qualities. The inherited qualities, the common elements the entities share, are not felt as interrelated or as a common characteristic of the nexus until they come together in the transmuted feeling. Transmuted feelings account for the sense of unity or community which grounds both our usual perception of the world and our more exceptional perceptions of a high level generality revealed in intuitions. In transmuted

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[13] PR, 383.

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feelings entities are perceived not as atomic units but in terms of whatever meaningful wholes they form. It is through transmuted feelings that the world is felt as a unity and is felt as divisible into parts which are unities, namely, nexūs. The unities are, therefore, in effect, forms of generality brought about by the simplification process of transmutation.

What this means for the case in point is that the feeling of one eternal object, perceived in transmuted feelings as a common characteristic of the nexus, enables us to deal with various levels of generality. By virtue of this mode of feeling, a nexus may be felt not only as green or as warm, but, when we are dealing with the nexus of the world in religious intuition, the nexus can be recognized and felt as imbued with a quality of permanent rightness. When one perceives a very pervasive and far-reaching generality, as in the latter instance, the quality that is felt wells up from the primitive sort of connections between things. The fact of relationship is so basic that, when raised to a level of consciousness, it strikes with the force of self-evidence. In this way, intuitions convey a peculiar completeness and immediacy in their presentation of the scope of generality.

Given this background, it is evident that the simplification by which the many are unified in transmuted feelings is the reflection of a basic unity entities share by virtue of their fundamental relatedness in the vectoral feelings of inherited qualities. In dealing with transmuted feelings, however, Whitehead tends not to refer so much to this relationality as he does to the world felt as a community.[14] Thus in considering the nature of intuitions, it is well to keep in mind the felt qualities which give concreteness to transmuted physical feelings and which accent the physical as well as the conceptual character of intuitions.

From these basic elements we get an indication of the shape of intuitions. They are a peculiarly vivid fusion of physical and conceptual feelings; they are a fusion of particularity and generality. The recognition of a fusion is especially important in order to do full justice to the sense of givenness that accompanies intuition. Intuitions are not merely a more rapid or a more direct way of discerning generality that otherwise must be arrived at through inference. Rather, there is a particular completeness of physical and conceptual feeling in intuitions. That is, there is a givenness to the generalization by which it is carried with the force of physical feeling. Aside from the fusion of physical and conceptual feeling and the rootedness of generality in physical feeling, we could not speak intelligibly of the feeling of givenness, for we would be speaking of a derivative sort of feeling. When the physical and the conceptual, particularity and generality, are united in a deep and pervasive way so they are felt as one, there is no sense of interpretation or secondary conceptual activity and the distinctive character of intuitions is revealed.

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[14] PR, 382-384.

These basic aspects of intuition which are suggested by the fundamental elements of Whitehead's thought have a special bearing on religious intuitions. The fusion of generality and particularity is borne out in various aspects of religious experience, especially in solitariness. The great religious figures whom Whitehead cited in Religion in the Making, Jesus, Buddha, Mahomet, were able to feel the great generalities in the particularity of their own experience.[15] The immediacy and particularity of their feeling or, to put it in Whitehead's terms, the originality of their primary expression, is the very element that remains unformularized.[16] Their originality must remain unformularized because it is the feeling that belongs most uniquely to the individual's assimilation of intuition in his religious solitariness. It is the fusion of the physical and conceptual within the individual's unique integration.

This same sort of fusion is also evidenced in the firsthand intuitions into the nature of things reflected in the sayings of Christ.[17]

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[15] RM, 19.

[16] RM, 131.

[17] RM, 56.

These sayings, Whitehead notes, are descriptions of direct insight and not formularized thought. The direct religious insights are reflected in expressions that are the lowest possible abstractions. They are not statements resulting from the adjustment of concepts, but they are almost a form of action bordering on the fact itself. The parables and sayings of Jesus, therefore, are expressions close to the physical and conceptual fusion that is an essential quality of intuitions.

The unity of the physical and conceptual in intuitions is reflected, as we have noted, in the form of expression Whitehead describes as primary expression.[18] Primary expression is that firsthand contribution of each entity to the generality of pattern in the universe. The insight of gifted individuals into this generality in the nature of things enables primary expression to attain a special clarity and to serve as a creative instance for the insight of others. In other words, their articulation of the intuition may serve to bring the same intuition to awareness in others. Because the great intuitions dawn slowly, we find intuitions attaining originality of expression in certain individuals who stand out. In such persons of genius, as has been noted, their expression has a creative effect for others precisely because they raise the felt quality and its pervasiveness to conceptual clarity and make it more accessible to others.

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[18] RM, 127-128.

The unity of physical-conceptual and particularity-generality in intuitions reveals the intuition to be interpretable as well as creative.[19] Because the meaning in intuitions is felt as being peculiarly complete and given, the intuitions do not seem to have a significant degree of interpretation. They are not experienced as an interpretation. Instead, they have a directness and force which seem to place them in their givenness beyond the pale of interpretation. When intuitions are reflected in primary expression, however, they are interpretable, though the obviousness of primary expression makes this interpretation very difficult. The uninterpreted element has the character of a physical fact, and when it is reflected in primary expression, the closeness of the physical and conceptual aspects remain and provide the basic ground which may be subjected to interpretation.

Secondary expression involves a further extension of generality inherent in the intuition into a more conceptual generality. This extension through secondary expression widens the experiential base by increasing awareness and thus makes it possible for more individuals to recognize the generality that pervades their existence. As Whitehead puts it, the recipient of the expression extends his apprehension of the ordered universe by penetrating into its inward nature as it is revealed by the originator of the expression.[20] These originators deal with what all men know, but they make it new.[21] In other words, they enable the generality to infuse physical experience more thoroughly so that physical experience itself may be enlarged and future avenues opened for the further perception of large generalities.

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[19] RM, 128.

We can find a basis for the enlargement of physical feeling in Whitehead's system itself. When generality is expressed effectively so that it becomes more and more a part of the common physical experience and forms the community of intuition by reason of the shared sacrament of expression, the base of experience itself is extended.[22] This bears out Whitehead's statement in Process and Reality that what is felt conceptually earlier may be felt physically later.[23] The introduction of a wider awareness of conceptual generality through secondary expression can set the stage for the extension of the base of physical feeling. It thereby becomes possible to speak of the extension of generality without losing the physical basis of all feeling because the very generality that is inherent in physical feeling yields itself to be felt more fully and thus changes the character of physical feeling.

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[20] RM, 31, 121.

[21] RM, 131.

[22] RM, 128.

[23] PR, 387.

What the individual can experience is conditioned by the fact of what he has experienced and, to a certain extent, by his expectations of what it is possible to experience. When his conceptual vision is enlarged by the communicated insights of others, it is possible, though it does not necessarily follow, that he can become open to new sorts of experience. Whether one is in fact shaped by a wider generality, however, will depend upon his openness to the felt qualities that are communicated physically in the experience.

Whitehead has observed that there is little firsthand or primary expression in the world and that the great generalities are often buried in the rubbish of irrelevant detail. The intuitions which reveal these generalities dawn only slowly through long periods of evolution. Such intuitions can be analyzed in terms of their relationships to other ideas and applied to various aspects of experience in changing ways, but once they are grasped they stand unsurpassed within their own province and continue to make their mark. But it is the immediate fusion of physical and conceptual that is the underlying condition for raising the generality to consciousness in intuitions. As the awareness grows, what all men know inarticulately takes on a more outward character in the community of intuition.[24] According to the degree of concretion, differing according to the grasp of various members of the community, a generality may be felt physically or it may be felt through reversion and then may later become a candidate for physical feeling.

When we look at the building up of a community of intuition by reason of the sacrament of expression proffered by one and received by the other, we can see a basis for the evolution of intuitions that parallels the evolution of religion. As single individuals perceive a universality of relations and express it in their lives, they contribute to the common store of expression. Thus they pave the way for a more comprehensive and perceptive way for others to perceive reality. The generality then becomes more available and the ground is laid for the further fuller development of a community of intuition to evolve.

Because intuitions come into prominence at the higher levels of experience characterized by greater contrast, the subjective form of intuitions often includes a craving or a restlessness and search for the greater expansion of generality in relations. The subjective form of intuitive feeling includes a quality of transcendency or a feeling of "more" which one is hard-pressed to express except through a conceptual outreach. Whitehead illustrates this subjective form of the intuition graphically through his discussion of the intuition of another order in the concluding section of Process and Reality, but the craving is also evident, though perhaps to a lesser degree,in other intuitions such as permanent rightness, peace, and holiness.[25]

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[24] RM, 128.

The conceptual outreach of intuitions is an expression of the tendency or the impetus of the intellectual aspects of experience to outrun the physical as a result of the contrast between generality and particularity. This conceptual outreach also brings into awareness the dimmer recesses of feeling, adumbrations of the less manageable and fuller dimensions of reality.[26] The conceptual extensions suggested in intuitions are either reflections of what has been physically felt and therefore is capable of being physically felt again, or, when reversion is involved, the conceptual outreach in intuition may be the suggestion of a "more" that may be physically felt later. This form points to an inexhaustible quality in experience which builds on contrast as a means of attaining intensity of satisfaction. It is a contrast that is ever present since the generality it reaches for cannot be exhausted in particularity.

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[25] PR, 516, 23; RM, 83.

[26] PR, 267. Whitehead does not take up this already-present aspect of the feeling of a "more" in relation to intuitions, but he suggests it in his discussion of some of the unmanageable aspects of feeling that are conveyed in causal efficacy.

Furthermore, the inexhaustibility that is suggested in the subjective form of craving is a function of the processive and relational character of experience. Generality has its roots in the relational process which does not permit a precise formulation of boundaries or limits. On the contrary, the processive-relational character of experience is carried by a physical feeling moving toward the "more" of the fullness of physical feeling. From this perspective, I sense that my physical particularization of generality here and now does not exhaust the range of possible relations I can integrate into my subjective unity. The generality of creative relations is rooted in reality. Thus, the more conceptual forms of generality as well as the craving that characterizes their subjective form are not mere abstractions of subjective activity. Likewise, the eternal objects which enter into the subjective form of the feeling also point to inexhaustibility. In this case it is the inexhaustibility in the realm of eternal objects as well as their continuing potentiality for realization.[27]

To put this another way, every entity as a particularization represents an abstraction from its world. It does so first physically by virtue of the fact that the past is felt through a perspective. From a perspective of the past a particular standpoint emerges.[28] In the higher forms of experience, including intuitions, there is a knowledge that within this standpoint what I aimat conceptually does not exhaust what is. Thus, one can feel in the religious intuitions the insistent craving to infuse into particularity the nontemporal generality that belongs to conceptual thought alone.[29]

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[27] PR, 70.

It goes without saying that this is but a sketch of the picture of intuitions that Whitehead's system yields. Moreover, there is some ambiguity or at least a lack of clarity in the distinction between felt qualities of generality with their subjective forms which are rooted in primitive physical feeling and the intuitions that are linked with higher phases of experience. At times in his internal discourse, Whitehead seems to assume they are interchangeable,as when he speaks of the intuitions of inheritance.[30] But in the final analysis, it seems that the felt qualities stand for a more primary base whose conceptuality needs to be brought into greater prominence and clarified if we are to understand the full dimensions of intuitions. Nevertheless, our exploration has yielded some general contours which can now be brought to bear on the specific intuitions Whitehead has cited.

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[28] PR, 334, 270, 174.

[29] PR, 23.

[30] PR, 253.

II. The Content and Role of Religious Intuitions

Scattered throughout Whitehead's writings we find various exemplifications of intuitions. Among them are the intuitions of permanent rightness, peace, holiness, the ultimate nature of intellectual action, the suitability of an outcome for an occasion, the value of speculative understanding for its own sake, memory, and inheritance. Undoubtedly, there are other intuitions as well which are not specifically designated as such and whose content is not singled out. Our task in this section will be to examine some of the basic religious intuitions with which Whitehead has been concerned to see what light our previous considerations lend them.

A. Permanent Rightness

One of the most important intuitions Whitehead mentions in relation to religion is the intuition of permanent rightness. His basic description of religious experience, which appears in Religion in the Making, presents permanent rightness as the intuition of a character inherent in the nature of things.[31] This description offers us an application of the understanding of intuition that has just been described. The feeling of a character inherent in the nature of things is a feeling of generality which, though it bears fruit in conceptual generality, is felt initially with the directness and force of physical feeling. This directness is rooted in the fusion of the physical and conceptual in intuitions. Whitehead's description of the origin of rational religion in the intuitional moment of self-consciousness illustrates the immediate feeling of generality, and it also points to the impetus within the intuition toward a further, more conceptual generality.

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[31] RM, 60.

The source of the intuition of permanent rightness is to be found in the experiential origin of religion, the concurrence of three allied concepts in one moment of self-consciousness.[32] Whitehead insists that the complete meaning of these three concepts can only be settled jointly by some direct intuition into the ultimate character of the universe, and, further, that the joint relationship presents a character or order that is described as permanent rightness. The concepts, which we have already considered to some extent, are: the value of an individual for itself, the value of the diverse individuals of the world for each other, and the value of the objective world which is a community derivative from the interrelation of component individuals. A brief examination of the structure of this originative experience reveals the intuitional roots underlying some of Whitehead's metaphysical principles as well as filling in the picture of intuitions themselves.

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[32] RM, 58.

The moment of religious consciousness starts from self-valuation which demonstrates the experiential or intuitional basis for the subjectivist principle.[33] This concept of self-valuation is not to be taken in any self-sufficient or exclusive sense, for it cannot be isolated from the other components. Self-valuation is simply the acknowledgment that all experience is the experience of subjects and that individuality is the initial basis for value experience. In terms of intuitions, self-valuation simply highlights the fundamental locus of all feeling and the basic standpoints of unity in the world. Without this primary feeling of self-worth, the subjectivist principle, which expresses a more conceptual generality, would represent a detached epistemological statement instead of an aspect of the generality inherent in the nature of things.

The concept of the value of the diverse individuals of the world for each other underlies the principle of relativity.[34] It represents that aspect in the moment of religious experience in which the world is experienced as a multiplicity of separate entities requiring each other. In other words, this qualification of religious experience indicates a feeling of relatedness, though there is not yet a basis for the grading of values or a ground for coordination among the related elements. At this point of analysis, there is not yet sufficient ground for defining religious intuition because the relation of the separate entities has not yet been integrated into the feeling of one nexus in place of the component actual entities. The intuition requires a comprehensive integration which is made possible by transmuted feelings. The feeling of relatedness, of entities requiring each other, does however indicate the felt quality of experience by which it is possible to affirm the principle of relativity and the potentiality of every being to participate in the becoming of another.

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[33] PR, 252. "The subjectivist principle is that the whole universe consists of elements disclosed in the analysis of the experiences of subjects."

[34] PR, 79. "According to this principle an actual entity is present in other actual entities."

The final concept within the moment of religious consciousness is the feeling of the value of the objective world as a community, a feeling of generality which grounds the ontological principle.[35] This third aspect brings to light the fullness of the religious moment by which one perceives the interrelations of component individuals of the community of the whole and the necessity of the whole for the existence of each of the individuals. This concept of community is accounted for by the transmuted feelings which introduce a feeling of generality as such into the moment of self-consciousness. At this point, it is a generality with a certain ultimacy, for it reveals a basic character in terms of the order pervading the whole. The moment of religious consciousness starts from self-valuation, but it broadens into the concept of the whole as a realm of adjusted values, mutually intensifying or mutually destructive. It is possible to discern the generality on a comprehensive scale as order pervading the whole only because the category of transmutation introduces the feeling of the world with its value as a whole. The quality is felt when the analogous feelings of diverse subjects "scattered" among the members of the nexus are transmuted into the feeling of the nexus as a unity.

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[35] PR, 36. "Every condition to which the process of becoming conforms in any particular instance, has its reason either in the character of some actual entity in the actual world of that concrescence, or in the character of the subject which is in process of concrescence."

The transmuted physical feeling of the nexus of the world as a unity provides the experiential basis for the ontological principle. This principle states that there is no general fact of composition which cannot be expressed in terms of the common world of the entity in question.[36] In other words, a reason always has reference to determinate actual entities.[37] Whitehead's account of the moment of religious consciousness brings this out in the third aspect which places self-value and the need of entities for each other in the context of world harmony and world loyalty. Without the comprehensive sense of interconnections, the ontological principle would not reveal its full generality and its source in the feeling of belonging to a community. The solidarity of multiple individuals is perfected in the unity of the consequent nature of God at which this transmuted feeling only hints.[38]

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[36] Ibid.

The intuition of permanent rightness which is a synthesis of these three aspects of religious consciousness introduces an insight into generality of the widest sort. It is the apprehension of a mutual adjustment of values which reflects a pervasive order. This is the revelation of generality in a moment of particularity where the notion of order is no longer a bare concept determining the grading of values but a feeling of generality itself.

The sense of generality in order, dependent upon the feeling of the datum as a whole, is experienced with a certain directness which is not characteristic of the usual inferential discovery of generality. In place of the generality that is derived from the active comparison of various entities or nexūs, a generality which accents content above feeling, the intuition of permanent rightness is a feeling of generality given in particularity. In the religious intuition of permanent rightness, the feeling of a general quality suffusing the whole is focused in a particular instance of feeling so that one feels the occasion as revealing a general ideal and as failing or succeeding in reference to the ideal.

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[37] PR, 65. This is the first step in the description of the universe as a solidarity of many entities.

[38] PR, 530-531.

In other words, the intuition of permanent rightness yields a felt quality raised to consciousness. Furthermore, the generality is felt as stretching beyond the particular occasion so that it introduces the feeling of "what might be" as opposed to what is.[39] Intuition often includes the craving for the fuller realization of the generality of relationship in subsequent occasions. The craving manifests itself in terms of a conceptual outreach reflecting the valuation of the generality experienced in permanent rightness. To put it in terms Whitehead has used, the valuation is expressed as a proposition and, as such, it suggests a lure for feeling that is paralleled in hybrid physical feelings of God.[40]

Though this exploration of Whitehead's understanding of intuitions does not permit a full development of the relation of intuitions to hybrid physical feelings of God, we can note some points of contact which bear further examination. We have already seen that each temporal entity derives its basic conceptual aim from God and that this aim is felt as a hybrid physical feeling.[41] That is to say, the individual feels God's valuation by feeling the subjective form of God's conceptual feeling. Of course, this hybrid feeling need not be viewed in terms of consciousness and the intensity consciousness bears. Hybrid physical feeling occurs in the primary phase of concrescence and is subject to the individual's modification by way of its own subjective aim which usually lies beneath the level of consciousness. The question that surfaces is how this basic level of the individual's experience relates to the felt quality of relationality which grounds intuitions.

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[39] PR, 417.

[40] PR, 164, 377.

The feeling of entities as requiring each other, or the feeling of relationality, accounts for a primary aspect of intuitions, the generality of relations as physically felt and grounded. The hybrid physical feeling of God accounts for the direction of the relationality. Hybrid physical feeling gives this focus or directionality to feeling by virtue of the subjective form of God's feeling which is the aim toward order and the comprehensive grading of relations.[42]

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[41] PR, 374.

[42] PR, 373.

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Both represent forms of generality, but hybrid feelings suggest a slightly more precise or more focused generality, since they presume the givenness of relations. In this regard, the explanation of the unique fusion of the physical and the conceptual in intuitions may be discovered not only to illuminate the origin of intuitions but also to point to a direction for maintaining the fusion and enlarging it through hybrid feelings. This connection, however, needs to be examined in much greater detail, both in regard to the structure of intuitions and in regard to its application to permanent rightness.

We have seen from this examination of permanent rightness that the feeling of generality in particularity does indeed illuminate the character of intuitions. The mode of generality that is highlighted in this intuition gives an insight into the pervasiveness of order which shapes the character of things and which persists in spite of variations in expression and in interpretation. For a slightly different but closely related presentation of permanent rightness we can turn to Whitehead's account of the intuition of peace.

B. Peace

Whitehead devotes a chapter of Adventures of Ideas to the explication of the intuition of peace which is the Harmony of Harmonies. This Harmony of Harmonies binds together the other essential qualities constituting civilization--truth, beauty, art, and adventure.[43] Peace, like permanent rightness, conveys a feeling of wide generality because it reveals a claim that transcends other claims that are too narrow to encompass universal concerns. The feeling of a universal claim, felt in a supreme moment of insight, can be nothing but the feeling of great generality experienced in particularity.

Peace is the intuition of permanence, a positive feeling which crowns the "life" and "motion" of the soul.[44] In this respect, it is not a generality that is detached from its physical roots. It is rooted in life and motion. Peace carries with it the stretching of one's purpose beyond concern with the self in such a way that the enlargement of the person occurs, not through the individual's rational decision but as an outgrowth of his experience.

Peace is neither anesthesia, hope for the future, nor interest in present details. Rather, it is the broadening of feeling and the experiential confirmation of a transcendent claim. Peace broadens feeling as a result of a deep unverbalized metaphysical insight into the coordination of values. As such, it expresses a feeling of infinitude in finitude which expands the horizons of the individual who feels it.

Whitehead tells us that as soon as high consciousness is reached, the enjoyment of existence is entwined with pain, frustration, loss and tragedy. But peace reveals an order that endures beyond these individual losses.[45] The metaphysical insight that peace reveals amid the passing of beauty, heroism, and adventure is the intuition of permanence. Peace is a quality of feeling which enables one to penetrate the contrast of what is not and yet might be, and to see the wider general possibility as already somehow present in hope. The faded realizations of surrounding fact do not destroy the intense physical feeling of the generality whose greatness touches the moment. The individual moment is a microcosm of the aesthetic order of the universe which prevails in spite of the passing of finite occasions. Thus the peace that Whitehead describes as a feeling of permanent rightness is a trust in the efficacy of beauty that characterizes the aesthetic order.

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[43] AI, 284.

[44] AI, 285.

The generality that is felt in the intuition of peace is a generality experienced as a given. It is a givenness that is of a piece with the givenness of relations and thus it can be felt in continuity with the generality inherent in physical feeling. Just as peace comes as a gift beyond the control of purpose, so the generality that is felt in the experience is felt as an inherent quality of experience, not a quality arrived at through discursive reasoning. The feeling of peace carries with it a removal of inhibition and a widening sweep of conscious interest. These consequences parallel those that Whitehead expressed in his description of religion as the force of belief cleansing the inward parts.[46] Peace is self-control at its widest where preoccupation with self has been left aside and its interests transferred to wider coordinations.[47] Thus, through the intuition of peace the particular standpoint of the individual in his solitariness takes on a new richness of relations.[48] Along with this, the generality intrinsic to the experience bears an impulse toward more conceptual generality in terms of a craving for "more" which is not frustrated by the limited realization of the present. In this way, the intuition supports the metaphysical enterprise, and, even beyond this, it sustains it; for where reason fails to reveal the details, faith in order and its source takes over.

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[45] AI, 286.

C. Holiness

The intuition of holiness introduces a slightly different quality of experience than the intuition of permanent rightness and the intuition of peace, but it also captures the feeling of generality or universality in particularity. The intuition of holiness is the feeling of the value of the details for the totality.[49] It refers to the apprehension of the totality of historic fact in respect to its essential unity and to the sense of value inherent in that unity. The generality of enjoying value and sharing value is only brought to focus, however, in each individual instance of value. In the intuition of holiness the universal breadth of value comes alive in the concrete dependence of particularized value on the world of value.

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[46] RM, 15.

[47] AI, 285.

[48] Cf., PR, 24.

The intuition of holiness suggests a feeling that bears resemblance to the intuition underlying the ontological principle. In stating that the reason for the shape of every entity is to be found either in the character of some actual entity in the actual world of a particular concrescence or in the character of the subject in the process of concrescence, the ontological principle recognizes the value of self-evidence. So also, in reflecting the feeling that the value of any individual is found in the individual itself and in the totality to which many individuals contribute their details, the intuition of holiness uncovers the basic value of existence. Hence, holiness is present in the here and now, not merely in some other world.

From Whitehead's perspective, therefore, holiness is felt largely in terms of wholeness and not in terms of separation. The intuition receives further illumination in the principle of relativity. Each individual contributes to external reality a gift of permanence, the gift of aesthetic significance which makes the individual relevant beyond its own finite immediacy. Each new occasion, in turn, inherits a more complex world in which holiness may be intuited. Against the background of this dynamic, growing, physical whole, the individual perceives the value of the details for the totality through a generality of relations felt in the expanding unity. The perception of the holy, therefore, comes not from an awareness of what is of value and what is not of value, but from an awareness of the interrelationship of values and from the realization that all entities in the totality require each other. In view of this, a deepening of value and holiness cannot come about for the individual without a deepening of relationality.

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[49] MT, 120.

The generality the individual perceives in the completed world exceeds present realization. In connection with the intuition of holiness, Whitehead speaks of a power in history which implants into the form of process the character of a drive toward an ideal. The ideal molds the form of what is realized, though the ideal is never realized in its fullness.[50] The effectiveness of the power, therefore, seems to be a modified effectiveness, yet one which influences the shape of the future through present realizations. This is the power of the divine Eros, promoting the wider inclusion of values in the growing complexity of the actual world. When Whitehead describes the general character of the ideal that shapes the direction of the process, therefore, he speaks of it as a drive toward the satisfaction of appetition.[51] In this sense, the intuition of holiness includes a persuasion toward future unifications as much as it expresses the basis for the unifications that have been attained.[52]

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[50] Ibid.

D. Importance

Whitehead's brief discussion of the intuition of holiness in Modes of Thought is related to his discussion of another intuition which he does not designate specifically as an intuition, but whose character and orientation reveal it to be one. This is the feeling of importance. We have considered importance already in relation to Whitehead's philosophical vision, but we can recall some of those considerations in order to accent its character as an intuition.

Importance is the feeling of the immanence of the infinite in the finite.[53] In this respect it is an instance of generality felt in particularity. Through the feeling of importance, the generality of conceptual thought permeates the particular expression in such a way that the individual is able to perceive a meaning that stretches beyond the particular fact. In the intuition one is able to perceive the relatedness and value of the totality which cannot be perceived merely through discursive reasoning.

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[51] MT, 122.

[52] MT, 119; RM, 60.

[53] MT, 20.

By virtue of the fusion of generality and particularity, importance reflects the experience of an irreducible given.[54] What is given is a generality that permeates all of reality as a felt quality, a quality that is experienced, therefore, with the force of physical feeling. Furthermore, in the intuition of importance, the felt quality conveys a general structure of reality which can be articulated, though with great difficulty, in terms of specific characteristics.

The intuition of importance has a significant part to play in Whitehead's own perception of the irreducibility of certain factors of experience and in his systematic formulation of these factors in terms of philosophical principles. Behind his formulations of the essential character of things by way of the principle of relativity and the ontological and subjectivist principles, there is an intuitive recognition of the importance of process and relations as heavy, unmanageable factors constitutive of all that is. These factors are felt qualities, which, once they are recognized and expressed in formal principles, become conceptual tools both for the understanding of experience and for the promotion of greater value and intensity in experience.

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[54] MT, 4; AI, 12.

The intellectual consequences of importance in the principle of relativity are evident. The central role of relations, found along with process to be at the heart of the holistic unmanageable feeling of importance, achieves formal recognition in the principle of relativity. Similar illustrations of the intellectual outcome of this insight into importance are evident in the subjectivist principle and in the ontological principle. The subjectivist principle states that the whole universe consists of elements disclosed in the analysis of the experiences of subjects.[55] Beneath this assertion lies an intuitive recognition that subjective experience, the locus for importance, is constituted by relations and process. Likewise, the ontological principle offers an alternative spelling out of the same recognition of what is important by affirming that what is not discoverable as an element in subjective experience is not to be received into the philosophical scheme. Or, to put it another way, everything that is posited as a reason is present somewhere in actuality.[56] Thus, the ontological principle recognizes the concrete shape of importance as present and as felt in physical fact, not merely as a generality that is derived. These conceptual expressions in Whitehead's scheme, therefore, build upon the basic feeling of certain irreducible elements generally given in all of experience. In light of this givenness, the qualities are known initially through the fusion of physical and conceptual feeling.

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[55] PR, 252-253.

[56] *Ibid.*, 64-65.

Against this general background of importance, we come to understand religious importance more fully. The intuitions of permanent rightness, holiness, and peace, are modes of feeling the character in things. They give experiential support to the value of living in acceptance of the factors which are central to the quality of every experience. Without such living, deeper value cannot be built upon existing value. On the conceptual side, the basic perception of the important character of all entities issues into explicit connections offered by rational religion and by metaphysics in order to make the full dimensions of importance more available for the enhancement of value.

We can further illuminate this intuition and its intellectual consequences by examining another intuition which supports the metaphysical enterprise, the intuition into the nature of intellectual action.

E. Faith in Intellectual Action

The theme of importance as an intuition finds special support in Whitehead's account of the ultimate moral intuition into the nature of intellectual activity, which he cites in Process and Reality.[57] The intuitions of importance and permanent rightness, among others, reveal insights into the most basic characteristics of reality. The intuition into the value of intellectual action arises in continuity with these insights as a corresponding trust in the generality revealed in religious intuitions. This faith abides even when every last instance of experience does not reveal the generality with clarity. The moral or religious intuition into the nature and value of intellectual action, therefore, provides a complement to the intellectual consequences of religion rooted in the insight into the source of order.

The content of this intuition is the faith that all the elements of experience possess a coherence which can be explicated in general theory. As such it is a faith which provides a motive for the intellectual pursuits of all the sciences.[58] Moreover, in stressing the religious character of the intuitions, Whitehead notes that the ultimate moral intuition into the nature of intellectual action is the point at which metaphysics, and every other science, gains its assurance from religion and passes over into religion. For this reason, it is the special role of religion always to promote the awareness that the discernment of relationships forms the very basis for discussing the meaning of existence.

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[57] PR, 67.

[58] Ibid.; Cf., SMW, 12.

This intuition into the nature of intellectual action is not so much a revelation of the character of reality itself as it is the feeling of the value of the quest to find the generality and the faith that generality is present even when there seem to be limits to its exemplification in experience. The faith that the elements of experience are explicable by some general theory depends upon a trust in the givenness of generality. This is but another way of saying that the generality is felt to be present as a generality inherent in physical feeling, not merely as a conceptual derivative. Conceptual generality, which is the goal of intellectual action, builds upon the impulse toward generality that is inherent in religious intuition.

The moral intuition we have been considering emerges again in The Function of Reason where Whitehead cites the strong intuition that speculative understanding for its own sake is one of the ultimate elements in the good life.[59] It is an ultimate element in the good life because it aims at uncovering the ultimate generalities that enable one to promote the art of life. For this reason, Whitehead asserts that the relentless pursuit of understanding, moved by freedom of thought, indicates an activity that is shaped religiously because it participates in the religious intuitions and the religious aim.

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[59] FR, 38.

F. Intuition of Another Order

In Process and Reality, Whitehead also speaks of the intuition of another order as a vague insistence haunting the intellectual feelings.[60] The feeling is analogous to the vague feeling of causality relative to physical feelings. It is an intuition which is illuminated by the aspect of religious experience which points to a "more." Though its content is not revealed in experience with any kind of conceptual clarity, the intuition both commands assent and promotes a conceptual outreach.

In Whitehead's own account of the religious problem, he perceives the religious spirit as asking the question whether the process of the temporal world passes into the formation of other actualities which are bound together in an order in which novelty does not mean loss.[61] A positive response to the problem for Whitehead is built upon an intuition of another order, one in which order not only issues into novelty but one in which the novel achievements are preserved without loss. Such an order is not demonstrated in our experience, but Whitehead says there is no reason of ultimate metaphysical generality why the present order should reveal the whole story. His interpretation and filling out of this other order, only penumbral in intuition now, results in a formulation of the consequent nature of God. In this consequent nature temporal actuality is transmuted into living fact, ever present without loss.[62]

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[60] PR, 516.

[61] PR, 517.

Though the other order of which Whitehead speaks is not clearly demonstrated in experience, it is felt somehow, albeit vaguely, in experience. In one way, this intuition seems to present a test for the ontological principle, for the order of which Whitehead speaks must be somewhere. Yet Whitehead's account of God as a concrete reality that participates in every experience prevents the recognition of this other order from being a contradiction. The order is present in God, though the dimensions of its generality are hidden, and it requires considerable interpretation.

The intuition of another order calls to mind the intuition of holiness with its perception of the value of the details for the totality. Still further, the intuition points to a hidden dimension of holiness as well, to a superior unity whose deeper generality dwells in mystery.

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[62] PR, 531.

The intuition of another order, then, is one which surpasses our basic perceptions of unity realized in the relationality of all things.

The intuition of another order is not derivable from rational considerations, though its interpretation is. The intuition itself is a function of the higher intellectual feelings dependent, as we have noted, on a vague insistence that points to a "more." As Whitehead describes it in relation to his own system, there is an intuition of another order where there is no unrest, no travel, no shipwreck. However one may challenge the interpretation, the intuition stands. Beyond this feeling of a fusion of a larger generality in particularity, one can only pause in wonder with a "dumb sense of importance."

G. The Intrinsic Suitability of An Outcome

There is one other intuition that should be noted here in Process and Reality, though it is not classified as a religious intuition. Whitehead calls attention to the intrinsic suitability of a definite outcome from a presupposed situation.[63] This intuition corresponds to the feeling of subjective aim. It is the feeling of a non-statistical suitability, intuited in a given situation, but the suitability is not derivable by direct analysis of the environment experienced or even the environment presupposed. Instead, the intuition depends upon the fundamental general gradation of appetitions which lies at the base of things, and which points a path toward solving indeterminations of transition.

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[63] PR, 315.

Generality in this intuition is bound up with the possibilities for intensity of satisfaction present to an occasion through contrast arising out of identity. The fact that occasions are drawn toward certain appropriate satisfactions suggests that there is a general character in things. A general character makes it possible to intuit the suitability of an outcome given existing conditions and to adjust when conditions change. Such an intuition into the suitability of an outcome provides the essential substructure of the conscious transmuted feeling of permanent rightness.

Though the intuition involves God and the aim he presents to each creature, Whitehead does not classify the feeling as religious, perhaps because it is an instinct available to all creatures and therefore has a secular character. We will recall that when Whitehead specifically distinguishes religious character, he usually does so on the basis of the conscious perception of a general unity of aim perceived in the universe.[64] There is nothing to indicate, however, that when this intuition of suitability is integrated with higher intellectual feelings involving consciousness, it cannot assume a religious character. At any rate, in the present context it illustrates generality felt in particularity. The feeling provides the germinal basis for the more developed generality which in human experiences issues into the feeling of an aim for the universe.

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[64] MT, 28.

H. The Role of Intuitions

All of the preceding expressions of intuition accent forms of content which can be described in most basic terms as expressions of generality felt in particularity. It will not be necessary, therefore, to devote a great deal of attention to the role of intuitions, for it has already become quite evident that they function to provide a direct insight into the nature of things. The function and role of religion itself was discussed at some length in the second chapter, and there we saw the development of the notion of religion's promotion of the impetus toward generality rooted in experience, that is, in intuitions. Our examination of the character and content of intuitions has uncovered the fundamental ground of this impetus. We have discovered intuitions to be insights into generality which are felt with the force of physical feeling. They provide the basis for more conceptual activity as well as a confirmation for it in reality. The role of intuitions in elucidating the link between generality and particularity has an important bearing on the relationship of the one and the many.

In this respect, Whitehead's specific treatment of religious intuitions is of a piece with his philosophical concerns and his approach to religion.

Summary

In this probe of Whitehead's understanding of intuitions, we have examined his approach to intuitions in general and have attempted to frame the basic structure of intuitions that emerges, aware that a fair degree of interpretation is necessary to highlight some essential characteristics about which Whitehead himself has not been explicit. Following the analysis of the nature of intuitions, we applied the structure discerned to the fuller explication of the intuitions Whitehead has cited. To clarify the results of the exploration, it is well to summarize them.

This examination of the nature of religious intuitions has shown them to be feelings of the relationship of the one and the many. More precisely, intuitions are feelings which capture with a certain directness and force the generality and unity that is inherent in a particular expression, a generality which issues into various forms of conceptual activity. In Whitehead's system, the nature and structure of intuitions depends upon the fusion of the physical and the conceptual. The fusion, of course, is a characteristic of reality itself, and it is felt with varying emphases by different subjects.

In intuitions, however, the force of physical feeling is not diminished when the subject feels a great generality in the nature of things.

Though Whitehead has not spelled out the essential connections of intuitions with the more primitive aspects of feeling, we can detect the fundamental basis for the generality felt in the essential feeling of the relatedness of all entities. We have spoken of this feeling of entities as requiring each other as a felt quality, a term that Whitehead himself does not use but that describes effectively the root character of the feeling of generality.

Our understanding of intuitions is further extended by examining transmuted feelings which enable an individual to feel a nexus as a unity, and therefore to see the generality inherent in things in a more organic way. Transmuted feelings also account for the consciousness of intuitions. Transmuted feelings, then, in relation to the originative felt qualities, provide the more developed structural basis which supports the understanding of intuitions as feelings of generality in particularity. These feelings are not merely alternative ways of determining what can also be discovered through more conceptual means. Intuitions feel the generality inherent in the nature of things, and thus both ground and validate the generality attributed to things.

After considering this background in relation to some of Whitehead's more general statements on religious intuitions, we examined the specific religious intuitions he cited, finding that what was revealed as the character and structure of intuitions offered an elucidation of the various intuitions. These various forms of the feeling of generality all illustrated the common role or function of intuitions which is to provide a direct experiential insight into the nature of things. Thus, intuitions ground the various modes of thought and provide their confirmation.

Though Whitehead himself has not offered a theory of intuitions, nor dealt with topics such as the relation of religious intuitions to the hybrid physical feelings of God, his system has enabled us to draw out a few lines along which such a theory might be developed. These tentative suggestions need to be studied further, applied, and tested.

CHAPTER V

WHITEHEAD'S APPROACH TO RELIGION: A FINAL SYNTHESIS

As we have seen from this study, Whitehead's view of religion, which is presented substantially in Religion in the Making and supported in his other works, has proven to be the fruit of a vision equalled in scope only by his philosophical vision. Indeed, as this study has shown, Whitehead's view of religion participates in and is an expression of his philosophical view and its fundamental concern with the problem of the one and the many. It will be the task of this final chapter to summarize the interpretation of Whitehead's view of religion presented in this essay in order to bring together its most salient elements and to prepare the way for an evaluation of the picture of religion that has emerged.

In summarizing Whitehead's approach to religion, three major areas will be our focus before we proceed to a critical evaluation. These three areas include the character of Whitehead's religious vision, its intellectual results, and its existential dimensions. The areas to be considered point to essential aspects of the thesis of the study, namely, that Whitehead's approach to religion is expressive of his concern with the one and the many. Before embarking on an examination of these areas, however, it is important to make explicit the levels of the thesis.

We have noted that valuation is the key to Whitehead's approach to religion. Valuation is likewise fundamental to our understanding of the full range of the thesis that explicates religion. The thesis that Whitehead's approach to religion is expressive of and participates in his philosophical concern with the problem of the one and the many is a thesis which reflects the basic value affirmation at the heart of a religious position. For Whitehead, the value affirmation is taken up with the essential mode of unifying the many; that is, with aesthetic order whose pattern of contrast arising out of identity characterizes all of reality.

Beneath the basic level of the thesis concerning the one and the many, however, there is an underlying level which reveals an even deeper orientation. The underlying level of the thesis is that the pervasive value orientation in the universe which aims at increasing intensity of experience is the supreme Eros which not only embraces contrasting values but which also aims at the transformation of incompatibilities into contrasts. The underlying thesis reveals an internal dynamism promoting larger, richer, and more comprehensive unities in the world. That is to say, the unification of the individual's world which conforms to a basic pattern of integration is guided at a deeper level by an aim toward the enlargement of the individual's value and stature. As the individual confronts a world which grows increasingly complex and which is marked with greater contrasts, incompatibilities, and ambiguities, the religious impulse impels him to overcome the obstacles he meets and to assimilate more diverse and even conflicting values. Thus, individuals participate in God's own adventure.

Moreover, the vision expressed in the basic thesis has intellectual consequences in the categoreal scheme and in the method of descriptive generalization which makes it possible. In light of the function of the categoreal scheme in spelling out how the many become one, we can say that Whitehead's view of religion is of a piece with the content and character of the categoreal scheme. The religious insights into order and generality receive extended application and bear their full consequences in the fully developed metaphysical system which is a way of demonstrating how the facts of existence find their justification in the nature of existence. At the same time, the categoreal scheme reveals the deeper experiential resources by which incompatibilities are overcome and points to the limits of rationality.

We can now summarize the ways in which the centrality of the thesis regarding Whitehead's view of religion has been demonstrated in this essay. We will do so by considering the three major areas suggested earlier: the character of Whitehead's religious vision, its intellectual consequences, and its existential dimensions.

I. The Character of Whitehead's Religious Vision

Our examination of Whitehead's approach to religion in Religion in the Making and in some of his other works has revealed the central role of value in shaping the character of religion. It remains for us here to summarize the important aspects of value that contribute to this character and to relate them to the thesis of this study by illustrating the way the thesis expresses itself in religion and in religious intuitions.

A. The Roots of Religion in Value Orientation

Whitehead has stated that religion is concerned explicitly with value and its intensification or deepening.[1] Behind this statement is the premise that the structure of value, including its deepening, can be understood basically in terms of order, but the order itself is one which promotes the deepening of value through the promotion of the self-value that the individual attains.[2] This deepening of self-value, accompanied by a deepening of definiteness and solitariness, turns on the incorporation of contrasting values.

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[1] RM, 120, 138, 146.

[2] RM, 97.

The mode in which value is realized is most essential to the thesis we have been examining, for the basic criterion that guides valuation is the aim toward intensity of feeling through the realization of contrast under identity.[3] As this aesthetic order is more adequately realized in the individual, the scope of value he encompasses, as well as his solitariness, grows. As the individual recognizes and responds to the values of the many individuals dispersed in the wider community, his own feeling-value is enlarged and thus he makes a greater contribution to the future advance of value.

In the process of the attainment of value, however, one is constantly faced with new values and new contrasts as a result of the increasing complexity of the world.[4] The generality of religion provides the integrating vision through which the individual is able to transcend the concrete expressions of value attained in the past and is able to bring the diversity of new value expressions into his present synthesis. It follows, then, that religion represents a special perspective on relations, a perspective which is especially bound up with the role of contrasts in the process of creative relations and with the role they play in increasing the stature of the individual.

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[3] RM, 111; AI, 252f; PR, 169.

[4] PR, 32.

The importance of contrast for religious value flows from several essential elements of the Whiteheadian scheme. First of all, the essentially relational structure of reality, that is, the fact that relations are constitutive of all entities, tells us that contrasts between entities are essential for relations to have any meaning.[5] Without contrasts, there would be nothing to relate. Contrasts provide the raw material for the becoming of individuals, and the more contrast there is, the more potentially rich is the integration the individual can make of his relations.

Secondly, the creative character of reality continually brings new contrasts into existence, and unless the individual takes account of them in whatever ways are appropriate, he will sink into a dangerous repetition of the past which eventually leads to the devaluation of value.[6] Since the world advances through the coming to be of the process which is born of relations and the relations which are born of process, contrast is both a condition for process and a consequence of it.

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[5] PR, 76. "An actual entity cannot be described, even inadequately, by universals; because other actual entities do enter into the description of any one actual entity. Thus every so-called 'universal' is particular in the sense of being just what it is, diverse from everything else; and every so-called 'particular' is universal in the sense of entering into the constitutions of other actual entities."

[6] PR, 388-389.

Thirdly, contrast, along with identity, is the very substance of the aesthetic order. Not only would there be no order were there not a diversity to be ordered; there would be no novelty without a processive integration of contrasts.[7] Moreover, the role of contrast is such that in the full flowering of the order of beauty one may expect to experience contrast bordering on chaos; for contrast in order introduces the deepest aspects of aesthetic involvement. It is the basis for the sense of tragedy that is conveyed in great works of dramatic art and in the great struggles of religious purpose.

Finally, the sense of contrast resulting from the feeling of what is, as opposed to what might be, introduces a longing or a craving for the richness of feeling that would be possible were the elements presently incompatible for feeling transformed into contrasts that could be prehended.[8] There would be no adventure of the spirit without the craving that arises from the disparity of the present realization and the hope of what might be. This is the hope that reaches out and seeks to embrace the "more." Whitehead exemplifies one of the most profoundly religious dimensions of this aspect of contrast when he speaks of the vague insistence of another order where present loss is taken up and transformed into a new immediacy.[9] Thus the feeling of another order is the feeling of contrast beyond all present contrasts.

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[7] PR, 103; 169. "If there is to be progress beyond limited ideals, the course of history by way of escape must venture along the borders of chaos in its substitution of higher for lower types of order."

[8] PR, 417.

In light of the fundamental importance of contrasts, Whitehead's conception of religion takes on a dynamic and almost profane character as it reflects the ultimacy of relations and the process they generate. In the context of his thought, the value that lies at the heart of religion does not set the individual at rest; it motivates and activates him. It does not resolve his conflicts and eliminate contrasts; rather, it promotes the recognition of contrasting values and awaits the transformation of incompatibilities into contrasts. In this way, religion is not so much a matter of choosing one value as opposed to others, as it is a matter of integrating the widest range of value through the guidance of a creative meta-value.

What this view of religion suggests is that the supreme Eros of the universe bears the aim to transform incompatibilities into contrasts. Whitehead illustrates the aim to overcome the incompatibilities of experience in his comments regarding God's relationship to evil.[10] It is a consequence of God's overarching aim for the realization of value.[11] God does not isolate evil from good or destroy it; rather, he transmutes evil into good in such a way that evil becomes a steppingstone.[12] That is to say, he does this initially in the primordiality of his all-embracing ideal aim as supreme Eros. As the living urge toward all possibilities of value, the Eros encompasses all living realities and moves relentlessly toward the enhancement of value through intensity of satisfaction. The overcoming of evil, then, is tied in with the task of maximizing value.

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[9] PR, 516, 531.

The underlying level of our thesis, which is exemplified in this notion of Eros and in the other strains of Whitehead's understanding of the religious life of mankind, accents the enrichment of relations between the one and the many by the inclusion of greater contrasts, awaiting the transformation of incompatibilities. Whitehead's account of rational religion demonstrates some of the ways this works out. We can summarize rational religion's contribution to the basic thesis by noting two important ways it deals with the problem of the one and the many.

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[10] RM, 148-149; PR, 517-518.

[11] PR, 373-374, 160-161; AI, 251, 198.

[12] RM, 149.

B. Individuality and Intuitions in Rational Religion

Rational religion has provided the context for Whitehead's religious position, and, consequently, his various descriptions of religion center around the topic of individuality in community.[13] To summarize the relation of this topic to the thesis of this study and our preceding considerations of value, we need only recall that the individual standpoint emerged as the locus for religion in consequence of the need to express more universal relations, to incorporate a wider world of value into the substance of the individual's becoming. In the process, generality assumed an increasingly important role as the force of more general beliefs were able to cleanse the inward parts and deliver the individual from the particularity of his own self-interest.[14]

In rational religion, individuality and the deepening of value go together, for belief is rooted in the discernment of more fundamental generalities which lead the individual from tribal identification to solitariness.[15] As the individual detaches himself from his particular surroundings and the particularity of ritual and emotion, he comes to rely more on those elements of value which are the basis for universal relations. The relationship between the one and the many is focused more sharply in the individual through generalization and universalization,for they facilitate the release from lesser values.

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[13] RM, 16, 19, 28, 47, 86.

[14] RM, 15.

[15] RM, 19.

Solitariness and relationality, therefore, go together. Since religion is concerned with individuality _in_ community, openness to the value of others is a prerequisite for the individual's own satisfaction and value. Of course, this is true in any mode of relationality, but it is of crucial importance in religious relationality for its very character involves a transcendence of particular interests in favor of more sweeping interests which overcome triviality. Thus, rational religion provides a framework for the universal claim of value to take root in the individual's life so that he himself can become a more complex, rich and self-transcending integration of the many.

Universalization and openness to a widening world of values does not eliminate the tension between individuality and community. In the higher levels of experience, generalization provides a means of dealing with the tension by illuminating the more basic principles and values in operation within relations, but the tension remains and is even increased in consequence of the new contrasts and incompatibilities which tug at the boundaries of individuality and community. It is these larger boundaries and the more universal tensions that are of greatest importance in Whitehead's view. The individual's perception of larger values occurs most immediately in intuitions which are another expression of the one and the many that is central to rational religion.

Religious intuitions play a central role in Whitehead's approach to religion, for they are the source of the great general truths which shape the religious outlooks of individuals.[16] Religious intuitions are expressions of the one and the many in that they are particular instances in which an inherent generality in things is felt. This source of generality is important because it is not a generality derived through interpretation but one which has its roots in the nature of things.

The religious intuitions bring wide generality into the particularity of physical feeling through a feeling of the fusion of the physical and conceptual poles of experience. As a result, the physical feelings of the individual take on a new magnanimity. That is to say, by virtue of the great generality that is felt directly in intuition, the individual is stretched to a new largeness of feeling. Rational religion carries out the intuition by continuing systematically to fuse the breadth of conceptual thought with the intensity of religious emotion.

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[16] RM, 19, 130-131.

In intuitions, the great generalities are felt with the force of physical feeling. The vividness which accompanies the feeling increases the ideal's motivating power, but in view of Whitehead's overall approach, the power still appears to operate in terms of persuasion, a persuasion that centers in the immediate, forceful perception of a unity of aim. Thus the conceptual framework of metaphysics or religion elaborates the general aspects of this unity of aim, while the intuitions still remain important to confirm conceptual generality.

The religious intuitions, therefore, manifest the relation of the one and the many in several ways. First, they do so in terms of their character as instances of generality felt in particularity. Secondly, they reveal a unity of aim and lend strength to the motivating power of the aim. Finally, the intuitions which provide the foundation of rational religion also support and confirm religion so that it can continue to function as the central element in the coherent ordering of life. In other words, intuitions provide religion's verifiable experiential rootedness.

The religious orientation described in the thesis we have been treating builds on the intuition of the pervasive generality of the aesthetic order. But the religious intuitions also have very important consequences which take shape in Whitehead's categoreal scheme and in the method of descriptive generalization. Since his view of religion is of a piece with the content and character of his categoreal scheme, it is well to bring out the intrinsic connection between the religious base of the thesis and the specifically Whiteheadian metaphysical approach.

II. The Intellectual Consequences of Whitehead's Approach to Religion

A. The Categoreal Scheme

As we have already seen in this study, Whitehead's analysis of religion is tied to his analysis of metaphysics.[17] He sees religion as providing the fundamental insight into order that grounds metaphysics. Moreover, it is the abiding trust in order that sustains the philosophical, and even the scientific, enterprise. Beyond this, the specific character of Whitehead's own metaphysical system demonstrates a strong relationship to his religious vision and sensibility.

Whitehead's metaphysical system is taken up with a distinctive aesthetic vision of order. The aesthetic mode of order provides a paradigm of the basic elements which characterize the sensitivity of relations to each other, and the categoreal scheme carries out that model with attention to specific detail. The aesthetic order is a perspective of value, with its own discovery regarding what is ultimate. Both Whitehead's religious approach and his philosophical vision build on the basic insight into this ultimate value. Whitehead's perception and analysis of ultimate value reveals creativity or processive relations as the essential generality that captures the essense of religious valuation and yields the most adequate intellectual resources.[18]

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[17] RM, 81-86; PR, 23-24.

The categoreal scheme, then, is the philosophical systematization of Whitehead's religiously rooted perception of the ultimate value or meta-value. As rational religion explicates its fundamental intuitions in its various dogmas, the philosophical view that Whitehead presents is explicated in the categories. The generality that is represented in the categoreal scheme, like the generality of rational religion, attempts to apply its elucidatory power to all occasions.[19]

Whitehead's insight into the more substantive and ultimate generalities attests to the intellectual fertility of his thought. His analysis of reality demonstrates wide applicability because it is of sufficiently deep generality to lend essential clarification to a wide range of experience and thought. The insightful generality of Whitehead's scheme is its great strength.

The categoreal scheme itself with its various details represents a spelling out of the relationship between the one and the many. The basic philosophical question, as Whitehead establishes it, concerns the matter of how concrete fact can exhibit entities abstract from itself, yet participated in by its own nature.[20] The categoreal scheme with its categories of ultimacy, existence, explanation, and obligation elaborates the various levels of dealing with the basic question. Both the philosophical question and the scheme which responds to it deal with the question of the one and the many in a basic way. At the same time, the manner in which the question of the one and the many is handled gives direction to the way that the religious equivalent of the question is treated. That is to say, Whitehead deals with the religious equivalent of the question in terms of how the individual in his solitariness relates to others so as to merge his claim to the attainment of value with the universal claim.

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[18] PR, 31.

[19] RM, 31; PR, 48.

The categoreal scheme, then, bears the weight of providing the rational components for explicating the meta-value of creativity which sums up the aesthetic order. The fullness of the scheme and its applicability reveals an intellectual fruitfulness that is rooted in a foundational insight of immense richness. Whitehead's insight into the sensitivity and mutuality of relations not only reflects an ultimate value that is religiously evocative, but it also reflects a religious insight that has far-reaching non-religious implications for Whitehead in that it becomes the basis for elucidating religious and non-religious relations alike.

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[20] PR, 30.

While the categoreal scheme represents an outstanding intellectual consequence of the religious intuition of the generality of relations, of parallel importance is the method which makes the scheme possible. Let us summarize, then, the role of descriptive generalization as the essential rational means of carrying out the task of understanding the one and the many.

B. Descriptive Generalization

Descriptive generalization, which was outlined at the beginning of this study, has its roots in the perception of a character in the nature of things; that is, in religious intuition. It is the methodological application of the general character inherent in the nature of things to the elucidation of all areas of experience.[21] Although the philosopher need not experience the intuition of final truths with the full religious tonality it can carry, nevertheless, the roots of descriptive generalization lie in a religious insight, and it is the philosopher's role to be able to recognize and analyze the deeper elements of generality in such intuitions.

By its very nature, descriptive generalization aims at the extension of insight through a conceptual outreach so that the basic feeling of order reveals all its dimensions, validates itself in elucidating past, present, and future experience, and is made available for the elucidation of a variety of other fields. For Whitehead, without this largeness of intellectual range to correspond with the enlargement of the individual's experience, religion remains parochial and lacks the ramified impact of something that is central to the ordering of life.

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[21] PR, 8.

To be more specific, by its intention to apply descriptive generalization widely, Whitehead's system promotes the function of reason in the service of religion and the art of life, which is to live, to live well, and to live better.[22] The way that the method of descriptive generalization contributes to this process is by providing the rational structure whereby living can be guided so as to maximize the possibilities for fullness of life. In this regard, Whitehead reminds us of the close relation of religion and speculative reason which is a result of the insight that religion lends to the systematic development of metaphysics and derivatively to those other disciplines for which metaphysics provides a framework.[23]

Whitehead's own system and the method of descriptive generalization that he used to deal with the generality of structure in the universe is a fruit of an intellectual process which presumes a religious sensibility or a feeling for essential importance. If the sensitivity to importance lacks the emotional impact of the intuition, it still reveals an ability to discriminate and analyze importance. Rational inference alone is not sufficient for the task without a basic responsiveness to the elemental forms of generality which are responsible for the sense of importance which is felt essentially as given for the task of generalizing.

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[22] FR, 8, 18.

[23] FR, 66.

Descriptive generalization would not be worthy of the philosophical enterprise unless it reached down to the unmanageable, given, and vague elements of experience. Otherwise, it would still be dealing with the more superficial and relatively transient characteristics of experience, and would fail to convey the essential structures by which human beings guide their lives. Descriptive generalization, then, is an intellectual consequence of a religious outlook, the methodological application of the same religious insight into deep underlying realities that issues into either metaphysics or religion.

The attempt to stretch the application of descriptive generalization to its limits is an expression of the conceptual outreach. Consequently, descriptive generalization attempts to clarify the applicability or range of generality inherent in specific ideas,while at the same time, it illuminates the limits of rationality. Descriptive generalization and the categoreal scheme,as we have seen, are ways of drawing out the fullest rational implications of the religious vision.

To complete the final presentation of Whitehead's view of religion, it is necessary to summarize the way such a view is lived out, by examining its existential dimensions.

III. The Existential Dimensions of Religion

Having examined the basic character of Whitehead's religious vision and its intellectual consequences, it remains to summarize the existential dimensions of his view. There are as many possible ways of speaking of these dimensions as there are pithy epigrammatic statements regarding religion by Whitehead. But for our purposes here, we can summarize these dimensions in several categories which reflect the one and the many; that is to say, we will consider the living out of Whitehead's approach to religion as unifying vision, relational solitariness, worshipful response to divine persuasion, and adventure of the spirit.

A. Religion as Unifying Vision

Whitehead reflects on religion specifically as a vision in several of his works.[24] The kind of vision that religion expresses is a vision which is central to the coherent ordering of life.[25] As such, its scope extends beyond the passing moment to the whole of life. This vision brings into view the ideal which is real, yet waiting to be realized, which is a remote possibility, yet the greatest of present facts, which gives meaning to all that passes, yet which ever eludes apprehension.

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[24] SMW, 191-192; RM, 149; PR, 519; AI, 167.

[25] RM, 30.

Religion operates as a unifying vision by virtue of its integration of value. This integration reflects the perception of unity of aim in the universe and the order or harmonious adjustment of values in the universe. In other words, the religious vision is teleological. In the Whiteheadian scheme, the perception of a unity of aim is the perception of the coordination of the divergent strands of value into a central focus directed toward intensity of feeling.[26] Intensity of feeling in this case involves more than emotional excitement. It calls for the purification of emotional excitement by the breadth of conceptual thought.

The perception of order is a principal means of enlarging conceptual thought and thus purifying the emotions. Order introduces generality by virtue of which we can determine the mode of limitation of value that maximizes intensity of feeling and delivers it from the narrowness of a vision that is too small. The unifying vision of religion which is taken up with value and its deepening, then, for Whitehead signals a mode of generality or order that recognizes a processive deepening through the accommodation of new contrasts.

Since generality and contrast are bound up with the unifying vision, this dimension of religion draws heavily on the rational elements of experience. A sense of conceptual outreach emerges amid the rational elements of experience which aim to embrace the "more" of wider relations, including the elements which are not yet, but which might be.

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[26] PR, 161, 373-374.

Because generality and contrast are essential to the unifying vision, the rational elements dominate this dimension of religion. At the same time, these rational elements promote the conceptual outreach by which the vision guides the individual toward the inclusion of greater contrast and intensity. When the outreach is accompanied by the intuition of peace, the vision is not dimmed by tragedy because the sense of peace preserves trust that in the long run the promotion of order and beauty will be efficacious.

The breadth of this unifying vision reaches its culmination for Whitehead in the insistent feeling of another order where present losses are transcended and the value of present achievements is preserved. Here, Whitehead illustrates the full scope of religion as a unifying vision for it is here in the insistent feeling of another order that the contrast which promotes intensity of feeling is demonstrated most fully. The religious vision introduces a contrast in which the mode of order that is prevalent is itself the ground to be superseded by a new contrast initiated through a conceptual outreach. The contrast introduces such intensity of feeling that where reason fails to demonstrate the vision, trust in the efficacy of beauty takes over.[27]

B. Religion as Relational Solitariness

Another important dimension of rational religion is its concern with individuality in community or with relational solitariness. In rational religion, the quality of one's religious response cannot be judged simply by its conformation to an established pattern, expressed uniformly by all members of a community. Instead, the quality and depth of religious response depends upon the individual's own integration of the value inherent in the world, and thus solitariness stands out as a vital aspect of religious living.[28]

This integration is guided by convictions which shape the way the individual relates to his world and the others in the world. His beliefs cleanse his relations with others, delivering them from mere repetition of response or conformity to narrow standards of behavior. The purification of the individual's faith is a purification of the smallness of his relations which can be accomplished through the perception of great generalities which are inherent in all relations.

As the individual is formed in rational religion, his relationality and his solitariness increase. The religious impulse seeks the fullness of relationships that encompasses the widest range of value. In this way, religion represents a universal claim which addresses the individual spirit with the question, what in the way of value is the attainment of life? The full response to this claim is world loyalty, for the individual can find no comprehensive value until he merges his individual claim with that of the objective universe.[29]

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[27] AI, 285.

[28] RM, 16. "If you are never solitary, you are never religious."

The individual grows as individual by his relationships. As they expand qualitatively to encompass a greater range and depth of value experience, so his solitariness grows. The evolution of religion from a tribal context to the context of world religion demonstrates this expansive effect. In a world religion one does not relate to a few others because they are like one's self. Rather, one relates to a diversity of others because he has discovered a deeper generality shared by all that supports his expanded world of relations.

At the same time that religion promotes the expansion of relations, the perception of generality that makes this possible also has the effect of increasing the individual's solitariness. Because the individual is constituted by his relations, when he is related to a greater diversity of others at a level of deep generality, his own individuality and uniqueness is enhanced and intensified. In solitariness his stature increases as he is more receptive to the range of value that others contribute to his becoming. Thus an increase in stature requires a deepening of solitariness.

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[29] RM, 59.

This movement toward solitariness is demonstrated in the great religious figures who have struggled with great general truths. They have felt their separateness from others as well as their solidarity with them because they have perceived that great generality is realized only in particularity, that the universal value of selfless concern for the promotion of the beauty and well-being of the larger world can be attained only by the solitary personal surrender of one's own personal interests and concerns. In the final analysis, the importance of relations notwithstanding, the individual's solitariness stands out for the religious perspective, which occurs in the midst of the relations out of which he is constituted and to which he makes his return. In the great moments of religion it is there that the real importance lies for Whitehead.

C. The Worshipful Response to Divine Persuasion

The unifying vision and the relational solitariness which have just been described represent aspects of religious existence which are incomplete in themselves until we acknowledge the dedicated response to value that is their counterpart when a genuine religious attitude is operative. For Whitehead, the immediate reaction of human nature to the religious vision is worship.[30] Worship is the surrender of one's personal claims and purposes to the eminently worthwhile claim which transcends individual purposes. Such worship is based on the power of love and its attraction for the individual to participate in the harmonious adjustment of detail.

Worship, then, is the surrender of one's self to the reality which most fully expresses the harmony one is to reflect. Worship is not a mere formality or ritual. It is not an external expression or an isolated act. It is the response of the individual at the center of his subjectivity to the source of the essential designs that shape the universe. Worship is surrender to God who invites the individual to merge his value claim with the universal value claim, to participate in the harmonious adjustment of values, and to reflect the beauty of love which has its source in God.

The object of worship for Whitehead is not a God who dominates as an arbitrary or tyrannical ruler but one who persuades as a model of beauty. The God who inspires worship is the poet of the world who leads by tender patience with his vision of truth, beauty, and goodness.[31] In his most mature thought, Whitehead describes God as exemplifying pre-eminently the character exemplified by all entities. That is, the deity that Whitehead regards as most worthy of worship is the deity that most fully exemplifies the fullness and mutuality of relationship.[32] In the final analysis, a God who is most evocative of worship for Whitehead is a dipolar God who not only leads but who also responds to and preserves the value of all other entities.

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[30] SMW, 192.

[31] PR, 526.

Yet when all things are considered, in Whitehead's approach to religion, the function of God that stands out most vividly is his character as divine persuasion and supreme Eros guiding the universe. This function is behind not only the basic level of the central thesis of this essay but also its underlying strain, for God is integrator and unifier, the one who brings together into the unity of his being the diverse values of the world, largely through his aim at intensity of feeling. Insofar as there are incompatibilities or evils which cannot be incorporated as contrasts, he transforms them so that they may be steppingstones for the achievement of good; but he does this by relentless persuasion rather than by coercion.

The depth of God's experience far surpasses that of any creature and is the outcome of his solitary struggle to bring order and greater beauty out of relationships and to overcome evil. Were it not for the strength of his own aim, God would be passive victim. But, instead, through his aim, he is active agent devoted to the transformation of the world for the sake of his own deeper experience and for the enhancement of beauty that his being will contribute to the world. In this respect Whitehead sees the power of God's persuasive love as evocative of the worshipful response and commitment to participate in the process. Given Whitehead's approach to religion as a whole and his emphasis on rational religion, it is the initiating and persuasive aspect of God's nature that stands out with regard to the religious claim rather than his effective and responsive presence.

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[32] PR, 523, 530.

D. Religion as Adventure of the Spirit

Whitehead's conception of God and of man's religious response to God in the worship of his life produces a dynamic view of religion. It is a view in which religion is a quest rather than a goal and in which the individual is stimulated and motivated rather than consoled. In Whitehead's framework of thought, when religion is true to its character, it is not a haven for the insecure. It is not an opiate or a stage of regression. Religion is the reaction of human nature to the search for God.[33] That reaction is one which, by its nature, requires one's finest energies and most selfless dedication.

What this means, for one thing, is that religion cannot come to a final resting place or satisfaction with itself. This has been the echoing cry of the reformers throughout the centuries.

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[33] SMW, 190.

But for Whitehead the dynamism of religion is based on his view of reality and on the position that religion itself can be either good or bad.[34] What is more significant about religion than some sort of inherent goodness is that it is transcendently important. The source of its importance is its provision of a direction for one's life, a system of belief by which one's character is formed.

The character of reality militates against complacency or self-satisfaction in religious self-understanding. Reality is a process in which the many become one and are increased by one. The advancing complexification that occurs constantly demands new integrations. In other words, one is always dealing with new demands of new relations which are part and parcel of the religious response within the whole of experience. Even beyond this, the quest for God is a continual source of adventure because God himself participates in the increasing richness of relations through his essential involvement in the process.

The importance of religion is a way of speaking of the abiding element which remains amid the continual flux of new unifications.[35] The transcendent importance of religion derives from its insight into essential generality which provides a direction applicable to the whole of one's life. For Whitehead, the form of this generality, which must not only reflect value but also the deepening of value, takes its shape from the aesthetic order which promotes the adventure of the spirit as it promotes novelty.

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[34] RM, 17.

[35] RM, 60; AI, 286.

In this context, religion is a disrupting and energizing force in history. Its deep purpose is not the maintenance of the status quo but the desire to be true to the aim of God whose order guides the universe. Religion reflects the basic character of the aesthetic order of contrast arising out of identity. Against this background one can speak coherently of God's role in disrupting history and bringing about a newness of life which is not an eternal return to a primal state but a novel realization of his relentless purpose, intensity of valuation.

Religion provides an energizing force in history concretely through the fusion of the particularity of its emotion with the generality of order it discovers in the nature of things.[36] As it concretizes the prevalent mode of importance, religion leaves aside minor intensities in favor of a more sweeping interest. Though it may be responsible for a downward as well as an upward movement, religion's fusion of particularity and generality contributes a motive force which, in the long run, is the kind of impetus necessary to deliver human existence from triviality and degeneration. Though the stretching of individual interests occurs abstractly through the subject's awareness of the generality of aim, the generalization is not effective as an energizing force until it is particularized in a concrete feeling of religious importance.

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[36] PR, 23.

In light of this final synthesis of Whitehead's approach to religion, it is now possible to evaluate the picture of religion that has emerged from our study.

CRITICAL EVALUATION

The preceding synthesis brings this study of Whitehead's approach to religion to a close. But the study would be incomplete without an evaluation of the view of religion that Whitehead has left us. At the end of the second chapter of this work, a tentative evaluation of Whitehead's view of religion in Religion in the Making was presented. In light of the preceding synthesis, it is now our task to offer a concluding statement regarding the adequacy of Whitehead's approach.

This evaluation will raise some questions and criticisms with regard to Whitehead's view of religion which can only be sketched here. For the evaluation to reveal its full impact and the possibilities which remain for the further application of Whitehead's system to religion, the issues raised here need to be spelled out in greater detail and more attention needs to be given to the constructive project of resolving some of the issues. The evaluation, nevertheless, will serve as a first step toward a more complete constructive response to Whitehead's statement of religion.

Whitehead's approach to religion offers a framework for dealing with the problem of the meaning of religion in an unfinished world, for it centers the issues squarely in the context of the valuational process. By so uncovering the concerns and character of religion, Whitehead establishes a means for dealing with the topic of religion which permits its relation to other areas of interest to be clarified. Most fundamentally, the overall valuational setting brings to light some of the common concerns of religion and metaphysics since they are both rooted in the religious intuition of a permanent character in things; and it affirms their interdependence in that metaphysics provides the systematic interpretation whereby the order discerned in religion can receive consistent application.

But Whitehead's development of the meaning and function of religion in light of his rational concerns regarding value raises some questions regarding the less rational aspects of religion. The deeper stirrings of religion, the enlargement of values and purposes that the individual first perceives viscerally, the unreflective wholehearted surrender of the religious response, are conspicuously absent from the final synthesis. Rather, it seems that religion fades in light of the systematic interpretation of value given by metaphysics. After religion contributes its originative insight, what remains to be realized are the dogmas, rituals, and particular expressions which are subsequently in constant need of reformation. When metaphysics enters the scene with its elaboration of value, the ever-recurring and fading vision of religion takes a form which is free from the vicissitudes and ambiguities of concrete experience. But what of the felt impulses which continue to stretch individuals to new depths before the vision is perceived as vision at all?

Granted, the physical aspects of religion are not wholly absent. Whitehead admits the fusion of the generality of conceptual thought with the intensity of sensitive experience in intuitions and in particular events. But the full impact of this fusion does not rise to the surface because its massive, unmanageable, vague aspects are not evident. What stands out is a vision against which the concrete forms and feelings of religion are seen more as difficulties than as resources. The moving force of religion, for Whitehead, lies more in the allurement of the promise than in the creative presence already at work.

As a consequence of the prominence of conceptual generality and vision, the generality of metaphysics seems to provide a more important model for the promotion of value than is found in the great religious figures who concretized value. Yet it is these concretizations of value that make it possible for ideals to be formulated. They are not only particular occasions that deliver the abstractions of philosophic thought from ineffectiveness, but they are also an important resource in the community of meaning, part of the data of experience.

These considerations regarding Whitehead's approach to religion are the general background for three basic problems which need to be cited: the role of community in religion, the association of religion with persuasion and final causality, and the emphasis on rational religion.

The first basic problem in Whitehead's approach to religion concerns the role of community in promoting and embodying religious meaning. The notion of community, which has a positive role in Whitehead's system by virtue of its carrying the continuity and identity out of which new value and contrasts arise, nevertheless also has a negative role in that it represents objectification and inertia. In Whitehead's approach to religion, the negative aspects of community stand out. Whitehead sees the function of religion in the long run as being bound up with the overcoming of negative inertial forces. When he speaks of the upward trend that religion represents, he does so in terms of the recurring religious vision which serves to promote the deepening of value by delivering the individual from the limited purposes of life, and from the inertia of the settled world of the past. This settled world is the world of the many, the community.

Against the background of this haunting negative aspect of community, Whitehead sees religion as what the individual does with his own solitariness. It is from the perspective of individuality, not community, that Whitehead's view of religion as individuality in community is supported and played out. While Whitehead has affirmed the thoroughly social character of reality and has acknowledged that religion is concerned with the creation of the individual through his relations, in the last analysis, the positive contributions of community do not emerge in their fullness. What the individual does with his relations stands out positively, while the way the community influences the individual stands out negatively. This emphasis introduces at least two difficulties for the understanding of religion.

An important difficulty in Whitehead's approach to the communitarian aspects of religion has to do with the question of how we are to deal with the creative influences that are bound up with community. It is not difficult to agree with Whitehead that the community tends toward the promotion of the stable elements of life in order to preserve the value that has been achieved. Nor is it difficult to agree that, as Whitehead has pointed out, this inescapable aspect of community can have a deadening effect. But, as he has not indicated with any force, community is also the inescapable basis for security which allows the emergence of new values and novel expressions appreciative of a wider community.

Community is the locus for that creativity which impels the universe forward not only by the ideal aim toward which the individual directs his integration but also through the feeling of the massive, unmanageable forces out of which the impulse arises and moves before the individual even senses the direction of the process. In some respects, even at the higher stages of experience, the community gives birth to the individual. Even when the individual calls into question certain elements of the particular community, the more universal community continues to form him through the heavier, less easily identifiable relations.

When the individual feels the challenge of the wider community to move out beyond the immediate, particular community to respond to larger, more universal claims, he is building on the positive experience of a particular community. This is the ground for his trust and openness to prehend the larger community positively. Even before the individual moves out to a wider world of influence, the particular community itself exercises a positive relational influence. The individual's particularized community of family, friends, and religious associates provides the immediate feeling of order and confidence without which one can hardly move beyond his present concerns and achievements. Likewise, the individual's concerns must be directed back to some particular community for his openness to relations to have real meaning.

Whitehead introduces this contribution of the particular community in Adventures of Ideas when he speaks of the confidence in order that comes from an affirming love relationship. But he merely mentions the point, and its full weight is not brought out. An adequate view of religion needs to give sufficient acknowledgment to the communitarian grounds that stimulate the individual's confidence to open up to wider communitarian influences in the first place. On this basis one can hope that one of the goals of particular communities will be the creation and education of individuals who can eventually be freed from the smaller community to participate, in turn, in the creation of larger, richer communities, promoting individuals of even greater stature. In this regard, Whitehead has not provided an adequate account of the complex communitarian elements that exert a positive influence on individuals.

Another point of difficulty related to Whitehead's influence on individuality is his neglect of the importance of symbol, ritual, and emotion. For Whitehead, the roles of symbol, ritual, and emotion are bound up with the communitarian, and therefore with the more physical elements of religion. When ritual and emotion are not criticized and are not coordinated with the central values that enable religion to function in the coherent ordering of life, they are merely strong stimuli which can feed upon themselves and which consequently result in repetition which does not easily lead to the deepening of value. Yet we must ask how symbol, ritual, and emotion do function positively when they are coordinated in the more developed forms of religion. Whitehead does not have much to say regarding their relevance at this level.

Whitehead seems to suggest that ritual and emotion are earlier stages of religion that are left behind in rational religion. This is not to be taken in an absolute sense, for his systematic approach and his recognition that more primitive elements continue to exert an influence would not permit an extreme interpretation of ritual and emotion. Nevertheless, the approach Whitehead takes in Religion in the Making, and his neglect of ritual, celebration, and the force of integrating symbols at the stage of rational religion leaves some important elements unaccounted for.

The picture of religion that finally emerges does not include a significant recognition of the role of ritual and symbol in exerting a powerful integrating influence on the formation of the individual. These expressions qualify as events in which religious values are brought to a focus, and in that context they can not only stimulate emotion and clarify vision, but they can also provide the physical conditions for the wider, expansive relations to be felt by the participants.

Whitehead's treatment of expression as the fundamental sacrament, the outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace, hints at the possibilities for understanding ritual and celebration in a more positive way, but Whitehead fails to draw out the full dimensions of creativity in sacramental expressions. While at times there has been undue emphasis on the efficacious results of sacraments, there is, nevertheless, an important insight at work in the perception of some sort of an effective element. This insight is the recognition that there is a potential in rituals and symbols to enlarge the individual's capacity for experience. In light of Whitehead's characterization of religion as the individual's movement to include greater value, we cannot avoid asking what contribution the communitarian celebration of meaning can make to the enlargement of the individual's capacity for relationships of greater quality. Such celebrations are physical occasions which, like all physical occasions, provide the ground for the specific feeling of the individual. Thus Whitehead's neglect of this important area represents the neglect of a possible source of the impulse to greater generality in relations.

Also apropos of the question of the role of community in religion is the matter of the tension between individuality and community. For Whitehead, the tension is usually seen in terms of the individual's need to express freedom and responsibility and to break away from communitarian forms and expressions. But there is also the positive contribution the community contributes to the individual in stretching his concerns when they are too narrow. It is often only through participation in community, provided it is large enough in its own purposes, that the individual feels the discomforting enlargement of his own values. This perspective, in which community serves growth, needs to have its positive tensions acknowledged more fully.

In general, then, we can say that a further exploration of the positive role of community is needed to determine the way its unity and affirmation help to form the individual. Both the smaller particular community and the larger universal community exert positive influences on individuals which are not adequately explored in Whitehead's thought.

A second basic problem in Whitehead's approach to religion concerns his almost exclusive association of the finer elements of religion with persuasion and final causality. For Whitehead, God creates through persuasion and the presentation of an initial aim. He does not coerce subjects but rather lures them to their completion through a presentation of value. Whitehead's view of religion reflects the same emphasis on persuasion as we find in his approach to God. Religion is a quest for the unattainable, the vision of something which stands beyond, behind, and within the flux of immediate things. In this regard, the most important functions of the religious relationship have to do with the ways it keeps the individual alive to the promise and possibility of what might be. The efficacious, empowering, and appreciative aspects of the religious relationship do not emerge with any force.

Whitehead hints at a possible ground for dealing with the efficacious, creative aspects of encounter with God when he speaks of the unmanageable, heavier elements in experience and of the sense of importance that pervades primitive experience. But this aspect is never incorporated into his description or analysis of religious experience. The result is that he does not account for the peculiar sort of fulfillment, strength of purpose, comfort, and immediate sense of justification that come from one's surrender to a creative relationship free of manipulation or control. This is unfortunate because, as essential as persuasion and final causality are, they will be short circuited if they are not seen in relation to the elemental feeling by virtue of which it is possible to strive for the vision even when frustrated.

That Whitehead almost exclusively associates the finer elements of religion with persuasion raises some problems regarding the nature and extent of God's role in the attainment of value. Granting the importance of the subject's response to God's persuasion, one cannot leave aside the importance of God's efficacious activity. The deepening religious value that Whitehead finds, both in the individual and in history, includes an efficacious aspect which sustains the adventure of the spirit. By associating religion and the function of God primarily with persuasive elements, Whitehead unduly limits God and thus fails to make fully evident his character as an actual entity.

Whitehead affirms that God is an actual entity, but unless we deal more adequately with the power that God would exercise by virtue of his being an actual entity, it is difficult to conceive the fullness of God's experience and its overflow. That is to say, Whitehead's description of God's love flooding back into the world leads us to ask what creative efficacy can be posited of this love. Unless we can account for God's efficaciousness, it is difficult to support the validity of trust in God and to affirm the reality of God's adventure. This problem can be more specifically illustrated in connection with the question of the power of evil and the question of the power of love.

The overcoming of evil, for Whitehead, has to do with the overcoming of fragmentary purpose. Final causality and persuasion, which function in relation to the religious vision, represent a coaxing of the individual occasion toward a more inclusive purpose. In this respect, they are God's instrumentality for overcoming evil. Whitehead insists that God neither demands love nor overcomes evil through coercion. Instead, respecting the individual's freedom, God presents the aim which will bring about greater value. Though one can appreciate Whitehead's concern to avoid attributing coercion to God, he cannot help but ask if final causality fully elucidates one's experience of God's power over evil. Whether we choose to call the efficacious elements of this power coercive or not is another question. For this reason, Whitehead leaves certain intuitions concerning evil and God's power unanswered and appears unable to avoid leaving a picture of God as somewhat of a spectator rather than a participant.

The power of God's love also needs to be related to efficaciousness. The need to account for this becomes evident when we consider the sort of a situation in which love effectively transforms the one who is loved. When an individual loves another who either loves less or is indifferent or who even hates him, we find an example of a special kind of power. It is a power which can open the recipient to wider influences. It can remove his inhibitions by affirming him in an all-inclusive love that is larger than hate or indifference. This affirmation has the effect of enlarging the feelings of the one who is loved and thus making him stronger. Moreover, the inclusiveness of the love does not merely represent an ideal of greater inclusiveness but an inclusive concrete reality which exerts a creative influence. Unless Whitehead's approach to religion can fill out final causality and persuasion with this efficacious aspect, it will not elucidate some of the finest moments of religious experience.

A third basic problem in Whitehead's approach to religion concerns his concentration on rational religion. This concentration raises difficulties which have already been mentioned in relation to other aspects of his approach, but it also includes several additional points which need to be noted. According to Whitehead's description, rational religion is the form that characterizes religion most comprehensively today inasmuch as it expresses a basic function of religion as the central element in a coherent ordering of life. Religion functions as such a central element by virtue of its insight into generality, a generality which subsequently requires a conceptual framework to apply it systematically toward the integration of various diverse elements of one's life. The insight into generality which issues into rational religion attests to the unity of truth, the extensiveness of order, and the fruitfulness of religion beyond its own sphere. But these contributions of generality notwithstanding, it must not be forgotten that religion has its source in a fundamental experience in which the rational aspect does not dominate.

Thus, some of the experiential roots of generality need to be recalled. We have noted that generality functions importantly in the perception of a character in the nature of things and in the perception of a unity of aim guiding the subject's integration of value. But the generality the concrescing subject feels must be inherent in particular occasions in the subject's immediate past. The generality is already present, already embodied in concrete particular situations which must be felt in order for the generality to be felt. If generality, which Whitehead says is the salt of religion, is divorced from the concreteness of its own exemplifications, religion can become thin and shallow. When one loses a sense of the physical groundedness of generality, he can forget the source of verification and can begin to believe he expresses the generality in all its fullness because he thinks the generality. In other words, if generality is to reveal the concrete possibilities for fuller, richer living in the concrete, it must always be seen first in relation to the concrete circumstances out of which it arises.

Apropos of this point of the physical rootedness of generality, Whitehead's analysis of religious experience in terms of religious intuition has focused on generality in such a way as to neglect the elemental feelings that give rise to it. We have followed an interpretation of intuition which attempts to recognize the important fusion of the physical and the conceptual, but this interpretation has only been sketched out of the suggestions of Whitehead's system,and it still needs to be developed and evaluated. What the basic analysis of religious experience in terms of intuitions brings out is that the content of the feeling receives all of the attention while the quality of the feeling itself is bypassed. Since the felt quality of the experience does not receive attention, there is not a full acknowledgment of the sense of relatedness and the release of power that accompanies religious experience. Even Whitehead's descriptions of the intuitions of peace and holiness, which usually convey a relational affirmation and a feeling of creative empowering from a source not one's own, do not incorporate a treatment of the quality of the feeling. The quality is not merely an emotional dimension of the experience, but it is intrinsic to the source of the feeling. Whitehead's dominant preoccupation with rational religion results in a loss of contact with the root qualities of religious experience.

In connection with these observations on rational religion, one realizes that both Whitehead's concern with final causality and his concentration on the conceptual aspects of religion have limited the range of religious impact to the envisagement of the expanding world of relations. This approach tends toward the neglect of the individual's surrender to present relations which provides the most effective impetus toward enlargement. Along these lines it might be well to bring out more strongly the function of reason which deals with the criticism of final causes, for the positive contribution of the function of reason in religion is not merely to pave the way for new rational descriptions and constructions, but also to remove the obstacles from the individual's ability to experience more widely. This means that reason should also serve to promote the individual's surrender to what is more fundamental than reason. It is indeed a function of reason to promote this religious art of life.

Continuing this experiential perspective, we realize that it is in response to deeper, richer values in processive relations that the individual truly perceives God to be companion. In the movement from relating to God as void to God as enemy to God as companion, the relationship is shaped not only by the individual's growing awareness of the order which God and the world exemplify, but even more, the relationship is shaped by the individual's surrender to participate in the relational process in which God's creative presence is at work.

At this deepest level of relationship, God the companion is present even in the midst of ambiguity where the individual believes and acts and surrenders in the transcendence of reason. The power at work here needs to stand out more than Whitehead has allowed it to. The power needs to be affirmed, not so that rational religion can finally and exhaustively explain it, but, on the contrary, so that God's mysterious and creative presence in the heart of the complex network of relationships is acknowledged more fully. Conceptual generality can aid in this realization, but it will ever be driven back to its ultimate ground in mystery.

All the problems we have considered with regard to Whitehead's approach to religion lead to a basic problem with regard to Whitehead's conception of God, namely, the matter of how to account for the efficacious expression of God's physical feeling. This study has not been directly concerned with undertaking a critical analysis of Whitehead's conception of God, and to take up objections or to attempt to criticize that conception in any great detail would be inappropriate here. It is proper to note, however, that Whitehead's approach to religion as an expression of the problem of the one and the many relies heavily on rationality and the conceptual aspects of experience for its explanation. The thrust of this perspective is in continuity with his conception of God, who, despite his dipolarity, manifests himself most strongly in terms of his conceptual feelings. The problem of the adequacy of Whitehead's view of religion, therefore, is bound up with the problem of the adequacy of Whitehead's conception of God. In light of this, the resources within Whitehead's own system for dealing with God's physical feelings and his efficacious, creative presence in the world need to be studied more closely. In its present form, Whitehead's view of religion, with its essential relation to this conception of God, is not wholly adequate for the elucidation of man's religious relationship to God, even though it goes a long way in aiding our understanding of the dynamic of the religious expressions that issue from the relationship.

While this evaluation has called attention to certain areas of Whitehead's approach to religion which fail to do justice to the heavier, elemental aspects of religious experience, these critical comments have been a response to Whitehead's own challenge to test his scheme. They should not obscure the significant contributions he has made toward a contemporary revitalization of religion, especially his provision of a framework for religion in the valuational process, his attention to what religion means in terms of importance, his demonstration of its relationship to the whole of life, and his elucidation of the intellectual consequences of religion in his own philosophical scheme. Above all, Whitehead's view has served to focus our attention on the larger issues that confront us, issues with which our age must wrestle if the religious vision is to renew its force and recur with added richness and purity in the concrete. The renewal of the religious vision as an emergent out of life experience depends upon the surrender to the adventure of relationship with God. For those who give themselves to the adventure and its claims, life is worship, not a rule of safety, but an "adventure of the spirit, a flight after the unattainable." Yet they trust that the unattainable is present in power, not only evoking the quest, but sustaining and fructifying it as well.

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